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The study is an attempt to find out the attitudes of the 
younger generation in Hong Kong towards the communist government, 
and also to try to figure out how these attitudes are formed. 
Three dimensions of political attitudes are tested. They are the 
general affections and evaluations towards the c o m m u n i s t 
government; attitudes towards the ideology of Chinese socialism; 
and the sentiment of patriotism. The level of knowledge on the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the c o m m u n i s t and the 
nationalist governments is also tested. 
Both the adolescents and their parents are quite negative 
towards the communist government. They are particularly hostile 
towards its recent performance. They also e v a l u a t e C h i n e s e 
socialism quite negatively, but they are in g e n e r a l quite 
patriotic. Patriotism of the adolescents coexists with their 
strong Hong Kong identity, and many reject the idea of reuniting 
with the Mainland under the communist rule after 1997• 
Influence of the parents is substantial: correlations of the 
parent-adolescent pairs are high on both general and specific 
a t t i t u d e s ; the p e r c e n t a g e of a b s o l u t e a g r e e m e n t is a l s o 
distinctive in the parent-adolescent pairs. 
No prominent difference is found in the relative influence 
of fathers and mothers. The finding breaks the myth of male 
dominance in political socialisation, neither is the affectionate 
mothers more influential on the adolescents' attitude formation. 
No significant sex-lineage similarity is observed. 
The influence of parents is greater when they have similar 
political attitudes. Not much difference is observed whether the 
parents are strict or lenient, and rebellions against extremely 
strict or lenient parents are not likely. Actually very extreme 
parental style is rarely observed, which suggests that conformity 
within the family is still a virtue respected by the younger 
Chinese. 
Agreement between parents and a d o l e s c e n t s are s l i g h t l y 
higher when parents talk more with the adolescents on the affairs 
of the PRC or the ROC, It does not make much difference whether 
the communication is two-way, or whether the adolescents are 
having a higher level of political interest* 
Adolescents who have overprotective parents or parents who 
seriously ignore their needs tend to view the political authority 
more negatively. But the extreme cases are too rare to have any 
significant impact on the general political culture. 
As for the parental attitudes, parents whose fathers were 
high in SES before communist rule tend to view the coramunist 
government more negatively. Parents who are themselves higher in 
SES and educational level are also more negative towards the 
communist government. 
Pro-communist school students are having rather typical pro-
communist attitudes: they are less negative towards the communist 
government, more supportive of Chinese socialism, and are more 
patriotic. They are also more knowledgeable, particularly on 
information concerning the communist government. Attitudes of the 
pro-nationalist schools are only similar to the neutral school 
students. The amount of exposure to political information in 
schools, "With control on the level of discussion participation 
and the objectiveness of teachers cannot satisfactorily account 
for the attitudes of the pro—communist school students. Their 
attitudes can at best be partly attributed to the pro-communist 
newspapers they read, and higher consumption of which is also 
related to greater political interest. Generally, adolescents 
are more interested when they p e r c e i v e their e x p o s u r e to 
political information in school is higher. And higher level of 
interest is in turn related to h i g h e r level of p o l i t i c a l 
knowledge. 
Finally, the influence of the parents is interacting with 
other agents in the pattern that mass media are having an , 
reinforcement effect on the influence of parents, intervention of 
the teachers is less obvious, while the peers are suppressing the 
influence of mothers on the adolescents. 
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We are having mixed feeling when we are confronted by the 
p r o b l e m of the f u t u r e of H o n g K o n g : u n d e r c u l t u r a l and 
nationalistic concern, there is every reason to terminate the 
colonial British rule and reuniting with the Mainland under one 
sovereignty; but under the practical consideration of whether one 
wants to live under the communist rule, the answer is always 
negative. Actually, there is always the impression that Hong Kong 
people are essentially negative towards the communist government 
of the PRC, which leads to their doubt about the sincerity and 
ability of the government in maintaining the autonomy of the city 
under the guiding principle of� 、cme country, two systems.‘ My 
research is therefore an attempt to� 、prove the common sense’， and 
a l s o to a c c o u n t for h o w t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s are f o r m e d . 
Socialisation studies is an uncultivated field in Hong Kong, 
whereas studies that work comprehensively on the influence of 
various socialisation agents had begun early in the 60 ‘ s in 
western countries. I hope that the p r e s e n t s t u d y , which is 
essentially an exploratory one, will provide some insights for 
future researchers on political socialisation, and hopefully, 
some raw data to begin with. 
On finishing the thesis, I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. 
Kuan Hsin Chi, who gives not only advice, but also encouragement 
to keep me go on. In the data collection state, I have met many 
people who are so willing to help, even I am a stranger to their“ 
And there are also the students, who give time for me. May I 
thank them all. I am also deeply impressed to find out in some 
in-depth interviews that a number of students really care for the 
well being of the people in the Mainland, and they are also 
highly informed. They give me hope for the younger generations. 
Last but not least, I would like to show gratitude to my family 
and my friends, who have tried their very best to help and 
support me whenever I am in need. 
Chapter One Objective and Literature Review 
The study is an attempt to solve two questions. The first 
question is what are the attitudes of the Hong Kong adolescents 
towards Communist China. The other is how these attitudes are 
formed. Hong Kong has been under the colonial rule of the British 
government for over one hundred y e a r s . The p e o p l e here have 
gradually developed a sense of b e l o n g i n g in Hong Kong by 
identifying with its social, economic, and political systems 
which they have played a part in building up. This Hong Kong 
identity urges the Hong Kong people to integrate their interest 
with the well being of the city, which leads to their support of 
the status quo. However, the s e t t l e m e n t b e t w e e n the B r i t i s h 
government and the government of the People's Republic of China 
that Hong Kong is to be placed under the latter,s sovereignty on 
July 1, 1997 reminds the people here that Hong Kong is not an 
isolated entity, and large scale interactions with communist 
C h i n a at b o t h the s o c i e t a l and g o v e r n m e n t a l l e v e l s are 
inevitable. It is expected that an important determinant of a 
smooth relationship between the two places is the confidence of 
the Hong Kong people in the s i n c e r i t y and a b i l i t y of the 
communist government in implementing the idea of� 、one country, 
two systems' that set the relationship between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland after 1997; and also the influential open policy in the 
economy of the Mainland. Therefore, it is a worthwhile task to 
note the attitudes of the people towards the communist government 
so as to provide some insights to the future development of the 
relationship. Particular interest is d i r e c t e d towards the 
attitudes of the younger generation, i.e. the adolescents, who 
will be masters of Hong Kong in a decade or two, whereas the 
attitudes of their parents are also looked into. The design can 
give a general picture of continuity and change in the attitudes 
across the two generations, and can also provide reference for 
understanding their future development. 
Experience of the younger generation with the c o m m u n i s t 
government is essentially indirect since most of them are born in 
Hong Kong. However, there are enough reasons to believe that a 
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relatively comprehensive set of attitudes directed towards the 
communist government is prevailing in them. First, they may learn 
of the communist rule from the older generations. A majority of 
the older generations are refugees from the Mainland during the 
post Second World War period, and many still have come as legal 
or illegal immigrants after the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949. They t h e r e f o r e have rich and 
diversified experience in living under the communist rule, which 
will pass on to the younger generation through sharings of life 
experience. Experience of the older geneirations can then provide 
a picture of the communist government, at least of its ruling in 
the past, to the younger generation. 
B e s i d e s t h a t , the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of the c o m m u n i s t 
government is by no means absent here. Under the consideration 
that Hong Kong is seriously deficient of defensive power under 
possible communist invasion, the Hong Kong g o v e r n m e n t has 
carefully preserved the interest of the communist government here 
in e x c h a n g e for t h a t H o n g K o n g is l e f t m o r e or l e s s 
undisturbed.(1) Influence of the communist government is also 
effective at the societal level• The g o v e r n m e n t ' s o f f i c i a l , 
quasi—official, and affiliated agents are actively participating 
in the social, economic and even political activities here, e,g. 
united front strategy is exercised to incorporate people into 
leftist commercial and social organizations and trade unions, and 
some members of these organisations are actively participating in 
political activities at both the local and central level in Hong 
Kong; agents of the communist government are also making a good 
amount of investments in Hong Kong's economy. Moreover, trading 
activities are active between Hong Kong and the Mainland which 
provide abundant of opportunities for contact. 
The psychological distance between the two places is 
s h o r t e n e d by the m a s s m e d i a in H o n g K o n g . T a k i n g i n t o 
consideration the proximity between Hong Kong and the Mainland in 
geographical location, and the importance of communist influence 
on the stability and prosperity here, news from the Mainland is 
always given high priority. Interactions between the Hong Kong 
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and the communist government are c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y r e p o r t e d . 
Moreover, the communist government is r u n n i n g and f i n a n c i n g 
newspapers and magazines here which are influential to the public 
opinions in Hong Kong. Discrete events in the M a i n l a n d like 
political campaigns, or implementation of specific or general 
policies also directly or indirectly influence the life of the 
Hong Kong people, e.g. the ^output' of the Cultural Revolution 
which triggered off the riots in Hong Kong in mid 60's has served 
to remind deeply the people here the prominence of the communist 
influence. 
In short, influence of the communist government has always 
been existing here, and the Hong Kong people have more or less 
encountered with the authority in one way or a n o t h e r . More 
concrete attitudes other than mere stereotypes are therefore 
likely to have prevailed. A few aspects of attitudes held by the 
adolescents towards the communist government are tested in the 
present study: the loyalty of the Hong Kong people towards the 
communist party and their trust towards the communist government 
in its sincerity and effectiveness when r u l i n g over the 
Mainland; attitudes towards Chinese socialism as the guiding 
ideology of the communist l e a d e r s h i p ; and also the level of 
p a t r i o t i s m . M o r e o v e r , t h e i r n e c e s s a r y k n o w l e d g e on the 
institutions and leadership, which constitutes the basis for 
understanding and conceptualising the operation of the communist 
government, is tested. 
Trust towards the ruling of the communist government has 
important implication for a better relationship with the rulers 
in the sense that it is the root of confidence. However, it is 
likely that attitudes towards the communist government are less 
stably held by the people here since the political institutions 
of the People's Republic of China have only been established for 
a few decades, attitudes of the adolescents may change according 
to the effectiveness of their institutionalisation and their 
achievement in attaining stability. In view of the dynamics of 
the attitudes in concern, the study is therefore marking a humble 
beginning to gather information on the attitudes of the Hong Kong 
people in pace with the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and p o s s i b l y 
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stabilisation of the communist government. The less stable 
attitudes of trust and loyalty are considered together with the 
supposedly more stable attitudes towards Chinese socialism, the 
evaluation of which is likely to rest on more long lasting 
principles and doctrines. The two types of attitudes are put 
together, taking interest in their implications on behaviour 
propensity to either push forward or withdraw support from the 
communist government: individuals who are positive to both are 
more likely to dispose to support the communist government more 
faithfully and steadily; those who are f a v o u r a b l e at the 
ideological level but not at the governmental level may dispose 
for moderate change in the government under the same philosophy 
of ruling; while those who are unfavourable to both may dispose 
for more radical action towards the authority or to withdraw from 
it. 
Attention is also paid to the patriotism of the adolescents 
towards the communist government. Patriotism, simply defined, is 
the love of country. In more complex terms, it may not only be an 
affection of love for the country but also a wish, that one's 
country be wealthy, powerful, civilised, and just, or an act of 
service i.e. the willingness to serve one's country as a proof 
and test of love.(2) The latter d e f i n i t i o n , which p r o v i d e s 
patriotism with a broader meaning, is employed in this study. In 
socio-psychological research, patriotism is considered to be the 
most significant of all the emotions that move men to action. (3) 
Patriotism has implication for behaviour propensity in the sense 
that when patriotic wish for the well being of one's country is 
satisfied, it usually means a willingness to be active in the 
country's service; if it is on the other way r o u n d , bitter 
opposition and revolt against the ruling principles and practices 
of the community is likely. (4) P a t r i o t i s m for a country 
therefore can be separated from the support directed towards the 
political authority. 
In Hong Kong, people are also divided in such a way that 
some direct their patriotism towards the p r e s e n t c o m m u n i s t 
authority; while some are longing for, with few actually working 
for, the well being of the country under a more democratic form 
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of government in future, the present communist government is 
therefore essentially incompatible with their future construct. 
In view of the strong behaviour propensity guided by patriotism, 
an understanding of the people's degree of patriotism and their 
a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t m a y s e r v e as 
explanatory factors for their behaviour when interacting with the 
communist government. 
Political attitude, in this study, is defined as inferred 
disposition towards the political system. According to Almond, 
attitudes have three components: the c o g n i t i v e c o m p o n e n t of 
knowledge and belief, the affective component of feelings, and 
the e v a l u a t i v e c o m p o n e n t of j u d g m e n t s and o p i n i o n s . (5) 
A t t i t u d e s g e n e r a l l y h a v e the f o l l o w i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
directional; intensity; ambivalence; and salience.(6) Therefore, 
the d i r e c t i o n of the a t t i t u d e as b e i n g f a v o u r a b l e or 
unfavourable, and the degree of likings or dislikings should be 
taken into consideration in the measurement. Moreover, attitudes 
may be conflicting each other, and have d i f f e r e n t degree of 
salience to the person, depending on how core the attitude is in 
the person's attitudinal system, and the circumstances the person 
are encountering. Political system in the present study refers to 
the political authority of the PRC, i.e. the communist government 
which is led by the communist party, and to the the ideology of 
Chinese socialism, which is the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l base of the 
government. The ideology determines to a certain extent the game 
rules under the communist leadership, but more importantly, it 
gives the essence of an ideal state. Therefore, an evaluation of 
the ideology is essentially a judgment of values, which can be 
quite independent from how successful the political authority in 
achieving for the ideals stated. F i n a l l y , the s e n t i m e n t of 
patriotism is actually directed towards the Chinese culture and 
the community of people who live under it. Since a majority of 
the Chinese are living in the M a i n l a n d , the sentiment is 
essentially directed towards the people there. 
When the origins of the above m e n t i o n e d a t t i t u d e s are 
traced, it comes to the second question in the present study, the 
answer of which is to be found from the perspective of political 
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socialisation, socialisation concerns with the process of how a 
person acquires and internalises beliefs, values, knowledge, 
skills, and standards of behaviour acceptable to his society. The 
outcome is, at the individual level, to enable the person to 
function as a more or less effective member of the society by 
behaving in a manner acceptable to the group. At the societal 
level, it is the accomplishment of social continuity and cultural 
consistency, and thus the survival of the group.(7) Political 
socialisation, similarly, is on how a p e r s o n i n t e r n a l i s e s 
beliefs, values, knowledge, and standard of behaviour directed 
towards the political objects. The crucial outcome of which is 
for the persistence of the political culture which is pertinent 
to the stability of the political system. Political socialisation 
therefore concerns with both the process and the consequence of 
the acquisition of political attitudes. 
The ultimate consequent of political socialisation is on the 
stability and survival of the political system. Commenting on a 
research on partisanship in four d e m o c r a c i e s , Jack Dennis 
remarked that the study of partisan i d e n t i f i c a t i o n among 
g e n e r a t i o n s h a s no m e a n i n g if it is n o t ^ l i n k e d to the 
acquisition and acceptance of the norms of the regime and 
finally, to its persistence.‘ (8) And he noticed that the French 
political system is able to maintain its stability even if the 
people have relatively fluid partisan affiliation in an unstable 
party system is due to a deeper attachment to traditions and 
values of an inherited ideological s u b c u l t u r e . (9) Easton 
suggested that the stabilising force of the political system 
comes from diffuse support in the society, which is defined by 
Easton as 'the generalised trust and confidence that members 
i n v e s t in the v a r i o u s o b j e c t s of the s y s t e m as e n d s in 
themselves.’(10) 
Socialisation is therefore a means to be employed by the 
political authority to avert any serious decline in the level of 
diffuse support, resulting in its p e r s i s t e n c e . (11) It is 
attributed a more aggressive role by Merelman. He noticed that 
the world's political systems are t h r e a t e n e d by d e c l i n i n g 
legitimate force and reliable e c o n o m i c a f f l u e n t , that the 
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'economic stagnation in the industrialised democracies along with 
massive external debts and economic dependency in the third world 
implies that the world economy can no longer assure political 
stability. ‘ (12) The role of s o c i a l i s a t i o n is t h e r e f o r e to 
struggle for and to restore political stability. 
The formation of political attitudes is a gradual process of 
learning, during which the socialisation agents play an important 
part in shaping the sentiments of the adolescents. Political 
learning can be specific or general, purposive or non-purposive, 
which can be directed towards p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t or non 
relevant objects. Narrowly speaking, it can be� 、the deliberate 
inculcation of political information, values and practices by 
instructional agents who have f o r m a l l y c h a r g e d with this 
responsibility,‘ or broad as� 、all political learning, formal and 
informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life 
cycle, including not only explicit political leairning but also 
nominal non-political learning that affects political behaviour, 
such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and 
the a c q u i s i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t p e r s o n a l i t y 
characteristics.‘ (13) Almond also distinguished between latent 
and manifest political socialisation. The former refers to non-
political experiences carrying latent political consequences, 
while manifest socialisation refers to the i n t e n t i o n a l and 
unintentional exposure of a child to material that is explicitly 
political.(14) 
Viewing from the perspective of the socialised individuals, 
learning is a developmental process, during which the individual 
interacts with the environment, assimilating the stimuli and 
adapting to them. His effectiveness to do so in turn depends on 
his psychological and social c a p a b i l i t y , i . e . his c o g n i t i v e 
development and his social skills. The individual may also have 
different experiences provided by different socialisation agents 
at different periods of his life, which may be reinforcing or 
conflicting each other. 
The sentiments of trust, love and loyalty are i m p o r t a n t 
elements of diffuse support, which are also the main targets of 
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socialisation. They have origins early in childhood, and early 
learning is enduring under the p r i m a c y and the s t r u c t u r a l 
principle. The primacy principle assumes that childhood learning 
is relatively enduring throughout life. Such a view is held by 
child development theorists that what is learned earliest in life 
is learned best, and is least likely to be d i s p l a c e d by 
subsequent experiences.(15) Greenstein maintained that� 、the more 
important a political orientation is in the behaviour of adults, 
the earlier it will be found to emerge in the learning of the 
c h i l d " (16) and J . D a v i e s a l s o c o m m e n t e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
socialisation、begins early at about the age of three and is 
basically completed by the age of thirteen.‘(17) The structuring 
principle focuses on the indirect i n f l u e n c e of the early 
socialisation agents, it asserts that these agents help to mould 
the personality and general attitudes which will structure the 
formation of the more specific attitudes later in life. According 
to t h i s v i e w , the l e a r n i n g of n e w i s s u e o r i e n t a t i o n s is 
structured by a more basic political o r i e n t a t i o n which the 
individual internalised during childhood, and which has persisted 
over time. (18) 
Under both principles, family and school, which provide the 
immediate environment of learning for the child, are considered 
to be important socialisation agents. They help in shaping the 
children's positive image and trust on the political authority, 
and patriotic love for the country. The family also helps shape 
the partisanship of the children, which will later guide their 
formation of more specific issue orientations. 
Influence of the family is two-folded. First, it places the 
child in a particular social context like social class, members 
in which share much similarity in attitudes, beliefs, values and 
living style. Secondly, it is through the parents that attitudes 
of the child are moulded. Parents are influential in the learning 
of the child since the child has to depend on the parents for 
satisfaction of needs, which vary over a wide range at different 
levels from the most basic need of security to the social need of 
love and affections. Davies remarked that� 、the family provides 
the individual initially with all his e n v i r o n m e n t for need 
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satisfactions and throughout his entire life is the locus for 
most of them,‘ and 'this is probably the central reason that the 
individual comes to think and act like his family more than he 
thinks and acts like those who are less regularly relevant to his 
need satisfaction.‘ (19) The emotional and physical dependency of 
the child on the parents renders the latter an effective agent in 
moulding the child's personality and behaviour. The withdrawal 
or satisfaction of these needs can serve as p h y s i c a l and 
emotional means of rewards and punishments which condition the 
child to the destined b e h a v i o u r . M o r e o v e r , the feeling of 
closeness will motivate the child to take the parents as models 
for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , and to a c c e p t t h e i r g u i d a n c e and 
instructions. 
Parents are found to affect the perception of the child on 
political authority, the acquisition of p a r t i s a n s h i p , the 
reinforcement of consensually held democratic values like civic 
t o l e r a n c e , and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n b e h a v i o u r . 
Influence of the parents in the former two aspects will be looked 
into in more detail since they are relevant to the objective of 
the present study, which is to look at the level of trust and 
loyalty towards the communist government. 
Greenstein found from a sample of heterogeneous but largely 
white children of New Haven, Connecticut in U.S. that they have 
highly idealised view of the president during the administration 
of Eisenhower. (20) Similar findings are reported by Eastern and 
H e s s on a t t i t u d e of c h i l d r e n d u r i n g the K e n n e d y 
administration.(21) It is likely that children will transfer 
t h e i r i d e a l i s a t i o n of p a r e n t s to p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s w h e n 
idealisation of the former gradually declines. (22) Moreover, the 
language used by parents towards the c h i l d r e n is also more 
positively oriented, with c o n t r o v e r s i e s a v o i d e d , which may 
account for the positive image of the c h i l d r e n towards the 
president.(23) Even after a crisis in the political authority, 
the positive attitude of children towards the presidential role 
is not much lowered. Children who witnessed the Watergate scandal 
during the Nixon Administration are described by Greenstein as 
perceiving the presidential role only in a less e x p l i c i t l y 
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idealised fashion while showing greater capacity to criticise the 
president.(24) It is believed that the positive sentiments in 
c h i l d h o o d is m o r e or l e s s g e n e r a l i s e d to the p o l i t i c a l 
institution when the child grow c o g n i t i v e l y . The p o s i t i v e 
sentiment developed during childhood is therefore important for 
the diffuse support for the political authority. 
Parents are also influential in the p a r t i s a n s h i p of the 
child, and that the child generally acquire the same party as 
their parents. Nevertheless, effectiveness of transmission is 
doubt on other attitude items. In a national research on over 
1600 secondary school seniors in U . S . , J e n n i n g s and N i e m i 
reported weak correlations on over twenty different orientations 
measured, which cover factors of specific issue positions and 
general attitudes.(25) Weak correlation is even found in general 
attitude item on political trust which bring doubt to the 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e s are m o r e l i k e l y to be 
transmitted from parents to the offspring than the specific ones. 
Therefore, previous findings do not provide much evidence to 
s u p p o r t the f a m i l y as an e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l i s a t i o n a g e n t . 
Criticisms challenge on the one hand the long lasting effect of 
the family influence while on the other hand the effectiveness of 
the transmission of a diversity of values, attitudes and beliefs 
between parents and offsprings. However, the socialisation role 
of the f a m i l y is s t i l l w o r t h w o r k i n g o n , as ^ n e g a t i v e 
correlations, in any study are almost n o n - e x i s t e n t . ' (26) 
Therefore, whereas the former criticism is to be answered by 
longitudinal researches, the latter can be tackled with by 
looking for more control on v a r i a b l e s i n t e r v e n i n g in the 
transmission process, which renders it more or less effective. 
A number of variables are likely to affect the transmission 
of attitudes between parents and offsprings. First, it is the 
child rearing method employed by the parents. Middleton suggested 
that in adolescence, a reaction f o r m a t i o n may be g e n e r a t e d 
against the dependency needs and may find e x p r e s s i o n in a 
rebellious youth culture to against the p a r e n t a l norm and 
authority. He found in a sample of c o l l e g e and u n i v e r s i t y 
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students in U.S. that deviation from parental viev^s is related to 
the kind of discipline experienced at home, and that rebellion 
a g a i n s t the p a r e n t a r i s e s f r o m s t r a i n e d p a r e n t - c h i l d 
relationships when the parent is interested in politics.(27) 
R e b e l l i o n s of c h i l d r e n is l i k e l y to be f o u n d a g a i n s t 
authoritarian parents. Langton suggested that rebellious response 
of the child will increase with increasing authoritativeness of 
the parent till a certain threshold and w i l l w i t h e r back to 
conformity,(28) since the child may be deterred by fear of severe 
punishment. Nevertheless, there is actually not much evidence of 
child rebellions against parental values which take a political 
form in the American culture. Lane attributed the rare instances 
to the permissiveness of the A m e r i c a n c u l t u r e and also the 
insalience of politics as an object of rebel. He suggested that 
there is less need to rebel in a permissive culture in U.S.; and 
that if rebellions indeed take shape, it is less likely to be 
channeled into politics or political ideology due to the low in 
salience of politics to the parents.(29) The latter suggestion 
matches with the finding of M i d d l e t o n , that r e b e l l i o n s are 
directed only towards interested parents, i.e., when the issues 
are salient to them. Therefore, as implied from the suggestion of 
Lane, rebellions against parents are more likely to be found in 
more authoritative cultures, and that politics are to be salient 
to the parents for the rebellion to take a political form. 
Another variable that may affect the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
transmission of parental attitudes is the communication pattern 
b e t w e e n p a r e n t and c h i l d . B o t h f r e q u e n c y and p a t t e r n of 
communication affect the transmission of p a r e n t a l v a l u e s . 
Wrightsman found in a sample of 72 white American elementary 
school boys and their parents that the child fear more against 
war when the extent of the parent's worry about war is great and 
when the message is communicated to the child frequently. (30) 
Levin also found in a sample of Illinois high school students 
that in social situation, adolescents to whom politics is salient 
are most influenced in bilateral communication of opinions, and 
uninterested adolescents are most likely to be influenced in 
unilateral communication where he assumes a passive role under 
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pressure to conform. Levin took the interest of adolescents as an 
intervening variable since interested students are more apt to 
exchange political opinions in face-to-face interaction, which 
results in their susceptibility to i n f l u e n c e from p e e r s . 
Moreover, uninterested adolescents are more likely to choose the 
same party as his family since the political influence usually 
flows in one direction from parents to child in nuclear families* 
(31) 
A third variable concerning parent child relationship is the 
parents' protection of the child, and too much protection from 
parents is likely to hinder the c h i l d ' s d e v e l o p m e n t of more 
mature attitudes as being more s u p p o r t i v e of the p o l i t i c a l 
authority. Overprotection is defined as the practice of parents 
to restrict or control narrowly their children's contacts outside 
the home and to guide their intellectual and emotional growth 
with much anxious care. (32) Overprotected children are likely to 
have a sense of insecurity when out of their i m m e d i a t e home 
environment. They will therefore view the outside world with more 
scepticism. The negativity towards the environment may then be 
transferred to a feeling of distrust or even hostility towards 
the political authority. Pinner found in a cross national study 
on high school and university students in Belgium, Dutch and 
Holland that in cultures where parental overprotection is common, 
distrust of government and political processes is also common. 
(33) In Belgium where parents are overprotective and are having 
deficient communication with their children, high school students 
are less favourable than the Dutch students towards the political 
institutions and processes in their own country. Parents of the 
latter allow their children to make new social contacts though 
rigid control are imposed. 
One more variable that may affect the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
transmission is the agreement of the parents in treating the 
child. It is expected that children are more likely to identify 
w i t h p a r e n t s w h o v a l u e the s a m e t h i n g . In p a r t i s a n s h i p 
researches, correlation between the parent and the offspring is 
much higher if the parents are c o n s i s t e n t l y united in p a r t y 
preference and that it is visible to the offspring. (34) The 
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observation is supported by the findings of Jennings and Niemi in 
the same research as mentioned above that the parent-offspring 
correlations on partisanship and on some twenty social and 
political items are much higher when parents agree with each 
other in their stand.(35) 
Therefore, child ireairing m e t h o d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n pattern 
between parents and child, and agreement between parents in their 
political stand are variables which may intervene in the parent-
child interaction and hence the effectiveness of the child's 
socialisation,* whereas protection of parents affects to certain 
extent the adolescents' perception of the political authority. 
The variables so identified will be employed for an examination 
of the parent child agreement in their attitudes towards the 
communist government in Hong Kong. Since socialisation concerns 
essentially with how the individual assimilates and adapts to the 
environmental influence, the pattern of stimulus and respond in 
the process may vary in different cultures. Most of the studies 
on political socialisation are carried out in the context of 
western culture, particularly that of the white American. Few 
studies is conducted within the Chinese culture, particularly in 
the community of Hong Kong. It is therefore necessary at the 
moment to have a look at the culture of Hong Kong to see how the 
variables can be applied here. 
In Hong Kong, Chinese culture predominates. Child rearing 
m e t h o d of C h i n e s e p a r e n t s are o b s e r v e d to be s t r i c t 
authoritative.(36) A Chinese proverb says, 'lenient mothers give 
rotten s o n s ' ( i ^ ^ j ^ l i ^ ). Chinese parents therefore are more 
disposed to use stricter means of discipline such as spanking and 
scolding which rely more on impulse control and shaming rather 
t h a n l o v e w i t h d r a w a l . On the o t h e r h a n d , c o n f o r m i t y and 
dependency of the child is much stressed in the Chinese culture. 
Under the Confucius ideas of hierarchical relationship, parents 
are authoritative figures whom children are to obey and respect 
In return, parents are to care and provide for the need of the 
child. Chinese parents are therefore playing a more important 
role in satisfying the needs of the child, and the child is also 
more reliance upon the parents, This r e l i a n c e on parents is 
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reinforced in the training of the child as independence is not 
emphasised. Moreover, harmony in the family is highly treasured, 
which renders deviant behaviours less endurable. Therefore, if 
permissive parents and i n d e p e n d e n t y o u t h s c h a r a c t e r i s e s the 
American parent child relationship, the relationship for the 
Chinese is likely to be just opposite, i.e. authoritative parents 
with dependent youths. 
In view that the rare instance of youthful rebellion against 
the political attitudes of the parents in U.S. can partly be 
attributed to a harmonious balance of parental permissiveness and 
child independence, the instance of youthful rebellion in Hong 
Kong is also determined by how our parental authoritativeness and 
child conformity balance each other. On the one hand, the older 
g e n e r a t i o n s a r e m o r e l i k e l y to be s t i l l a d h e r i n g to t h e 
traditional Chinese values, their stricter child irearing pattern 
may stimulate a larger scale rebellions in the adolescents. On 
the other hand, the younger generations are witnessing greater 
conflict with parental values due to the i n c r e a s i n g v a l u e 
discrepancies inside and o u t s i d e the f a m i l y u n d e r the r a p i d 
development of the society. The virtue of filial piety and the 
norm of conformity are also less t r e a s u r e d by the y o u n g e r 
g e n e r a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , the s t r i c t n e s s of the p a r e n t s m a y 
overwhelm the conformity of the child, resulting in more youthful 
rebellions* Moreover, politics is no less likely an object of 
irebellion since the people in Hong Kong are rather politicised in 
the sense that they are continuously confronted by political 
campaigns in the Mainland, though mainly indirectly. Locally, 
there is the problem of reintegration 切 -ith the Mainland under the 
sovereignty of the PRC in 1997, and the consequential change in 
the local political system w h i c h t r i g g e r s off a p r o c e s s of 
politicisation of the mass. 
M o r e o v e r , u n d e r t h e C h i n e s e i d e a of ^ s t e r n f a t h e r s , 
affectionate m o t h e r s ' (取 S i ^、慈、 , t h e mother-child affectionate 
distance is likely to be smaller than that of father, which may 
motivate the child to identify more with mothers. Furthermore, 
mothers in Hong Kong are playing a more important economic role 
and they are also more knowledgeable of the society due to the 
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convenience and abundance of information flow. They are therefore 
able to exert more unique influence on the political attitudes of 
the child. Such a position of mothers is then likely to challenge 
the traditional role of fathers in political socialisation. 
The traditional role played by parents to satisfy the needs 
of the child and the mild emphasis on i n d e p e n d e n c e in child 
training suggest that Chinese p a r e n t s are m o r e likely to be 
overprotective. The sense of insecurity in the child when he 
faces the outside world may instill in him a higher level of 
scepticism and hostility towards the political authority. The 
present study is somewhat different from Pinner's. The focal 
interest in on the variation among individuals in one culture 
rather than among groups under different cultures. In view that 
the traditional Chinese norms in Hong Kong are confronted by 
western values and practices during the process of rapid social 
and economic development, a greater v a r i a t i o n in p a r e n t a l 
protection is likely which will have different implications on 
the effect of socialisation. 
Finally, under the hierarchical n o r m , i n s t r u c t i o n s of 
parents are not to be challenged, the power relationship between 
parents and offsprings in their communication is therefore from 
above to below. The communication pattern between parents and 
child is likely to be essentially one-way, which is likely to 
have negative effect on the transmission of parental values. 
Another agent to be considered is the school. The school is 
influencing the child both formally and informally. The teachers 
and principals are authoritative figures who have formal means of 
coercion provided by school regulations, that deviant behaviour 
of the adolescents will be punished. They also have sophisticated 
knowledge which renders their sayings persuasive. In western 
democratic societies, the school is supposed to play an essential 
role in instilling in the student a sense of patriotism and in 
transmitting the democratic creed. Formally, the creed is taught 
in c i v i c c u r r i c u l u m , w h i c h d e s t i n e d in the s t u d e n t an 
understanding of the rights and duties of citizens, a sense of 
political efficacy, to be political interested, and to be more 
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political knowledgeable. However, Langton and Jennings found from 
a national probability sample of high school seniors in U.S. that 
such courses are generally ineffective, particularly to the white 
students. (37) Other formal socialisation practice includes 
school rituals such as flag rising ceremony and observation of 
national holidays. Informally, the s c h o o l s exert i n f l u e n c e 
through the teaching method employed by teachers, the classroom 
atmospheres, the treatment of p u p i l s by s c h o o l a u t h o r i t i e s , 
extra-curricular activities, and the social life with peers. 
Effectiveness of socialisation in s c h o o l s d e p e n d s on a 
number of variables, which are essentially informal socialisation 
practice concerning with the atmosphere in school. Dawson and 
Prewitt suggested that an open democratic classroom climate helps 
to foster the democratic values in the students.(38) Ehman found 
in a random stratified sample of 10 to 12 grade students in 
Detroit Metropolitan Area in U.S. that for negroes, more social 
studies courses serve to increase cynicism in a open climate, 
while an decrease in cynicism is observed in the white students 
when the same environment is provided. He therefore suggested 
that an intellectually open climate, i.e. an atmosphere more 
conducive to inquiry and o p e n - m i n d e d n e s s , w i l l enable the 
students to know more about the 'reality': the n e g r o e s are 
more negative towards the political authority when they come to 
know that the problems of the blacks are being ignored or dealt 
with unfairly by the system; the whites, as the privileged group, 
are likely to react in the opposite way. Moreover, it is found 
that an open classroom climate may lead to lower cynicism and 
higher efficacy in the white high school students. Moreover, in 
case the issues to be tackled with are controversial, an open 
rather than a closed atmosphere will help in the attainment of 
favourable political attitudes in both white and black subgroups. 
(39) 
The schools in Hong Kong are playing a somewhat different 
r o l e f r o m t h a t of the w e s t e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o u n t r i e s . T h e 
government and aided schools, which makes up nearly four fifth of 
all the schools in Hong Kong, are e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l in 
nature, the sense of patriotism towards China is not encouraged, 
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if not deterred, in the school setting: history on contemporary 
China is very limitedly studied by students, possibly to avoid 
recalling the memories on the s u p e r p o w e r s ‘ t o r t u r i n g of the 
nation, and also to avoid c o m m e n t i n g on the c o m m u n i s t r u l e ; 
political activities in schools are till now forbidden; and only 
very low level civic virtues are taught in school, with no touch 
on political values. The socialisation effect of the schools in 
Hong Kong on attitudes concerning the communist government are 
thus very limited. Their main concern is likely to be Hong Kong 
oriented to create a sense of the community necessary for the 
maintenance of the status quo, and also a more or less positive 
image towards the Hong Kong government. 
Particular interest is taken in the partisan schools. Two 
groups of partisan schools are identified: pro-communist and pro-
nationalist• They constitute a very small poirtion in Hong Kong's 
education system. Since most of them are private schools, they 
can thus enjoy a good autonomy in their school policies. They 
are supposed to play a more distinctive role in socialising the 
adolescents' attitudes towards the communist government. Some 
of these schools employ socialisation practice like observing 
rituals concerning the PRC or the ROC government in accordance to 
their s t a n d . Some pro-communist s c h o o l s even hold s o c i a l 
activities like film show on history of contemporary China, talks 
on political issues, and study tours to the Mainland； which aims 
at instilling in the students a sense of patriotism towards the 
mother country. Nevertheless, due to the generally apolitical 
atmosphere in the school setting, it is expected that influence 
of t h e s c h o o l is e x e r t e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y t h r o u g h i n f o r m a l 
socialisation practices such as discussions with teachers and 
among peers. The stand of the teacher may also be essential in 
bringing the message through, and a relatively objective one is 
likely to be more effective. 
Finally, adolescents are taken for the s t u d y for the 
following reasons. It is a stage when relatively 、！nature’ and 
stable political attitudes are formed, which are based on a well 
developed cognitive development. At the age of about 12 and 13 
at late childhood, the child can already grasp political concepts 
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at the normal adult level. And when the child enters early 
adolescence at the age of 13 to 15, he witnesses a period of 
unusually quick growth in political cognition, accompanied by 
rapid acquisition of political knowledge. (40) Cognitively, the 
adolescent is likely to attain the stage of formal operation, and 
is able to grasp more abstract ideas and logical reasoning, thus 
is b e t t e r a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d the o p e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l 
institutions, political principles and is capable of conventional 
moral reasoning to give more mature and independent judgment of 
his own. 
Adolescence is also the stage when the influence of family 
reaches its climax and declines. The adolescent is on the one 
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hand full of the remnant of the family, while on the other hand 
he may start to rebel against it when he comes into contact with 
values prevailing in the larger community. Setting aside the 
problem of the long lasting effect of a t t i t u d e s a c q u i r e d in 
childhood, and the effectiveness of adult or youth socialisation, 
it is a stage where the influence of the family, particularly the 
parents, can best be studied. The influence of the school, is 
also substantial at this stage, as most of the social activities 
of the adolescents are centred round it. 
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Chapter Two Methodology and Hypotheses 
A. Sampling 
The schools in Hong Kong are stratified into three groups 
according to their political background for sampling. Two of 
them are partisan schools, namely the pro-communist schools and 
the pro-nationalist schools. The third group composes of schools 
that have no distinctive political s t a n d i n g , which will be 
addressed as the neutral schools in the essay. The schools are so 
stratified under two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . F i r s t , p a r t i s a n s h i p of 
school and the related education philosophy and practice are 
likely to be important factors that d e t e r m i n e the p o l i t i c a l 
attitudes of the adolescents towards the communist government. 
The other consideration concerns with family influence. Parents 
who prefer their children to enter the p a r t i s a n schools are 
likely to differ in backgrounds and a t t i t u d e s from those 
entering neutral schools. The two subsidized schools in Kennies' 
Mill Village, which is a pro~nationalist community inhabited 
mostly by prior nationalist m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l s and their 
descendants, take up about one third of the students from the 
community whose parents might have distinctive political stand. 
Stratified in this way, a greater variety of attitudes towards 
communist China can be obtained and their origins can be traced 
respectively. 
Pro-communist schools are chosen from the seven self-claimed 
patriotic schools which choose to remain as private schools so as 
to remain relatively independent in Hong Kong‘s a p o l i t i c a l 
education system.(1) Three schools and a total of five Form Four 
classes are selected from this category for study. They all have 
the following characteristics and differ only to a more or less 
extent: 
1. Celebrate the national day of the People's Republic of China 
on October 1. 
2. Organize activities which facilitate knowledge of mainland 
China, including film show and study tours. 
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3. A certain percentage of the teachers, ranging from 10 to 30%, 
receive education in the Mainland. 
Moreover, expenditures of the three schools all rely on fund 
and scholarships from people having close connection with the 
communist government such as their trading partners or Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference members. 
Pro-nationalist schools are more difficult to define since 
no clear-cut group ever exists here w h i c h claims such a 
position. Two criteria are thus used to define the group: they 
receive fund from the nationalist government, which may be in the 
form of direct funding for school e x p e n d i t u r e s , or for the 
s t u d e n t s as s c h o l a r s h i p s , or b o t h ; t h e y p a r t i c i p a t e in 
celebration of the national day of the R e p u b l i c of China on 
October 10. 
As a result, three schools in Kennies' Mill Village are 
chosen. Another school is out of the village, which is a private 
school quite popularly known as being pro-nationalist. A total of 
eight Form Four classes are chosen for study. Among the four 
s c h o o l s , o n e h a s a l l its e x p e n d i t u r e s s p o n s o r e d by the 
nationalist government, its post secondary students can enter 
universities in Taiwan without going through the joint schools 
examination organized here in Hong K o n g . The one out of the 
village has a certain amount of funding from the nationalist 
government for school expenditure, and about half of its senior 
form students receive scholarships offered by the nationalist 
government. Both schools celebrate the national day of the ROC. 
The other two schools in Kennies' Mill Village are government 
subsidized schools run by religious o r g a n i z a t i o n s . One was 
formerly a school for overseas Chinese before turning into a 
subsidized school in the 70's; s t u d e n t s in both schools are 
susceptible to a small quota of scholarship from agents of the 
nationalist government in the community. Both schools participate 
in the celebration of the national day of the ROC and other 
important festivals such as the Youth Festival organized by the 
community. All the four schools in this subsample have about 20% 
to 50% of their teachers educated in Taiwan. 
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The neutral schools are selected from the pool of over 400 
day or full time private, subsidized and government schools which 
do not have a distinctive political background. Two classes 
from two government schools, three c l a s s e s from two p r i v a t e 
schools, six classes from five subsidized schools, and one class 
from a pre-vocational training school are chosen for study. 
The sampling method is in no sense r a n d o m due to the 
following limitations: 
1. The expected reject rate is high. The research topic is a 
quite sensitive one under the apolitical atmosphere of the 
schools in Hong Kong. Hence most of the contacts in neutral 
schools are directed towards familiar teachers rather than 
towards the school principals. 
2. Both the pro-communist and pro-nationalist schools are used 
to keep a low profile in their political stands, and are 
particularly sensitive to the research topic. Questionnaires 
are conducted in schools which do not refuse an invitation, 
and they can be considered as comparatively more open both 
internally and externally. 
Characteristics of the sample 
A total of 915 form four students were selected for study. 
Form Four students are chosen under the following consideration: 
1. They satisfied the age range for adolescents. The range 
extends from 14 to 21, with c e n t r a l t e n d e n c y at mid-
adolescent. 
2. They have better reading and comprehension skill than lower 
form students to fill in the questionnaire. 
3. T h e y h a v e s t a y e d in t h e i r s c h o o l s l o n g e n o u g h for 
socialisation to take place. 
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Higher form students are not chosen for the study due to the 
following reasons: 
1. Form Five students have to enter the Hong Kong Certificate of 
Education Examination• They are thus not d i s t u r b e d for 
practical and ethical reasons. Moreover, their age range and 
their education level do not differ much from those of the 
Form Four's. 
2. Post-secondary students are not c o n s i d e r e d since large 
mobility of the students occurs after the H.K.C.E.E” and 
most students enter the present schools only recently. 
For the sake of comparison, proportionate sampling of the 
three strata is not possible since s t u d e n t s in the p a r t i s a n 
schools are fewer in number as compared with the neutral schools. 
Final number of cases in the three s u b s a m p l e s are in an 
approximately 1:2:1 ratio, with 195 cases from pro-communist 
schools, 455 from neutral schools, and 235 from pro-nationalist 
school, making up a total of 885 . 30 cases from a pro-
n a t i o n a l i s t s c h o o l h a v e b e e n d r o p p e d as the r e t u r n e d 
questionnaires are problematic as being essentially identical: 
their attitudes and the reported attitudes of parents are highly 
consistent which are both extremely anti—communistthe social 
status of their grandparents are almost identical which solely 
reported as belonging to the landlord and extremely rich class. 
Despite the fact that the samples are by no means random, 
attempt still be made to g e n e r a l i z e their a t t i t u d i n a l 
characteristic to the population of adolescents sharing the same 
age range. Only the neutral school subsample will be used for 
generalization since it shares characteristic similar to most of 
the schools in Hong Kong, which are essentially apolitical under 
the present education system, whereas the number of students in 
the partisan schools is few as negligible. 
All the Form Four students enrolling in day or full time 
government, aided and private secondary schools as taken as the 
population. In table 2.1, the neutral school subsample has a 
ratio of students enrolling in the government and aided schools 
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to private schools of 2.82:1, the ratio the population is 2,75:1. 
They are therefore quite similar* H o w e v e r , the ratio of 
government to aided school students is over-represented. The 
ratio in the sample is 1:3.54, while that of the population is 
1:7.84. In table 2.2, the male to female ratio within the age 
range of 14 to 19 years old in the sample is 1:1.37, the ratio of 
all secondary school students within this age range is 1:1.02, 
the proportion of girls in the sample is thus higher than that in 
the population. 
Administration and Measurement 
T h e d a t a are c o l l e c t e d by m e a n s of a p a p e r - a n d - p e n 
questionnaire which takes an average of 30 minutes to finish. 
About half of the questionnaires are administered by teachers of 
the students. Prior instructions were given to the teachers for 
p r o p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . R e s t of the q u e s t i o n n a i r e s w e r e 
administrated by me, and they are e s s e n t i a l l y done in the 
partisan schools. A response form reporting the queries and 
cooperativeness of the students were filled in by all the 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , the s t u d e n t s are 
cooperative. 
The questionnaire is divided into four parts. The first 
part consists of evaluative and a f f e c t i v e a t t i t u d e items 
concerning the ruling of the communist government, the ideology 
of socialism and patriotism. Most of them are six-point scale 
attitude items, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
Label of the scale is from strongly trust to strongly distrust 
for items concerning trust towards the communist government. Two 
more questions are set for the adolescent's self identification 
of nationality and his choice for the future of Hong Kong. 9 
q u e s t i o n s t e s t i n g the k n o w l e d g e on p e r s o n a l i t i e s and 
institutions in the mainland and Taiwan are asked. Respondents 
are to fill in the answer themselves. 
The second part of the questionnaire asks the adolescent to 
separately report the attitudes of his parents. The items are 
the same as those for the adolescents except for the knowledge 
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items, which are dropped in this section. 
The third part tests the interaction of the adolescents with 
the socialisation agents which includes essentially the school 
and the family. Questions concerning media-consumption behaviour 
and interaction with peers are also asked. 
The final part asks about the d e m o g r a p h i c data of the 




Four sets of hypotheses are studied. The first three sets 
concern with effect of the socialisation agents. The first set 
tests socialisation effect of the family. The second set concerns 
with the school, while the third set tests an h y p o t h e s i s on 
i n t e r a c t i o n a m o n g a g e n t s . The f o u r t h set is to see the 
m o t i v a t i o n a l d r i v e of the s t u d e n t s in the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
political knowledge. 
The first set of hypotheses concerns with the influence of 
family on the attitudes of the adolescent towards the communist 
government. It is further divided into three categories. The 
first category concerns with the transmission of attitudes from 
the parents to the adolescent. Effective transmission of parental 
attitudes is related to the child rearing method of parents, very 
strict and politicised parents are likely to have children 
rebelling against them. Too permissive parents, on the other 
hand, will provide too free an environment for the adolescent to 
develop his own attitudes, and thus conformity is also minimal. 
Hypothesis 1 
Less conformity will be found in the s t r i c t e s t and most 
lenient parents, the relationship between parental style and 
congruence between parents and adolescents will therefore be a 
curvilinear one. 
Communication pattern between parents and adolescent will 
also affect the effectiveness of transmission. It is expected 
that bilateral comnrnnication on political issue concerning China 
w i l l e a s e t r a n s m i s s i o n in i n t e r e s t e d a d o l e s c e n t , w h i l e 
uninterested one is more likely to be influenced in unilateral 




Parents who are having one-way communication with adolescent 
are m o r e l i k e l y to a f f e c t t h o s e w h o a r e p o l i t i c a l l y 
uninterested,* parents having t w o - w a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n ith 
a d o l e s c e n t s are m o r e l i k e l y to a f f e c t t h o s e who are 
politically intei:ested« 
Moreover, the role played by p a r e n t s in m o t i v a t i n g the 
adolescents to be more interested in the affairs of both the 
Mainland and Taiwan is also tested. 
Hypothesis 3 
Adolescents having two-way c o m m u n i c a t i o n with p a r e n t s are 
politically more interested. 
Agreement between the parents in their political attitudes 
may also influence the transmission of the parental attitudes to 
the adolescents. It is expected that parents who agree with each 
other are more likely to transmit their a t t i t u d e s to the 
adolescent. 
Hypothesis 4 
Adolescent whose parents share similar political attitudes 
(homogeneous) are more likely to agree with the p a r e n t s ‘ 
attitudes than those whose parents disagree with each other. 
The second category concerns with the indirect influence of 
the parents towards the adolescent by shaping his personality,, 
which will structure his conception of the political authority. 
It is expected that where parental overprotection is frequent, 
distrust of government and political process is also common. 
Hypothesis 5 
Adolescents of more protective parents are likely to show more 
distrust towards the PRC government 
The third category concerns with the social and economic 
environment which the family is or was in, which may influence 
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the direction and intensity of the attitudes of the parents. It 
is e x p e c t e d t h a t the m o r e h a r d s h i p the p a r e n t s or the 
grandparents experienced under the c o m m u n i s t r u l e , the m o r e 
negative will be the attitudes of the parents towards the PRC. 
Hypothesis 6 
The longer the period of settlement of the parents in the PRC, 
the more negative the orientations of them towards the PRC 
government. 
Hypothesis 7 
T h e h i g h e r the SES of the g r a n d p a r e n t s b e f o r e the 
liberation of China, the more negative the orientations of 
the parents towards the PRC. 
Other hypotheses concerning the impact of the social and 
economic environment on the family are: 
Hypothesis 8 
The higher the SES or educational level of the parents, the 
more distrust their attitudes towards the PRC. 
Hypothesis 9 
The level of patriotism of the parents will vary with their 
educational level and SES. 
T h e s e c o n d set of h y p o t h e s e s t a k e the s c h o o l as 
socialisation agent. The socialisation effect of schools having 
different political stands, and the general socialisation effect 
of schools as a whole are examined. Considering the restriction 
of the Hong Kong government on the politicisation of the schools, 
the influence of the schools upon the s t u d e n t s is u s u a l l y 
indirect through the teachers, school activities, or even the 
newspapers assigned to the students to read. It is also expected 
that pro-communist and pro-nationalist schools still have their 
own distinctive socialisation influence on the adolescent. 
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Hypothesis 10 
Adolescents studying in pro-communist and pro-nationalist 
schools will be politically more knowledgeable. 
Hypothesis 11 
Pro-communist and pro-nationalist schools will socialise the 
students to attitudes in line with the school. 
Hypothesis 12 
Adolescents in pro-communist and pro-nationalist schools, who 
perceive higher exposure of p o l i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n in the 
school environment will be more likely to be socialised to 
attitudes in line with the school. 
Hypothesis 13 
A d o l e s c e n t s p e r c e i v i n g h i g h e r e x p o s u r e of p o l i t i c a l 
information in the school e n v i r o n m e n t will be p o l i t i c a l l y 
more interested. 
The differences between s c h o o l s , w h i c h have p a r t i c u l a r 
subcultures of their own, are also examined. 
Hypothesis 14 
Adolescents in different schools w i l l differ in p o l i t i c a l 
attitudes towards the PRC. 
The third set of hypothesis is on interaction among the 
socialisation agents, and focus is on the relationship between 
the influence of the family and other socialisation agents. 
Hypothesis 15 
The influence of the family is smaller if the influence of 
other agents is larger. 
Although knowledge in the personnels, structures and even 
operations of the political authority does not necessarily be 
prior to the formation of affective and evaluative orientations 
towards it, it is still expected that knowledge forms the basis 
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for more mature and stable a t t i t u d e s . The h y p o t h e s i s thus 
identify the motivational drive u n d e r l y i n g the a d o l e s c e n t ‘ s 
acquisition of political knowledge, and it is likely that the 
interest in the affairs of China may be an important factor. 
Hypothesis 16 
The higher the interest of the adolescent in the political 
affairs of the PRC, the more p o l i t i c a l l y k n o w l e d g e a b l e he 
will be. 
Effect of the mass media, which is e x p e c t e d to be an 
important source of political knowledge, is also examined. 
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C . Analysis 
Factor analysis found that the eleven attitude items of the 
adolescent can be grouped under three factors which explain 52% 
of the total variance in the set of adolescent's attitude items. 
The first set of items are: 
1. The communist government manages China very well. 
2. Most of the officials in the communist government are not 
corrupted. 
3. I am loyal to the Chinese Communist Party. 
4. On weighing the past performance of the communist government, 
its merits outnumber demerits. 
5. Be patient, and the communist government's management of China 
will get to improve. 
They are grouped under the category of attitudes directed 
t o w a r d s the r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t , theii: 
correlations with factor one range from .56 to .69 after Varimax 
Rotation. The 6th item in this c a t e g o r y is ‘ Level of trust 
towards the communist government before the June 4 crisis'. The 
crisis occurred in Beijing on the fourth of June in 1989, during 
which some students who were u n d e r g o i n g a d e m o n s t r a t i o n to 
r e q u e s t for d e m o c r a c y in the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e m i l i t a r i l y 
suppressed. Correlation of the item with the first factor is .49. 
One more item, which tests the ^Level of trust towards the 
communist government after the June 4 crisis, will be used for 
comparison of change in trust level after the drastic event. 
The second set of items are: 
7. No merit is found in Chinese Socialism. 
8. The leadership of the communist government leaders neglect 
the interest of the Hong Kong people when drafting the basic 
law. 
If nationalist government is to rule China, it will do a 
better job than the coinmimist government. 
30 
Correlations of the three items with factor two are .72, .70 
and .71 respectively. They are grouped under the category of 
attitudes directed towards the ideology of Chinese socialism. The 
8th and 9th item can thus be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r a s t i n g the 
socialist ideology against the capitalist ideology with practical 
e x a m p l e s . T h e d r a f t i n g of the b a s i c c o n c e r n s w i t h the 
practicability of the principle of� 、one country, two systems', 
which suggests for the peaceful coexistence of two contradicting 
ideologies in one country. The last one contrasts against the 
performance of the communist and nationalist government as guided 
by two different ideologies. 
The third set of items includes: 
10. I love China very much. 
11. I am willing to contribute my strength to China. 
Both items check the patriotism of the adolescent. The 
first one is more general in nature, while the second one tempts 
the adolescent to put the sentiment into action. Both correlates 
highly with the third factor at .85 and .88. 
On the whole, the groupings suit satisfactorily with the 
categories first intended. Similar results are obtained when 
factor analysing the reported a t t i t u d e items of fathers and 
mothers. Nevertheless, a few items are dropped in the analysis 
due to the poor response rate in the r e p o r t e d a t t i t u d e s of 
parents. Items 5,8,9,11 are dropped. The adjusted set will be 
used in matching the adolescent with his parents. The full set 
of item is used only in presenting the a t t i t u d e s of the 
adolescent, and the effect of socialisation on the adolescents by 
socialisation agents other than the family. 
To avoid response set in the choice, attitude items are set 
from both directions of being favourable and unfavourable towards 
the communist government. In actual analysis, the scores of item 
7,8,9 will be reversed, so that in general, the higher the score, 
the m o r e n e g a t i v e is the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s the c o m m u n i s t 
government and the ideology of Chinese socialism. For items 10 
and 11, higher score indicates more p a t r i o t i c . As for the 
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knowledge item, one point is counted for each correct answer. 
Analysis in the study will be conducted using one of the 
three samples. 
1. The three subsamples of p r o - c o m m u n i s t , n e u t r a l and pro-
nationalist schools will be used for e x a m i n a t i o n of the 
factors affecting the parent-adolescent agreement in control 
of partisan schools, and also for analysing the socialisation 
effect of the partisan schools themselves. 
2. An o v e r a l l s a m p l e w i l l be u s e d in a n a l y s i n g f a c t o r s 
independent of the influence of partisan schools; influence 
of the grandparents on parental attitudes, and also when the 
cases are too few for analysis to be c o n d u c t e d in the 
subsamples. 
3. The neutral school subsample will be used for generalisation 
of the profile of attitudes of both the adolescents and the 
parents to the population of adolescents and their parents. 
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Tables for Chapter Two 
Table 2.1 Comparison between Sample and Population 
(number of Form 4 students by type of school) 
Government 
and Aided Private Ratio 
Population 53188 19367 2.75 : 1 
Sample 336 119 2.82 : 1 
Table 2.2 Comparison between Sample and Population 
(number of Form 4 students by sex) 
Male Female Ratio 
Population 133082 135635 1 ： 1.02 
Sample 189 258 1 ：�1.37�
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Chapter Three A Profile of Two Generations 
This chapter will first give a brief description of the 
adolescents' attitudes towards the r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t 
government, the ideology of Chinese socialism and patriotism 
towards China. The focus is on the neutral school students since 
the neutral schools share much of the characteristics of the 
schools in Hong Kong, which are essentially apolitical under the 
financial and legislative control of the Hong Kong government. In 
the second part of the chapter, attitudes of the two generations 
will be contrasted. Relationship with each parent is analysed 
separately since the socialisation roles of fathers and mothers 
are likely to differ from each other. Finally, sex difference in 
the adolescents' attitudes and sex-lineage similarity between the 
two generations are looked into. 
A- Political attitudes of the adolescents 
Neutral school 
The response rate is quite high generally which indicates 
that many students do have quite well formed o p i n i o n s and 
s e n t i m e n t s t o w a r d s the C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t . 
Considerably lower response rate is found in some items: the two 
hypothetical items on the expected performance of the ruling of 
the communist government in future, and the performance of the 
nationalist government if it is to r e p l a c e the c o m m u n i s t 
government; evaluation of the past performance of the communist 
government, which needs to refer to more sophisticated knowledge 
on contemporary China; and the declaration of one's behavioural 
propensity to contribute one's strength to the country, which 
demands more determination than to simply express one's patriotic 
love. 
In tables 3.1a to 3.If, the neutral school students who 
express their opinions evaluate the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government quite negatively, particularly towards the present 
leadership. 77.4% and 78.1% of the students respectively disagree 
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strongly that the present leadership manages China very well and 
t h a t m o s t of the o f f i c i a l s in the g o v e r n m e n t are n o t 
corrupted.⑴ Moreover, high as 85.1% strongly deny their loyalty 
towards the communist party. It is therefore likely that their 
affection towards the communist p a r t y is a f f e c t e d by their 
evaluation of the present communist government, since it is the 
party that leads the government and the top officials of both 
apparatuses have much overlapping with each other. On the other 
hand, their trust level towards the communist government before 
the June 4 crisis is quite high: over 40% of the students are 
trustful or very trustful of the government, whereas only 24% 
report that they distrust the government very much. 
Despite that the students are g e n e r a l l y h o s t i l e to the 
present leadership, they do not attribute much the blame to the 
guiding ideology of the government. In tables 3.1g to 3.1i, the 
response is more moderate at the ideological level. Only 27.5% 
strongly agree that no merit is found in Chinese socialism, while 
48.9% disagree or strongly disagree to the statement. Neither do 
the students strongly think that the nationalist government can 
replace the communist government: only 17.3% of the students 
agree strongly that the nationalist government will do a better 
job than the communist government, and 44.6% disagree or strongly 
disagree to the statement on the other h a n d . More n e g a t i v e 
attitudes are noted on the drafting of the basic law which 
actually touches the interest of the students: 43.9% of them 
strongly agree that interest of the Hong Kong people is neglected 
in the drafting process. 
The students are patriotic both in affective love and in 
behavioural propensity: in tables 3.1j and 3.1k, 69% agree that 
they love China and about one-third of which are holding very 
strong attitude; 73.2% of the s t u d e n t s are also willing to 
contribute their strength to the c o u n t r y w h e r e a s 32.6% are 
holding very strong attitude. Nevertheless, the patriotic feeling 
co-exists with their strong Hong Kong identity. In table 3.2, 
62% of the students consider themselves as Hongkongese rather 
than as Chinese. In table 3.3, only 7.1% welcome the idea of 
returning Hong Hong back to China after 1997 if they have the 
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choice, while 46.6% prefer continuous ruling of the British Hong 
Kong government. Patriotism of the students are therefore do not 
relate much to support to the present communist leadership. It 
seems to be on the contrary instead: the students love China and 
its people, who are by no means leading a happy life under the 
communist leadership. Their patriotism may urge them to look for 
better leadership in future, whereas a good number of them do not 
believe that a better ruling of the c o u n t r y can s i m p l y be 
achieved by continuous ruling of the present leadership. This 
dilemma calls for much uncertainty within the students, who on 
one hand love the county, but on the other hand do not want Hong 
Kong to integrate with it. Their patriotism therefore remain much 
inconspicuous, and are hinder much by their self-interest. The 
fact that many of them prefer to maintain the status quo of under 
the British rule therefore reflects their conflicting sentiment 
towards the ^motherland'. It is at the same time revealing some 
success of the schools in cultivating a positive attitude towards 
the British government under the present educational policy. 
Leftist and rightist school 
Leftist and rightist school s t u d e n t s c o n s t i t u t e only a 
minority in the school system. However, when the process and 
effect of socialisation are under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the unique 
environments the two groups of students are exposed to render 
them very special objects to research on. 
As expected, leftist school students do have attitudes quite 
different from those of the neutral school students. They are 
less negative towards the ruling of the communist government and 
the ideology guiding it. They are also more patriotic. Rightist 
school students are also more patriotic than the neutral school 
students, but are very similar to them on other a t t i t u d e s . 
Comparing with the neutral school subsample, less leftist school 
students hold strong negative response on items concerning the 
ruling of the communist government. Greater differences are found 
in attitudes towards the present ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government and loyalty towards the communist party. 21.4 and 22.7 
percentage points less leftist school students respectively are 
36 
holding strong negative attitudes. More of them are positive 
towards the ruling of the communist government on the other hand, 
which is noted by a higher percentage at the other side of the 
attitude scale. Before the June 4 crisis, 14.8 percentage points 
more leftist school students admit that they trust the government 
very much. Rightist school students are similar to the neutral 
school students in their attitudes towards the ruling of the 
communist government. In table 3 . 4 , m e a n s of the items also 
r e v e a l s i m i l a r p a t t e r n of d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t h r e e 
subsamples. One way ANOVA conducted shows that leftist school 
students have mean scores on all the seven items significantly 
lower than the rightist and neutral schools' at the .05 level, 
indicating that they are less negative towards the ruling of the 
communist government. No significant difference is found between 
the means of the rightist and the neutral school students. 
At the ideological level, 13.1 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s less 
leftist school students hold strong negative attitudes against 
Chinese socialism, as well as 17.1 percentage points more of them 
deny strongly that no merit is found in the ideology. Similarly, 
6。1 percentage points less leftist school students strongly agree 
that the nationalist government will do a better job if it is to 
replace the communist government, while 23 percentage points more 
of them strongly disagree so. Moreover, 15 percentage points less 
of the students agree strongly that the interest of the Hong Kong 
people is neglected in the drafting of the basic law. Mean 
attitude scores of the leftist school students on these three 
items are all significantly less negative than the neutral and 
rightist school subsamples. The rightist school students are 
again similar to the neutral school s t u d e n t s in their mean 
attitude scores. 
The leftist school students are also more patriotic than the 
neutral school students. 30.8 percentage points more leftist 
school students strongly agree that they love China very much, 
and 13 percentage points more are willing to contribute their 
strength to the country. Rightist school students are as well 
more patriotic than the neutral school students, 15.8 percentage 
points more of them admit strongly their love for the country. 
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Means of the three subsamples all differ significantly from each 
other on their patriotic love. The leftist school students are 
the most patriotic, rightist school students rank second. On the 
willingness to contribute one's strength, both the leftist and 
rightist school students are significantly more patriotic than 
the neutral school students, while they themselves do not differ 
significantly from each other. The greater patriotic sentiment of 
the leftist and rightist school students can also be seen from 
their self identification of nationality: 35 percentage points 
more leftist school students identify themselves as Chinese, and 
15.9 percentage points more rightist school students admit so. 
Finally, more leftist school students prefer returning Hong Kong 
back to China after 1997, the p e r c e n t a g e is high as 2 8 . 0 % , 
whereas only 7.1% of the neutral school students prefer so. The 
rightist school students show no obvious difference from the 
neutral school neutral students in this aspect. 
The higher level of patriotism of both the leftist and 
rightist school students and the willingness of the former to 
contribute their strength to the m o t h e r c o u n t r y are to be 
explained from their socialisation e x p e r i e n c e . B e s i d e s the 
possible influence from schools and parents, their patriotic love 
may come from their sentiment for the place in which they were 
born: the percentage of students who are born in the Mainland are 
55.2, 24.6 and 16.3 for the leftist, rightist and neutral schools 
respectively. The place of birth and the consequential childhood 
e x p e r i e n c e in the c o u n t r y m a y go a l o n g w i t h a s e n s e of 
familiarity which renders the person to love and identify more 
with China. However, in the course of s o c i a l i s a t i o n , the 
patriotic love of the leftist school students are more likely to 
be associated with a considerable level of s u p p o r t for the 
communist government. They are t h e r e f o r e more w i l l i n g to 
contribute their strength under the c o m m u n i s t l e a d e r s h i p . 
Rightist school students are likely to love the country without 
actually accept the communist r u l e , they are therefore less 
willing to contribute their strength to� 、serve, the p r e s e n t 
leadership. 
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Influence of the June 4 crisis 
Students in the three subsamples are g e n e r a l l y q u i t e 
negative towards the present ruling of the communist government 
and at the same time are having greater hope in its long term 
development: they have considerably high level of trust towards 
the leadership, and they are also quite h o p e f u l of a better 
r u l i n g of the g o v e r n m e n t in f u t u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r 
originally trusting attitude towards the leadership is very much 
spoiled by the June 4 crisis, and a d r a m a t i c drop in the 
adolescents' level of trust is observed. 
In table 3.11, a dramatically high p e r c e n t a g e of the 
students admit distrust to the ruling of the communist government 
after the June 4 crisis. High as 90.4% of the neutral school 
students report strong distrust of the g o v e r n m e n t after the 
crisis, and 86.9% of the rightist school students also report so. 
An impressive 77% of the leftist school students also admit 
strong distrust of the communist rule. 
Among the students who report distrust of the government, 
many of them actually convert from an o r i g i n a l l y trusting 
attitude. In table 3.1m, 33.8% of the neutral school students 
change from different level of trust to strongly or moderately 
distrust. 36.4% of the rightist school students also do so. Since 
greater hope leads to greater d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , the g r e a t e s t 
conversion is noted in the leftist s c h o o l s t u d e n t s who have 
impressively high level of trust before the crisis, and 43.3% of 
them have converted. Moreover, no change in attitude is observed 
only in a small percentage of students in each subsample, the 
majority of which already have strong d i s t r u s t towards the 
communist government before the crisis. 
Nevertheless, it is still much in doubt that whether the 
impact of the drastic event is long lasting. The event has called 
for massive demonstrations and activities against the present 
communist leadership in the city, which have socialisation effect 
on the adolescents to certain extent. The effect of which should 
only be answered in some future research after some possible 
internalization processes have taken place. 
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B . Contrast between parents and adolescents 
After considering the attitudes of the adolescents, it takes 
a step further to ask whether these attitudes are pertinent to 
the present generation or that the attitudes have already passed 
through some generations and is now taking a more stable form. 
Attitudes of the parents are examined and are compared with those 
of the adolescents. Tedin distinguishes among three possible 
types of attitude correspondences that can be used to describe 
relationships between parents and c h i l d r e n . They are group 
correspondence, which looks at the distribution pattern in each 
generation regardless of the relation of parent-adolescent pair; 
absolute matching, which considers the absolute agreement of 
parent-adolescent pair; and relative pair, which measures the 
variation of parent-adolescent pair as relative to each other.(2) 
Only the latter two types of correspondence have implications on 
the influence of parents on the adolescents' attitude formation. 
Similar group correspondence only i n d i c a t e s that the two 
generations are subjected to same e n v i r o n m e n t a l i n f l u e n c e . 
Nevertheless, all three methods will be used for describing the 
parent-adolescent correspondence in Hong Kong. 
1. Father- Adolescent agreement 
Group correspondence between fathers and adolescents 
Neutral school 
More negative sentiments are directed by the fathers to the 
performance of the present l e a d e r s h i p , c o r r u p t i o n of the 
government officials and party l o y a l t y . F a t h e r s are less 
negative than the students towards the ruling of the communist 
government, but they are on the other hand less trustful of it. 
Attitudes of the fathers are shown in tables 3.5a to 3 . 5 e , 
greater differences between the two generations are found on 
items concerning the performance of the present leadership, 14•5 
percentage points less fathers strongly deny their party loyalty; 
and 12.4 percentage points less fathers hold strong negative 
attitude towards the present ruling of the communist government. 
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Moreover, 6.1 percentage points less fathers strongly disagree 
that most government officials are not corrupted. In table 3.6b, 
mean attitude scores of the fathers are s i g n i f i c a n t l y less 
negative than the adolescents towards the c o m m u n i s t r u l e . 
However, fathers are less trustful of the communist government: 
19.6 percentage points more of them are very distrust of the 
government. More consensus between the two generations is found 
only in their evaluation of the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t ‘ s past 
performance. 
In table 3.5f, neutral school fathers are similar to the 
students in their negativity towards Chinese socialism but on the 
other hand, considerably more fathers are s u p p o r t i v e of the 
ideology: 8.5 percentage points more fathers strongly disagree 
that no merit is found in the ideology. On the average, they are 
slightly less negative than the students. 
In table 3.5g, the two generations are similar in their 
patriotism towards China. Although slightly more fathers hold 
strong patriotic feeling towards C h i n a , mean score of the 
students in patriotism is slightly higher. 
Leftist and rightist school 
Similar to the relationships observed in the adolescents, 
leftist school fathers are less hostile to the communist rule 
than the neutral school fathers. Greater differences are also 
observed on attitudes towards the p r e s e n t l e a d e r s h i p : 20.1 
percentage points less fathers deny s t r o n g l y the p r e s e n t 
performance of the communist government; about 10 percentage 
points less leftist school fathers disagree strongly that most 
officials in the communist government are not corrupted; and 
distinctively more leftist school fathers proclaim fidelity to 
the communist party, 15.1 percentage points more of them strongly 
admit party loyalty, and 27.9 percentage points less of them deny 
it strongly. Moreover, 21.6 percentage points less leftist school 
fathers show strong negative feeling towards the past ruling of 
the communist government, while 11.1 percentage points more of 
them evaluate it very positively. Nevertheless, 20 percentage 
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points more leftist school fathers are trustful of the ruling of 
the communist government, while 20.4 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s less 
fathers show strong distrust of it on the other hand. Rightist 
school fathers are on the whole have response similar to those of 
the neutral school fathers. In table 3.7, means of the three 
groups show similar pattern of difference. On items concerning 
the ruling of the communist government, mean scores of leftist 
school fathers differ significantly from the other two groups, 
except for the item on corruption in the g o v e r n m e n t . Mean 
attitude scores of the rightist school fathers are similar to 
those of the neutral school fathers except that the rightist 
school fathers are significantly more hostile towards the present 
ruling of the communist government. 
Leftist school fathers are also more supportive of Chinese 
socialism than neutral school fathers. 18.3 percentage points 
less leftist school fathers agree strongly that no merit is found 
in Chinese socialism, while 13.9 percentage points more of them 
support the ideology strongly on the other way r o u n d . 9.7 
percentage points more rightist school fathers are on the other 
hand holding strong negative sentiment towards the ideology as 
compared with the neutral school fathers. Leftist school fathers 
are also the most patriotic of the three groups, rightist school 
fathers rank second, while the neutral school fathers are the 
least patriotic of all. The three groups all differ from each 
other significantly on the mean attitude scores towards Chinese 
socialism and patriotism. Rightist school fathers are the most 
hostile of socialism and leftist school fathers are at the other 
extreme. Leftist school fathers on the average are the most 
patriotic, followed by rightist school fathers. 
In conclusion, leftist school fathers are having attitudes 
quite different from the neutral and rightist school fathers. 
They are less negative towards the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government and the ideology of Chinese socialism, and are the 
most patriotic. Rightist school fathers on the other hand are 
similar to the neutral school fathers, but are more negative 
towards Chinese socialism and are more patriotic. 
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Although the difference among the three s u b s a m p l e s of 
fathers is similar to that among the corresponding subsamples of 
students, some generation difference in the leftist and rightist 
school subsamples can still be noted. Leftist school fathers are 
less negative towards the ruling of the communist government than 
their adolescents, except again on their trust towards the 
communist government. Substantially greater difference is noted 
in two items concerning the present leadership: 11.1 percentage 
points less fathers disagree s t r o n g l y that the c o m m u n i s t 
government manages China very well, 19.7 percentage points less 
of them strongly deny loyalty to the party, while on the other 
hand 11.1 percentage points more fathers strongly admit fidelity. 
In table 3.6a, mean scores of the two generations also differ 
significantly on these two items. Relatively less differences are 
observed on items concerning corruption of government officials 
and the past ruling of the communist government. Leftist school 
fathers are also less trustful of the communist government, but 
the difference between the two generations is less than that of 
the neutral school's. 9.5 percentage points more fathers strongly 
distrust the government. Conversely, 6.8 percentage points more 
f a t h e r s is h a v i n g s t r o n g a t t i t u d e of t r u s t t o w a r d s the 
government. 
L e f t i s t s c h o o l f a t h e r s do not d i f f e r m u c h from the 
adolescents in attitude towards Chinese socialism and in their 
level of patriotism. Fathers are slightly less negative towards 
the ideology and are less patriotic in average. 
Differences between the rightist school fathers and students 
are less on items concerning the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
g o v e r n m e n t , in the s e n s e t h a t the a m o u n t of f a t h e r s and 
adolescents who hold strong negative attitudes towards the ruling 
of the communist government do not differ much from each other. 
Nevertheless, in table 3.6c, mean scores of the two generations 
differ significantly again on a number of items including the 
present ruling of the communist government, party loyalty, and 
trust towards the government, mildly significant difference is 
also obtained in evaluating corruption in the government, On the 
average, the adolescents are more negative towards the communist 
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government, and again, more trustful. 24.1 percentage points less 
adolescents distrust the government strongly. 
Rightist school fathers are also more n e g a t i v e towards 
Chinese socialism. 10 percentage points more fathers strongly 
agree that no merit is found in the ideology, mean scores of 
fathers and adolescents reveal similar difference. Nevertheless, 
patriotism of the two generations are much similar to each other. 
Generally speaking, mean scores between the two generations 
actually do not differ much in the two、isms' across the three 
subsamples, indicating that the pattern of distribution across 
the two generations are quite similar, and the environment that 
is affecting both the fathers and the a d o l e s c e n t s is quite 
homogeneous in this aspect. 
Matching with fathers 
Neutral school 
In table 3.8, absolute agreements of the father-adolescent 
pairs are quite high. On the items concerning the ruling of the 
communist government, most of the absolute agreements are higher 
than 40%. The highest is in party loyalty, which is 57.6%, The 
lowest is in trust towards the government, which is 38.9%. The 
agreement is much higher than the f i n d i n g s of A b r a m s o n , who 
reports a 33% matching between the p a r e n t s and high school 
seniors in U.S. with same party identification and strength. (3) 
Hatchings in attitudes towards C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m and 
patriotism is similarly high as 40.1% and 40.6% respectively. 
Despite the high rate of a g r e e m e n t , high as 35.2% of the 
adolescents have attitude towards Chinese socialism just opposite 
that of their fathers, i.e. father agree but adolescent disagree 
or vice versa. Opposition against fathers' patriotic sentiment is 
considerable lower. 
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Leftist and rightist school 
Generally, matchings between fathers and adolescents are 
highest in the rightist school pairs, especially in the present 
ruling of the communist government, corruption in the government, 
and party loyalty. The percentages of absolute agreement are 
52.9, 57.8 and 61.2 respectively. The matchings are generally 
l o w e s t in the l e f t i s t s c h o o l s . On the o t h e r h a n d , t h e i r 
opposition rate is generally the h i g h e s t a c r o s s the three 
subsamples, Matchings between the two generations are lowest on 
trust towards the communist government, which are 31,3% and 24.6% 
in the leftist and rightist schools. Opposition rate is also 
high, over 40% opposition pairs are observed in both subsamples. 
On items concerning the ruling of the communist government, the 
neutral schools' rate of matching generally lies between that of 
the rightist and leftist schools. 
Matchings of the father-adolescent pairs on attitude towards 
Chinese socialism is highest in leftist school, which is 49.3%, 
Matching on patriotism is highest in rightist school pairs, which 
is 48.7%. 
Correlations between fathers and adolescents 
Despite that the samples are in no sense random, Pearson 
product-moment correlation is conducted for the sake of simpler 
calculations to see the degree of a s s o c i a t i o n between the 
father—adolescent pairs. 
Neutral school 
In table 3.9, correlations between fathers and adolescents 
on the ruling of the communist government range from ,18 to ,38, 
Higher correlations are found in a t t i t u d e s towards the past 
ruling of the government, corruption of the officials and trust 
towards the government, which are .38, .36 and .34 respectively. 
The lowest correlation is on the present ruling of the communist 
government. Father-adolescent association in attitude towards 
C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m is . 3 1 . A s s o c i a t i o n in p a t r i o t i s m is 
distinctively high at .54. 
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Leftist and rightist school 
On items concerning the ruling of the communist government, 
correlations range from .23 to .52 and from .33 to .43 in the 
leftist and rightist father-adolescent p a i r s . The h i g h e s t 
correlations are found in attitudes towards the past ruling of 
the communist government and c o r r u p t i o n of the g o v e r n m e n t 
officials in both subsamples. In general, correlations between 
fathers and adolescents are the highest in the leftist schools, 
except for trust towards the communist government. Correlations 
in rightist school pairs are also considerably higher than those 
of the neutral schools. 
Associations in attitude towards Chinese socialism are .47 
and .55 in the leftist and rightist schools respectively. The 
correlations are much higher than the neutral school pairs. On 
patriotism, association of leftist school father-adolescent pairs 
is only moderately high at .41, while that of the r i g h t i s t 
schools is much higher at .62. The leftist s c h o o l s are more 
concern of their role in cultivating the patriotic feelings of 
the adolescents, which may interact with the influence of the 
fathers, thus accounting for the lower in correlation in the 
item. 
In c o n c l u s i o n , the l e f t i s t f a t h e r s s e e m s to be m o r e 
influential in attitudes towards the ruling of the communist 
government, while those of the rightist schools have stronger 
influence at the ideological levels concerning the two� 、isms'. 
Influence of the neutral school fathers are in general quite 
moderate on the different dimensions of the a d o l e s c e n t s ‘ 
attitudes. 
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2. Mother-Adolescent agreement 
Correspondence between mothers and adolescents 
Neutral school 
Mothers' attitudes are shown in tables 3.10a to 3,10g, the 
greatest difference between the mothers and the adolescents among 
the various items concerning the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government is on trust towards the government: 27 percentage 
points more mothers hold strong attitude of distrust. On other 
items, more adolescents show strong negative sentiment against 
the ruling of the communist government in general. The range of 
percentage point differences between adolescents and mothers who 
show strong negative attitudes is from 0.4 to 8 . 1 , which is 
prominently less substantial than those with fathers. Mothers 
are, in this sense, more radical than fathers in their attitudes. 
However, in table 3.11b, highly significant differences in mean 
scores are obtained between mothers and adolescents in attitudes 
t o w a r d s c o r r u p t i o n in the g o v e r n m e n t , t r u s t t o w a r d s the 
government and party loyalty. 
On the average, mothers and adolescents do not differ much 
in their attitudes towards Chinese socialism, with adolescents 
being slightly more negative. Adolescents are more patriotic than 
the mothers on the other hand, and 12.5 percentage points more 
mothers deny strongly their patriotism. The difference in mean 
patriotism of mothers and adolescents is also much greater than 
that between fathers and adolescents. 
Leftist and rightist school , 
The pattern of distribution of mothers' attitudes is similar 
to that of fathers'. Leftist school mothers have quite different 
attitudes from the other two subsamples. The rightist school 
mothers are again similar to those of the neutral schools. Less 
leftist school mothers show strong negative attitudes against the 
ruling of the communist government, particularly towards its past 
and present performance. Moreover, less of them deny strongly 
their party loyalty, though the number who strongly admit that 
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they are loyal is also low. The observation that leftist school 
mothers have attitudes quite different from those of the neutral 
schools is substantiated in table 3 . 1 2 , in w h i c h their mean 
attitude scores are all significantly less negative than the 
neutral school mothers‘. 
In tables 3.10f and 3.10g, more l e f t i s t s c h o o l m o t h e r s 
disagree strongly that no merit is found in Chinese socialism. 
They are also more patriotic. Comparison of means reveals similar 
findings. 
Attitudes of rightist school mothers do not differ much from 
the neutral school mothers towards the ruling of the communist 
government and the ideology of Chinese socialism. However, they 
are distinctively more patriotic than neutral school mothers, but 
are less patriotic than the leftist school mothers. 
When the attitude distributions of mothers and adolescents 
are contrasted, the greatest d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n m o t h e r s and 
adolescents on items concerning the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government is on trust towards the communist government, 23.6 and 
23.9 percentage points more mothers in the leftist and rightist 
schools respectively show strong attitude of distrust. In tables 
3.11a and 3.11c, adolescents are also significantly more trustful 
of the government on the average. For the rest of the items, the 
percentage point differences range from 0.7 to 8.0 and 0.6 to 
10.5 in leftist and rightist schools. The adolescents are all 
more negative than the mothers in their mean attitude scores. 
Nevertheless, mean scores of the leftist school students are 
very similar to their mothers, whereas more prominent differences 
are found in rightist school m o t h e r s and a d o l e s c e n t s . The 
distribution pattern of the leftist school students' attitudes 
students therefore resembles more with mothers than with fathers, 
while that of the rightist school students differ similarly with 
both parents. 
Slightly less leftist school but more r i g h t i s t school 
mothers show strong negative sentiment towards Chinese socialism. 
The percentage point differences between mothers and adolescents 
are 2.7 and 2.5 in leftist and rightist schools. On patriotism, 
48 
more adolescents admit strong p a t r i o t i c f e e l i n g s than their 
mothers. The percentage point differences are 11.1 and 7.4 for 
leftist and rightist schools, which are much greater than those 
of the neutral schools. On the other hand, substantially more 
mothers deny strongly their patriotic feeling. The percentage 
point differences with the a d o l e s c e n t s are 10.9 and 7.8 in 
leftist and rightist schools respectively. Mean attitude scores 
between mothers and adolescents on Chinese socialism are similar 
in both subsamples, while the adolescents are significantly more 
patriotic than the mothers on the average. In both subsamples, 
the adolescents' mean level of patriotism is more similar to the 
fathers than to mothers, while their mean a t t i t u d e towards 
Chinese socialism is similar to both parents. 
Matching with mothers 
Neutral school 
In table 3.13, the absolute matchings of mother-adolescent 
pairs are high as those of the father-adolescent pairs. On items 
concerning the ruling of the communist government, the highest is 
on party loyalty, which is 59.3%. The lowest is again on trust 
towards the communist government, which is 36.4%. Matchings on 
attitude towards Chinese socialism and patriotism are also high 
as 43.3% and 39.7% respectively. Higher rates of opposition are 
noted on trust towards the government and on Chinese socialism, 
which are 27.2% and 33.9% respectively. 
Leftist and rightist school 
On items concerning the ruling of the communist government, 
the lowest matching item is still on trust towards the communist 
government, the percentages of matching are 28.8 and 33.5 for 
l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t s c h o o l m o t h e r - a d o l e s c e n t p a i r s . 
Nevertheless, the matching rate is substantially higher than that 
with fathers in the rightist school subsample. Generally, lowest 
agreement on the items are found in the leftist school pairs. 
T^ien matchings with both parents are contrasted in the leftist 
school subsample, mothers are having substantially higher rate of 
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matching with the adolescents than fathers only on party loyalty, 
the opposition rate is also much lower. Other matching rates are 
similar to those of fathers. 
The percentage of matching on Chinese socialism is similar 
to those of the neutral schools. On patriotism, higher rate of 
matching at 46.3% is observed in the rightist schools. When the 
parents are contrasted, rate of matching with both parents are 
similar on patriotism. Higher rate of matching with fathers on 
attitude towards Chinese socialism is noted in the leftist school 
adolescents, whereas the matching with both parents are similar 
in the rightist schools. 
Correlation between mothers and adolescents 
Neutral school 
In table 3.14, on items concerning the ruling of the 
communist government, correlations of the mother-adolescent pairs 
range from .27 to .40. The highest c o r r e l a t i o n is on trust 
towards the communist government, while the lowest is again on 
the present ruling of the government. Association on Chinese 
socialism is .33, whereas that on patriotism is high as •60* The 
correlations with both parents are very similar on each item. 
Correlations obtained with both parents in the present study 
are considerably lower than that obtained by Jennings and Niemi 
between parents and offsprings on partisanship, which is .59.(4) 
Nevertheless, the present correlations are considerably higher 
than their findings on more specific items concerning government 
policies and social issues. Calculated in tau-b, they obtained a 
highest correlation of .34, the lowest is only . 0 5 . In this 
study, correlations with fathers and mothers in attitude towards 
corruption of government officials are .36 and .30 respectively. 
The item can be considered as a more specific item concerning the 
operation of the bureaucracy. In this sense, the correlations 
obtained are quite high. Relatively lower correlations are noted 
on the present ruling of the communist government, which are 
still quite high as .18 and .27 for fathers and mothers. 
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Leftist and rightist school 
Correlations between adolescents and mothers range from .37 
to ,49 and .22 to .42 in l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s 
respectively on items concerning the ruling of the communist 
government. In leftist schools, mothers have a greater influence 
on the adolescents than fathers on the affective items of party 
loyalty and trust towards the communist government. In rightist 
school, mothers are no more i n f l u e n t i a l than f a t h e r s , w h i l e 
f a t h e r s on the o t h e r h a n d are m o r e i n f l u e n t i a l on the 
adolescents' party loyalty. 
Leftist school mothers have substantially greater influence 
t h a n f a t h e r s on the a d o l e s c e n t s‘ p a t r i o t i c f e e l i n g , the 
correlation is .21 higher than that with fathers. Rightist school 
fathers have greater influence on a t t i t u d e towards C h i n e s e 
socialism than mothers, the correlation of which is .23 higher. 
Again, no distinctive pattern is o b s e r v e d in the r e l a t i v e 
influence of fathers and m o t h e r s on the two 'isms ‘ of the 
adolescents in the two subsamples. 
In conclusion, relative influence of the parents are quite 
similar in the neutral school subsample. No distinctive pattern 
is found in rightist and leftist school p a r e n t s though the 
influence of one parent distinctively o v e r r i d e the other on 
certain items. 
3. Concluding remarks 
When the three aspects of correspondence between the two 
generations are taken together, the three subsamples display 
quite unique parent-adolescent relationship of their own. 
In the neutral school subsample, the two generations differ 
considerably in their attitude distribution. More similarity is 
found in attitudes towards the past ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government and on the ideology of C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m . The 
evaluation of the former is to base on past events, on which 
public opinions and commentaries have already been quite well 
developed and have widely prevailed in the s o c i e t y , thus 
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providing similar reference to both generations. On the other 
hand, evaluation of the present leadership is likely to vary with 
its performance on different tasks and in different periods of 
time, the two generations are thus more likely to be exposed to a 
greater diversity of opinions and experience, resulting in their 
greater diversification of attitudes. Attitude towards Chinese 
socialism as a more or less given set of principles and values 
aire also likely to be more stable across the g e n e r a t i o n s . 
Finally, greater similarity is also found in patriotism between 
fathers and adolescents. Greater matchings are obtained mainly on 
items concerning the present l e a d e r s h i p , i n c l u d i n g a t t i t u d e 
towards corruption of the government officials and party loyalty. 
It is likely that they are items on which the parents and the 
adolescents have more communication a b o u t . F i n a l l y , h i g h e r 
tendency of agreement, which is m e a s u r e d by the d e g r e e of 
association, is again obtained on p a t r i o t i s m of the father-
adolescent pairs. 
Attitude distribution of the leftist s c h o o l s u b s a m p l e 
towards the ruling of the communist government are quite similar 
between the two generations, particularly between the mothers and 
adolescents. Fathers and adolescents are also similar in both 
their level of patriotism and attitude towards Chinese socialism, 
while mothers and adolescents are similar in their attitudes 
towards Chinese socialism. Their similarity suggest that the two 
g e n e r a t i o n s are e x p o s i n g to q u i t e s i m i l a r e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
influence, which is likely to be pro-communist provided by the 
relevant mass media, social organizations, or even schools they 
are enrolling in. Despite the similarity in their environment, 
agreement between individual p a r e n t - a d o l e s c e n t pairs is not 
particularly high. Their matching rate is generally the lowest. 
Despite that, their correlations are generally stronger than the 
neutral school subsample. Nevertheless, in consideration of their 
possibly more homogeneous environment, the correlations are not 
high as expected. This suggests for some interactions of the 
various socialisation with the influence of the parents which 
accounts for more dynamic in the relationship of the parent-
adolescent pairs. 
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T h e r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s u b s a m p l e on o n e h a n d d i s p l a y s 
characteristic similar to those of the neutral schools', while on 
the other hand has some unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of its o w n , 
Attitude distribution of the two generations are similar to those 
of the neutral schools'. However, their matchings of the parent-
adolescent pairs are generally the h i g h e s t . Much stronger 
correlations than those of the neutral schools' are also obtained 
in the father-adolescent pairs, correlations with fathers are 
prominently higher in attitude towards Chinese socialism and 
patriotism. In view of the high rate of m a t c h i n g and strong 
correlations between the parent-adolescent pairs, the rightist 
school parents are playing a distinctive role in socialising the 
attitudes of the adolescents towards the communist government, 
particularly towards the ideology of C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m and 
patriotism. 
C. Sex difference and sex-lineage similarity 
1. Sex difference in political attitudes and political interest 
Neutral school 
In table 3.15b, the attitudes of boys are not distinctively 
different from those of girls when mean scores of items on the 
ruling of the communist government are compared using t-test, 
Boys are in general less negative towards the ruling of the 
communist government than g i r l s . H o w e v e r , mild s i g n i f i c a n t 
differences are obtained only on the present and past performance 
of the communist government. The difference between boys and 
girls in attitudes towards the ruling of the communist government 
and Chinese socialism may be due to the d i f f e r e n c e in their 
personalities: girls are more e m o t i o n a l l y guided in their 
judgment, and thus they hate and love more intensely than boys. 
On the other hand, boys are more likely to judge by evidence and 
will thus be more moderate in their attitudes. Nevertheless, the 
mild though not at all negligible difference between the two sex 
renders that the foundation of the sex stereotype is gradually 
shaken. When women are playing a more important economical role 
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in the society, the gap in the socio-economic status between man 
and woman is narrowed, boys and g i r l s are also t r e a t e d m o r e 
equally at home and in school. 
Boys are also less hostile than girls at the ideological 
level: they are significantly less sceptical of the communist 
government in the drafting of the basic law, and are less hostile 
towards Chinese socialism. The greater difference between the two 
sex in this aspect may be due to that girls are likely to be more 
socially oriented. They will thus focus on the effect of the 
ideology i.e. how it has affected the ruling of the communist 
government, which is likely to be quite unsatisfactory. Boys on 
the other hand, are more likely to appreciate the merits of the 
ideology from its principles. 
Moreover, boys are significantly more patriotic than girls, 
particularly in their love for C h i n a . T h e y are h e n c e more 
、emotional， than girls in this aspect. Greater expectation are 
still prevailing in the society that boys are to look beyond the 
family for achievement outside their near social environment, as 
a Chinese proverb says,� 、Man,s ambitions should be far-reaching' ^�  々 ， 
( t ) A} •？� ). Their sentiments are therefore directed to 
more distant objects. This global mindedness is also revealed in 
the slightly higher political interest expressed by the boys. 
Leftist and rightist school 
In table 3.15a and 3.15c, very little difference is observed 
between boys and girls on items concerning the ruling of the 
communist government, though a g a i n , boys are s l i g h t l y less 
negative in their attitudes. The two sex are also very similar in 
their attitude towards Chinese socialism. The finding is quite 
different from that of the neutral school subsample. It is likely 
that girls in the leftist schools are more knowledgeable of the 
ideology, and their evaluation of it is therefore less likely to 
be affected by the performance of the present leadership. 
Boys are also more patriotic than girls, and again, the 
difference is greater in general p a t r i o t i c love than in the 
willingness to contribute to the country. On political interest, 
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leftist school boys are having greater interest in the China 
affairs, while that between the rightist school boys and girls 
does not differ significantly. 
The mild difference in attitudes other than patriotic love 
between boys and girls in general indicates that they are having 
quite similar socialisation experience in schools where boys and 
girls are treated on fairly equal basis. Nevertheless, since most 
of the schools in the subsamples are co-education colleges, the 
socialisation practice of which is coloured less by sex role 
stereotype, future studies can be conducted by comparing among 
segregated schools, where the sex stereotypes are expected to be 
more prominent. 
2. Sex-lineage similarity with parents 
From earlier analysis, no distinctive difference is found in 
the influence of neutral school fathers and m o t h e r s on the 
attitudes of the adolescents when boys and girls are taken 
together. This section queries the possibility that fathers and 
mothers influence their boys and girls differently, basing on the 
stereotype that boys tend to model upon their fathers while girls 
model upon their mothers. 
Neutral school 
In table 3.16b, no distinctive sex lineage similarity is 
observed though fathers' influence is somewhat greater on sons as 
their correlations are considerably stronger. No obvious pattern 
is observed in mothers' relative influence on sons and daughters. 
Some correlations are prominent stronger with sons while some are 
prominently stronger with daughters. When the relative influence 
of fathers and mothers is c o m p a r e d , fathers ‘ influence is 
considerably greater on the party loyalty of the sons, and is 
also higher on the daughters‘ evaluation of corruption in the 
communist government. 
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Leftist and rightist school 
In table 3.16a, father-son c o r r e l a t i o n s are s l i g h t l y 
stronger than mother-son c o r r e l a t i o n s in a number of items 
concerning the ruling of the communist government in leftist 
schools. Mother-daughter correlations are also distinctively 
stronger than father-daughter correlations on a number of items, 
particularly towards corruption of the government officials, 
party loyalty and trust towards the communist government. Certain 
sex-lineage similarity can thus be traced, whereas leftist school 
mothers have distinctively greater influence than fathers on the 
patriotism of both sons and d a u g h t e r s . M o r e o v e r , d a u g h t e r s ' 
associations with both parents are generally weaker than those of 
sons. A possible explanation is that leftist school girls are 
having less discussions with parents on China affairs. This may 
be attributed to their lower level of political interest, and 
they are therefore less motivated to participate in political 
discussion. 
In table 3.16c, rightist school fathers' influence is quite 
similar on their sons and daughters, though their correlations 
with daughters is somewhat stronger. Mother-daughter associations 
are no stronger than father-daughter associations in general, 
whereas mothers are distinctively less influential than fathers 
on daughters' party loyalty and a t t i t u d e towards C h i n e s e 
socialism. Rightist school fathers are in fact much more 
influential than mothers in the a t t i t u d e towards C h i n e s e 
socialism for both sons and daughters. 
No o b v i o u s p a t t e r n on s e x - l i n e a g e s i m i l a r i t y is t h u s 
observed. Influence of fathers and mothers are quite similar on 
both sons and daughters in the neutral school subsample, while 
the relative influence of the parents in the leftist and rightist 
school subsamples are marked by much iirregulairities • It is likely 
that fathers and mothers are treating their adolescents quite 
e q u a l l y , w h i c h is q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the p r a c t i c e in 
traditional societies. Fathers are not particularly close to 
t h e i r s o n s , w h i c h a p p l i e s a l s o to the m o t h e r - d a u g h t e r 
relationship. Influence of the parents are therefore likely to be 
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determined by more general parent-adolescent relationship which 
does not distinguish between sons and daughters. 
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Tables for Chapter Three 
Table 3.1 Political Attitudes of the Adolescents 
a. Adolescent - The communist government manages 
China very well (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 1.6 10.9 31 . 5 56. 0 … - 184 
1.5 10.3 29.9 53.1 5.2 194 
Neutral 1.6 3.4 17.6 11A — - 437 
1.6 3.3 17.1 75.3 2.1 449 
Rightist 0.9 5.2 16.6 77.3 — - 229 
0.9 5.1 16.2 75.3 2.6 235 
b. Adolescent - On weighing the past performance of the communist 
government, its merits outnumber demerits (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 15.5 28.6 25.5 30. 4 161 
12.9 23.7 21.1 25.2 17.0 194 
Neutral 7.6 16.9 33.3 42.0 — - 378 
6.4 14.3 28.1 35.5 15.6 448 
Rightist 14.6 14.6 27 . 3 43. 4 —— 205 
12.8 12.8 23.9 38.0 12.4 234 
c. Adolescent - Be patient, and the communist government's 
management of China will get to improve (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 11.3 35 .6 26 .9 26. 3 —— 160 
9.3 29.5 22.3 21.8 17.1 193 
— 一 — — • 脚 ^ " 帽 — • — 一 一 職 睡 — 一 — * • • 驅 麵 • 麵 ^ • 一 " • 一 • • • I 111III I I • 
Neutral 3. 5 27 .3 32 . 9 36 .3 374 
2.9 22.8 27.5 30.4 16.5 448 
Rightist 5 . 5 23 .6 23.6 47.3 203 
4.7 20.5 20.5 41.0 13.2 234 
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d. Adolescent - Most of the officials in the communist government 
are not corrupted (in percent) 
一一一一一一一 I — — — — — — — • 一 一 一 — 一 一 一 * * * * 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 _ 一 _ — 一 — 一 一 _ 一 一 一 一 一 一 丁一一一一一 一一一一一， 
Very Very No N o . 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 6.0 8.7 20.8 64 .5 … - 183 
5.7 8.2 19.6 60.8 5.7 194 
Neutral 2 . 8 3 . 7 15 . 5 78 . 1 432 
2.7 3.6 15.0 75.2 3.6 448 
Rightist 4. 5 4 .0 18 . 3 73. 2 - — 224 
4.3 53.8 17.4 69.7 4.7 235 
L 一 — 山 — 麵 一 一 一 一 •一••一一一•一一膽睡•一—••一 • • 麵 — 一 — 一 — 一 鐘 — 一 教 _ 一 _ _一 
e. Adolescent - I am loyal to the communist party (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 9.2 9.2 19.1 62.4 — - H i 
6.8 6.8 14.1 46.1 26.2 191 
Neutral 2. 5 3. 0 9.5 85.1 401 
2.2 2.7 8.5 76.3 10.3 447 
Rightist 3 . 5 3 . 4 8 . 3 84 . 9 205 
3.0 3.0 7.2 74.1 12.8 235 
f. Adolescent - Level of trust towards the communist government 
before the June 4 crisis (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Trust Trust Distrust Distrust Opinion of cases 
Leftist 21.7 42.3 22 . 3 13 .7 —— 175 
19.5 37.9 20.0 12.3 10.3 195 
Neutral 6.9 33.3 35.9 24.0 — - 409 
6 .2 30.2 32.6 2 1 J 9. 3 451 
Rightist 8.6 37.6 27 . 1 26 .7 — - 210 
7.7 33.6 24.3 23.8 10.6 235 
59 
g. Adolescent - If nationalist government is to rule China, it 
will do a better job than the communist 
government (in percent) 
.Very Very No No. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 38.9 30.3 19.7 11,2 — - 152 
30.6 23.8 15.5 8.8 21.2 193 
Neutral 15. 9 28 .7 38 . 2 17 . 3 335 
11.8 21.4 28.6 13.0 25.2 448 
Rightist 17 .6 23 . 2 41 .4 17.6 —— 181 
13.6 17.9 32.1 13.7 22.6 234 
h. Adolescent - The leadership of the communist government 
neglects the interest of the Hong Kong people 
when drafting the Basic Law (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 13. 8 28. 9 28 . 3 28 . 9 — - 173 
12.4 25.9 25.4 25.9 10.4 193 
Neutral 7 . 0 15. 2 33 .9 43. 9 401 
6.3 13.6 30.3 39.2 10.7 449 
Rightist 4.8 14.5 31.4 49.3 — - 207 
4.2 12.8 21.1 43.4 11.9 235 
i. Adolescent - No merit is found in Chinese socialism (in percent) 
一 • 一 — T ™ " • 一 ™ 一 — _ 一 " ~ _ 一 一 — ~ 一 _ _ _ — 一 ， — 一 _ _ 隱 _ _ 一 _ 
Very Very No N o . 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 24.4 47.5 13.8 14.4 — - 181 
23.0 44.8 13.0 13.6 5.7 192 
Neutral 7.3 41.6 23.6 27.5 — - 411 
6.7 37.9 21.5 25.0 8.9 451 
Rightist 10.9 40. 6 21. 9 26.5 219 
10. 2 37 .9 20. 4 24.7 6 J 235 
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i‘ Adolescent - I love China very much (in percent) 
Very Very No No, 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 8.9 8.3 29.3 53.6 — - 181 
8.2 7.7 27,2 49.7 7.2 195 
Neutral 14 . 4 16.6 46. 2 22 . 8 398 
12.7 14.7 41.0 20.3 11.4 449 
Rightist 14. 2 11. 5 35. 8 38 . 6 - … 218 
13.2 10.6 33.2 35.8 1.2 235 
k. Adolescent - I am willing to contribute my 
strength to China (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Opinion of cases 
Leftist 10.8 7.2 36.5 45.6 — - 167 
9.3 6.2 31.6 39.4 13.5 193 
• 攀 " " " " " " ^ ^ " " • • 瞎 一一 誦 购 " 鍾 “ • • 一 一 *••鍾一酵 ^一一•麵•一一 ^•••••—••^^•••美 
Neutral 12.4 14 . 5 40.6 32.6 372 
10.2 12.1 33.7 27.0 17.0 448 
Rightist 6.7 12.4 38.3 42. 5 —— 193 
5.6 10.2 31.5 34.8 17.9 235 
1. Adolescent - Level of trust towards the communist government 
after the June 4 crisis (in percent) 
Very Very No N o . 
Trust Trust Distrust Distrust Opinion of cases 
Leftist 2.1 4.9 15.8 77 .0 —— 183 
2.0 4.6 14.9 72.3 6.2 195 
Neutral 0.7 0.7 8.2 90.4 ---- 439 
0.7 0.7 8.0 88.0 2.7 451 
Rightist 1.8 0.9 10.5 86.9 — - 229 
1.8 0.9 10.2 84.7 2.6 235 
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m. Adolescent - Change in Trust Level after the June 4 Crisis 
(in percent) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
From trust to 
Strongly distrust 24.0 20.8 25.9 
Moderately distrust 19.3 13.0 10.5 
Slightly distrust 12.3 4.9 8.6 
Change within same dimension 33.3 46.1 37,2 
of trust or distrust 
Unchanged 11.1 15.2 17.8 
Table 3.2 Adolescents' Self-identification of Nationality 
(in percent) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Hongkongese 27.5 62.0 45.9 
Chinese 71.0 36.0 51.9 
Others 1.6 2.0 2.1 
Table 3.3 Adolescents' Choice of the Future of H.K. 
after 1997 (in percent) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Independent 37.3 36.9 35.5 
British rule 23.3 46.6 44.9 
PRC rule 28.0 7.1 9.O 
No opinion 11.4 9.5 10.7 
No. of cases 193 453 234 
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Table 3.4 Mean Attitude Scores of Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
— • 一 一 導 _ • " 一 一 • 一 • 一 ^ _ 一 - •一•MavaMavaM*一 — ^ O M i a M M••義•一• —— m ... 
CP present ruling 通勢 4.70 (1.04) # 5.17 (1.01) @ 5.23 (1.00) 
CP past ruling 3.81 ( 1 . 4 3 ) 吞 4 . 2 9 ( 1 . 2 7 } @ 4.21 (1.54) 
CP future ruling 3.78 (1.29) # U 8 (1.17) @ 4.37 (1 .33) 
CP corruption 財 4.86 (1.25) # 5.20 (1.05) @ 5.13 (1.21) 
CP loyalty 財 (1.44) I 5.45 (1.02) I 5.45 (1.09) 
Trust before crisis @f 3.33 (1.15) # 3 J 8 (1.12) @ 3 . 85 (1 . 23) 
Trust after crisis @ | 5.20 (1.04) I 5.53 (0.77) @ 5.54 (1.89) 
NP replaces CP 財 2.89 (1.32) # 3.54 (1.20) i 3.56 (1.31) 
Basic law drafting 3.79 (1.37) # U 3 (1.28) @ 4.51 (1.25) 
Chinese socialism 鲜� 3.13 (1.29) # 3.81 (1.22) @ 3.71 (1.28) 
General patriotism @t 4.53 (1.36) U 3.76 (1.29) @ & 4.08 (1.46) 
Specific patriotism I 4.33 (1.39) U 3.93 (1.28) i 4.36 (1.26) 
— 一 一 丄 ~ 一 ~ ~ ~ ~ _ 一 ~ ~ 丄 一 一 一 ~ 丄 一 一 
@ 1 i denote significant pairs (p < .05) 
(Complete form of the attitude items can be found in Appendix E) 
Table 3.5 Political Attitudes of Fathers 
a. Father 一 The communist government manages 
China very well (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 7.9 16.4 30.9 44.9 165 
Neutral 5.7 8.1 21.3 65.0 385 
Rightist 3.4 6.8 20.4 69.4 206 
b. Father - On weighing the past performance of the communist 
government, its merits outnumber demerits 
(in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 22.2 29.9 24.3 23.6 144 
Neutral 11.1 16.2 27.5 45.2 327 
Rightist 12.8 17.3 26.8 43.0 179 
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c. Father — Most of the officials in the communist government 
are not corrupted (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 10.3 7.9 17.6 21.8 165 
Neutral 6.8 6.4 14.8 26.2 393 
Rightist 8.3 7.4 9.9 20.2 203 
d. Father - I am loyal to the communist party (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 20.3 20.3 16.7 42.7 138 
Neutral 5.2 7.5 16.7 70.6 347 
Rightist 5.5 7.7 10.4 76.4 182 
e. Father - Level of trust towards the communist government 
in general (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Trust Trust Distrust Distrust of cases 
Leftist 28.5 25.2 23.2 23.2 151 
Neutral 8.5 20.7 27.1 43.6 376 
Rightist 8,7 20.5 20.0 50.8 185 
f. Father - No merit is found in Chinese socialism (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree of cases 
Leftist 29.7 49.7 12.1 8.5 165 
Neutral 15.8 34.5 23.0 26.8 374 
Rightist 14.7 29.4 19.3 36.5 197 
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g. Father - I love China very much (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree of cases 
Leftist 8.0 10.4 33.1 48.5 163 
Neutral 17.0 22.2 32.3 28.5 365 
Rightist 17.2 12.4 32.3 38.1 186 
Table 3.6 Mean Attitude Scores of Fathers and Adolescents 
a. Leftist school 
Father Adolescent 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.31 (1.24) 4.71 (1.04) 嫩 
CP past ruling 3.56 (1.37) 3.81 (1.44) * 
CP corruption 4.80 (1.38) 4.96 (1.16) N.S. 
CP loyalty 4.18 (1.66) 4.78 (1.42) *** 
Trust towards CP 3,46 (1.41) 3.29 (1.11) N.S. 
Chinese socialism 2.92 (1.13) 3.08 (1.23) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.43 (1.29) 4.59 (1.35) N.S. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 p < .001 N.S. non significant 
b. Neutral school 
Father Adolescent 
— Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.76 (1.19) 5.20 (0.94) 嫩 
CP past ruling 4.28 (1.33) 4.34 (1.23) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.95 (1.29) 5.23 (1.02) 嫩 
CP loyalty 5.09 (1.21) 5.52 (1.00) *** 
Trust towards CP 4.25 (1.28) 3.89 (1.11) *** 
Chinese socialism 3.66 (1.32) 3.80 (1.19) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.78 (1.33) 3.82 (1.29) N.S. 
* P < -05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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c. Rightist school 
Father Adolescent 
— Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.98 (1.17) 5.28 (0.96) 大•大 
CP past ruling 4.24 (1.51) 4.26 (1.56) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.99 (1.42) 5.19 (1.16) * 
CP loyalty 5.22 (1.22) 5.49 (1.07) ** 
Trust towards CP 4.38 (1.40) 3.86 (1.26) *** 
Chinese socialism 3.94 (1.50) 3.72 (1.32) * 
General patriotism 4.06 (1.56) 4.09 (1.42) N.S. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
Table 3.7 Mean Attitude Scores of Fathers 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
• • 丨 • 一 — 咖 — — • • 丨 圓 — 》 _ • 一 灣 一 一 ••一一 
Mean (SD) Kean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling if 4. 30 (1. 25} 4.75 (1 . 20) § k 4.98 (1.17) 
CP past ruling 3.51 (1.37) I 4.26 (1.34) @ 4.22 (1.49) 
CP corruption 4.75 (1.43) 4.55 (1.29) 5.00 (1.42) 
CP loyalty 穌 4.02 (1.68) # 5.03 (1.27) i 5.17 (1.29) 
Trust towards CP 3.44 (1.39) # U1 (1.28) § 4.38 (1.41) 
Chinese socialism 2.89 (1.12) U 3.64 (1.33) d i 3.94 (1.51) 
General patriotism if 4.44 (1.29) U 3.73 (1.35) @ k 4.02 (1.57) 
• 一 脚 • 丄 — 一 — 麵 — 一 — 一 一 一 • • 嶋 一 一 丄 脚 酵 一 — 一 一 譯 《 » — — 丄 • • 一 • • 抽 — 一 《 _ _ 一 雄 __ 
瘦 # & denote significant pairs (p < .05) 
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Table 3.8 Agreement on Political Attitudes 
between Adolescent and Father (in percent) 
Disagreement 
Absolute C o M u n i s t N o. 
Agreement Pro Anti Total of cases 
CP present ruling 
Leftist school 41.2 16.9 5.0 21.9 160 
Neutral school 41.6 11.7 3.2 14.9 374 
Rightist school 52.9 9.0 4.0 13.0 202 
CP past ruling 
Leftist school 39.9 18.2 11.3 29.5 133 
Neutral school 40.6 13.2 9.5 22.7 294 
Rightist school 45.8 13.2 11.4 24.6 168 
•I I • «—«— ^ ^ » — — — I I lai, I 1,1 I • • I I 丨  II,,, ^ ^ ^  •睡 
CP corruption 
Leftist school 46.0 9.2 5.0 14.2 161 
Neutral school 51.3 10.7 3.3 14.0 379 
Rightist school 57.8 12.0 3.0 15.0 201 
CP loyalty 
Leftist school 3 7 J 22. 5 4.5 27 . 0 111 
Neutral school 57.6 9.2 3.6 12.8 321 
Rightist school 61.2 10.0 4.8 14.8 170 
Trust towards CP 
Leftist school 31.3 14.2 28.6 42.8 140 
Neutral school 38.9 10.2 19.0 29.2 347 
Rightist school 24.6 12.0 28.1 40.1 174 
Chinese socialism 
Leftist school 49.3 14.6 10.1 24.7 156 
Neutral school 40.1 18.4 16.8 35.2 351 
Rightist school 41.9 10.6 17.5 28.1 188 
General patriotism 
Leftist school 39.3 12.9 9.6 22.5 155 
Neutral school 40.6 15.1 8.4 23.5 331 
Rightist school 48.7 9.7 5.8 15.5 111 
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Table 3.9 Correlation between Political Attitudes of 
Fathers and Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling 0,44大* (160) 0.18** (374) 0.33** (202) 
CP past ruling CL52•大(133) 0.38** (294) 0 * 4 1 * 大 ( 1 6 8 ) 
CP corirupticm 0.51** (161) 0.36** (379) 0.43** (201) 
CP loyalty 0.33** (111) 0,29** (321) 0.37** (170) 
Trust towards CP 0.23* (140) 0.34** (347) 0.33** (174) 
Chinese socialism 0.47** (156) 0.31** (351) 0.55** (188) 
General patriotism 0.41** (155) 0.54** (331) 0.62** (177) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 3.10 Political Attitudes of Mothers 
a. Mother - The communist government manages 
China very well (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 5.3 17.8 23.0 53.9 152 
Neutral 1.7 4.3 17.1 77.0 369 
Rightist 1.5 3.6 20.8 74.1 197 
b. Mother - On weighing the past performance of the communist 
government, its merits outnumber demerits (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 20.5 33.1 16.9 29.6 142 
Neutral 10.2 16.7 24.9 48.2 305 
Rightist 12.6 20.1 23.3 44.0 159 
c. Mother - Most of the officials in the communist government 
are not corrupted (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 7.8 12.9 15.5 63.8 155 
Neutral 5.3 6.3 17.2 71.1 378 
Rightist 5.3 9.5 14.7 70.5 190 
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d. Mother - I am loyal to the coramunist party (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Leftist 8.8 14.4 22.4 54.4 125 
Neutral 2.7 8.8 11.5 77.0 339 
Rightist 7.8 4.8 13.1 74.4 168 
e. Mother - Level of trust towards the communist government 
in general (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Trust Trust Distrust Distrust of cases 
Leftist 19.0 24.6 19.0 37.3 142 
Neutral 2.4 16.3 30,3 51.0 367 
Rightist 4.3 19.1 26.1 50.6 188 
f• Mother — No merit is found in Chinese socialism (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree of cases 
Leftist 29.4 37.9 20.9 11.7 153 
Neutral 15.9 33.1 23.0 27.9 326 
Rightist 15.0 32.9 23.1 29.0 173 
g. Mother - I love China very much (in percent) 
Very Very No. 
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree of cases 
Leftist 19.8 11.3 26.2 42.5 141 
Neutral 26.9 21.7 30.0 21.4 327 
Rightist 22.0 12.1 34.7 31.2 173 
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Table 3.11 Mean Attitude Scores of Mothers and Adolescents 
a. Leftist school 
Mother Adolescent 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.54 (1.29) 4.66 (1.07) N.S. 
CP past ruling 3.61 (1.43) 3.72 (1.44) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.76 (1.35) 4.94 (1.24) N.S. 
CP loyalty 4.68 (1.38) 4.88 (1.42) N.S. 
Trust towards CP 3.88 (1.46) 3.33 (1.06) *** 
Chinese socialism 3.14 (1.28) 3.13 (1.36) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.11 (1.60) 4.58 (1.43) 嫩 
* p < .05 ** P < .01 嫩 p < .001 N.S. non significant 
b. Neutral school 
Mother Adolescent 
— Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.09 (0.95) 5.22 (0.94) * 
CP past ruling 4.33 (1.35) 4.39 (1.26) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.99 (1.24) 5,23 (1.03) 嫩 
CP loyalty 5.17 (1.17) 5.53 (0.94) *** 
Trust towards CP 4.51 (1.14) 3.87 (1.10》 … 
Chinese socialism 3.73 (1.35) 3.83 (1.23) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.50 (1.40) 3.81 (1.31) 嫩 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
c. Rightist school 
Mother Adolescent 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.15 (1.02) 5.30 (0.95) * 
CP past ruling 4.23 (1.51) 4.29 (1.57) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.99 (1.30) 5.20 (1.19) * 
CP loyalty 5.08 (1.39) 5.52 (1.06) … 
Trust towards CP 4.48 (1.24) 3.89 (1.26) *** 
Chinese socialism 3.73 (1.40) 3.80 (1.37) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.81 (1.57) 4.10 (1.50) ** 
* p� 〈 .05 ** p�〈 .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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Table 3.12 Mean Attitude Scores of Mothers 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling if 4.53 (1.28) I 5.09 (0.95) @ 5.15 (1.01} 
CP past ruling 3.56 (1.40) f 4.30 (1.35) @ 4.22 (1.50) 
CP corruption f 4.74 (1.38) 眷 4.98 (1.24) 5.00 (1.29) 
CP loyalty 射 4.57 (1.42) # 5.15 (1.16) ® 5.08 (1.38) 
Trust towards CP @t 3.89 (1.44) f 4.55 (1.13) @ 4.50 (1.23) 
Chinese socialist 3.11 (1.28) I 3.71 (1.36) @ 3.73 (1.39) 
General patriotisi # 4.05 (1.61) H 3.39 (1.45) & 3.80 (1.58) 
I II I II 11 I • 11 11 11 11 li II I ••一 
@ # & denote significant pairs (p { .05) 
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Table 3.13 Agreement on Political Attitudes 
between Adolescent and Mother (in percent) 
Disagreement 
Absolute Coiiunist N o . 
Agreement Pro Anti Total of cases 
CP present ruling 
Leftist school 37 . 9 15.7 6 J 22.5 148 
Neutral school 48.2 5.0 3.3 8.3 361 
Rightist school 54.4 3.0 3.6 6.6 193 
CP past ruling 
Leftist school 38.3 16.6 12.6 29.2 123 
Neutral school 41.7 14.8 10.0 24.8 287 
Rightist school 45.3 14.0 9.5 23.5 150 
CP corruption 
Leftist school 44.1 13.2 7.3 20.5 152 
Neutral school 52.2 9.0 3.3 12.3 367 
Rightist school 54.8 10.6 3.1 13.7 188 
CP loyalty 
Leftist school 51.0 9.0 7.0 16.0 100 
Neutral school 59.3 8.9 2.4 11.3 314 
Rightist school 58.4 11.2 5.0 16.2 159 
Trust towards CP 
Leftist school 28.8 8.4 29.5 37.9 132 
Neutral school 36.4 3.5 23.7 27.2 343 
Rightist school 33.5 6.3 25.0 31.3 176 
Chinese socialism 
Leftist school 42,8 13.0 17.7 30.7 147 
Neutral school 43.3 11J 16.5 33. 9 307 
Rightist school 40.8 16.2 16.2 32,4 167 
General patriotism 
Leftist school 41.9 17.1 3.6 20.7 134 
Neutral school 39.7 19.3 5.6 24.9 294 
Rightist school 46.3 12.6 4.8 17.4 166 
1� 」� — 」� 1�
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Table 3.14 Correlation between Political Attitudes of 
Mothers and Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling 0.37** (148) 0.27** (361) 0.41** (193) 
CP past ruling 0.43** (128) 0.40** (287) 0.42** (150) 
CP corruption 0.43** (152) 0.30** (367) 0.38** (188) 
CP loyalty 0.49** (100) 0.31** (314) 0.22** (159) 
Trust towards CP 0.39** (132) 0.40** (343) 0.42** (176) 
Chinese socialism 0.40** (147) 0.33** (307) 0.33** (167) 
General patriotism 0.62** (134) 0.60** (294) 0.64** (166) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 3.15 Means Attitude Scores of Boys and Girls 
a. Leftist school 
Male Female 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.70 (1.01) 4.69 (1.10) N.S. 
CP past ruling 3.80 (1.44) 3.83 (1.44) N.S. 
CP future ruling 3.68 (1.32) 3.92 (1.24) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.77 (1.33) 4.97 (1.11) N.S. 
CP loyalty 4.58 (1.61) 5.09 (1.09) * 
Trust before crisis 3.17 (1.23) 3.58 (0.99) * 
Trust after crisis 5.09 (1.11) 5.36 (0.91) N.S. 
NP replaces CP 2.92 (1.40) 2.87 (1.18) N.S. 
Basic law drafting 3.71 (1.38) 3.92 (1.35) N.S. 
Chinese socialism 3.03 (1.32) 3.33 (1.24) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.86 (1.19) 3.99 (1.46) *** 
Specific patriotism 4.50 (1.31) 4.03 (1.46) * 
Political interest 3.82 (1.14) 3.39 (1.20) * 
* P < .05 ** p� 〈 .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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b. Neutral school 
Male Female 
— Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.07 (1.03) 5.27 (0.92) * 
CP past ruling 4.12 (1.34) 4.45 (1.16) * 
CP future ruling 4.17 (1.14) 4.17 (1.20) N.S. 
CP corruption 5.17 (1.13) 5.20 (1.00) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.38 (1.10) 5.50 (0.93) N.S. 
Trust before crisis 3.80 (1.08) 3.94 (1.14) N.S. 
Trust after crisis 5.46 (0.86) 5.58 (0.69) N.S. 
NP replaces CP 3.51 (1.31) 3.55 (1.07) N.S. 
Basic law drafting 4.15 (1.32) 4.45 (1.21) * 
Chinese socialism 3.61 (1.20) 3.93 (1.21) ** 
General patriotism 4.16 (1.11) 3.48 (1.34) … 
Specific patriotism 4.06 (1.23) 3.82 (1.32) N.S. 
Political interest 3.58 (1.07) 3.47 (0.98) N.S. 
* p < .05 ** P < .01 • p < .001 N.S. non significant 
c. Rightist school 
Male Female 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.09 (1.11) 5.38 (0.84) * 
CP past ruling 4.17 (1.53) 4.25 (1.56) N.S. 
CP future ruling 4.32 (1.35) 4.42 (1.32) N.S. 
CP corruption 5.27 (1.08) 5.01 (1.26) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.40 (1.21) 5.49 (0.96) N.S. 
Trust before crisis 3.80 (1.28) 3.91 (1.19) N.S. 
Trust after crisis 5.50 (0.96) 5.56 (0.82) N.S. 
NP replaces CP 3.64 (1.47) 3.50 (1.13) N.S. 
Basic law drafting 4.46 (1.27) 4.57 (1.22) N.S. 
Chinese socialism 3.60 (1.37) 3.80 (1.17) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.41 (1.29) 3.73 (1.56) *** 
Specific patriotism 4.54 (1.31) 4.18 (1.16) * 
Political interest 3.87 (0.98) 3.64 (0.95) N.S. 
* P < .05 ** P < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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Table 3.16 Sex-lineage Relationship 
a. Leftist school 
Father Mother 
• 一 — • 一 一 一 《 « • 一 一 麵 一 _ _ ^ 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 • 一 一 一 一 一 • • 一 一 一 一 一 一 — 一 _ 一 財 一 • 一 一 • 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 — 一 一 一 一 一 一 
Male Feiale Male Feiale 
CP present ruling 0.42** ( 96) 0.47** ( 63) 0 . 3 9 " ( 34) 0.37* ( 63) 
CP past ruling 0.53** { 85) 0 . 52** ( 47) ( 80) 0.51** { 47) 
CP corruption 0.63** ( 97) 0.27 { 63) 0.40** ( 87) 0.48^* ( 64) 
CP loyalty 0.51** ( 67) 0.15 ( 44) 0.48** ( 59) 0.46* ( 40) 
Trust towards CP 0.32* ( 87) 0.06 ( 53) 0.38** ( 79) 0.45** ( 52) 
Chinese socialist 0.49** ( 97) 0.40* ( 58) 0.48** ( 88) 0,31* { 58) 
General patriotism 0.44** ( 98) 0.36* ( 57) 0.63** ( 81) 0.60** ( 52) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
b. Neutral school 
Father Mother 
Male Feiale Male Feiale 
CP present ruling 0.27** (162) 0.11 (208) 0.39** (150) 0.17* (207) 
CP past ruling 0.33** (119) 0.42** (173) 0.38** (113) 0.44** (171) 
CP corruption 0.44^* (161) 0.313** (213) 0.40** (156丨 0.20* (207 ) 
CP loyalty 0.32** (140) 0.29** (177) 0.20 (132) 0.41** (173) 
Trust towards CP 0.38** (146) 0.31** (197) 0.46** (144) 0.35** (195) 
Chinese socialism 0.45** (149) 0.19* (198) 0.38** (124) 0.30** (181) 
General patriotism 0.48** (137) 0.57** (191) 0.57** (117) 0.58** (174) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
c. Rightist school 
Father Mother 
Male Female Male Feiale 
CP present ruling 0.33** (107) 0.36** ( 92} 0.43** (102) 0.34** ( 87) 
CP past ruling 0.34** ( 89) 0.49** ( 76) 0.39** ( 78) 0.49** ( 68; 
CP corruption 0.41** (110) 0.43** ( 88) 0.36** ( 99) 0.46** ( 85) 
CP loyalty 0.34** ( 92) 0.45** ( 75) 0.30* ( 83) 0.03 ( 73) 
Trust towards CP 0.29* ( 93) 0.42** ( 78) 0.45** ( 93) 0.39** ( 80) 
Chinese socialisi 0.51** (100) 0.62** ( 86) 0.33** ( 88) 0.28* ( 76) 
General patriotism 0.60** ( 93) 0.63** ( 81) 0.65** ( 90) 0.60** ( 72) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Chapter Four Socialisation in the Family 
After examining the correspondence between the attitudes of 
parents and adolescents, this chapter aims at i d e n t i f y i n g 
factors which render family a more or less effective agent of 
socialisation. Factors identified concern e s s e n t i a l l y with 
relationship between parents and adolescent, which includes the 
d i s c i p l i n a r y s t y l e of p a r e n t s as s t r i c t or l e n i e n t , the 
communication pattern between parents and adolescents, and the 
degree of protection provided by the parents in the adolescents' 
growth. Moreover, the factors which may influence the attitudes 
of the parents is also traced. 
Hypothesis 1 
Parental style and the transmission of parental values 
The hypothesis states that less confoirmity will be found in 
the strictest and most lenient parents, the relationship between 
parental style and congruence between parents and adolescents 
will thus be a curvilinear one. 
It is found that students whose parents are extremely strict 
and lenient are very few in the three subsamples. (1) The rare 
instance of very strict parents is s o m e w h a t u n e x p e c t e d . The 
strictness of the parents is likely to be more、bearable, when 
the parents are at the same time playing an important role in 
providing for the need of the child, the gap between them will 
thus be narrower than expected. Moreover, strictness of parents 
is a only relative measure which is s u b j e c t e d to c u l t u r a l 
variation, i.e. the adolescents are less likely to count their 
parents as very strict if parents of their peers are behaving in� 、” 
similar mould. Nevertheless, since the cases available is few, 
the whole sample is taken for analysis. The finding is therefore 
at best taken only for reference. 
In tables 4.1a and 4.1b, all associations with the very 
strict and very lenient parents are not significant, and negative 
signs are observed occasionally which indicates that rebellions 
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against parental attitudes is likely. Despite that, the cases 
available is too few for reliable conclusions to be drawn. 
When the adolescents who have extremely strict or lenient 
p a r e n t s are e x a m i n e d of t h e i r p e r c e n t a g e a g r e e m e n t and 
disagreement with the parents, it is found that adolescents who 
have very strict parents are no less likely to agree with the 乂 
parents than opposing them.(2) There is probably no obvious cue 
of rebellions against the political attitudes of very strict 
parents. Similarly, neither do extremely lenient parents have 
offsprings who would deviate too much from their p o l i t i c a l 
orientations. 
Moreover, correlations of the parent-adolescent pairs when 
the parents are moderately strict or lenient are examined in the 
three subsamples. As expected, no d i s t i n c t i v e p a t t e r n of 
difference is observed. Neither strict nor lenient parents are 
consistently more influential, though distinctive differences are 
found across the two groups on certain issues in the three 
subsamples. 
Hypothesis one is therefore not substantiated. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Transmission of parental attitudes - one way verses two way 
communication 
The hypothesis states that parents who are h a v i n g o n e - w a y 
communication with adolescents are more likely to affect those 
w h o are p o l i t i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t e d ; t h o s e h a v i n g two w a y s 
communication with adolescents are more likely to affect those 
who are interested. 
To test the hypothesis, three steps are taken. The first is 
to see whether more frequent discussion with parents on China 
a f f a i r s w i l l l e a d to g r e a t e r a g r e e m e n t w i t h p a r e n t a l 
attitudes.(3) The direction of c o m m u n i c a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l 
interest of the adolescents are then controlled in sequence. 
In tables 4.2c and 4.2d, correlations between neutral school 
students and their parents are s l i g h t l y s t r o n g e r when the 
frequency of communication is high. All the correlations with 
mothers are stronger, and associations of five out of seven items 
are stronger with fathers. The differences range from .03 to .34, 
and .06 to .37 for mothers and fathers respectively. It is 
likely that increasing communication will sometimes hinder the 
influence of parents: in a number of items, correlations of the 
father-adolescent pairs are s u b s t a n t i a l l y weaker when the 
communication level is high. In such c a s e , an i n c r e a s e in 
understanding may intensify the difference between parents and 
adolescents, T^hich leads to diveirsion from parental attitudes. In 
most cases, adolescents agree more with parents when the level of 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n is h i g h , w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t p a r e n t s are 
essentially influential in the course of communication. 
In table 4.2a and 4.2b, similar finding is obtained in the 
leftist school subsample. In table 4.2e and 4.2f, no distinctive 
pattern is found in the rightist school father-adolescent pairs, 
the correlations do not differ much whether the communication 
level is high or low. Influence of fathers is therefore less 
likely to be exerting directly through communicating with the 
adolescents, at least verbally. Moreover, some correlations of 
78 
the mother-adolescent pairs are considerably weaker when the 
communication level is high, i.e. more frequent expressing of 
idea by mothers is counter to effective socialisation- Some ideas 
of the rightist school mothers are likely to be less acceptable 
to the adolescents so that when they are spoken out more 
frequently, higher level of rejection may result. 
In conclusion, increase in frequency of communication do 
relate to higher association between parents and adolescents, 
particularly in the neutral school subsample. The second step is 
then to test whether the influence is more effective when the 
communication is two-way. 
O p e n n e s s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is d e f i n e d by w h e t h e r the 
communication is one-way or two. Two-way commimication is defined 
by that the adolescent has frequent c o m m u n i c a t i o n with each 
parent on either important news concerning China or China affairs 
in general, and that the parent generally to certainly allow the 
adolescent to express his opinions back. One-way communication is 
defined by frequent communication with parents with expression of 
opinions generally not allowed. Comparison is made between those 
who are communicating frequently with parents and those who are 
having two way communication with parents since those who are 
having one-way communication with parents are too few in number 
for any meaningful comparison to be made. Again, no distinctive 
difference is observed in the correlations with each parent. 
This may simply be that adolescents who are h a v i n g frequent 
communication vdtli their parents are at the same time enjoying 
two-way communication with them. 
The third step is to take into consideration the political 
interest of the adolescents which may to some extent determine 
their susceptibility to parental influence in one way or another. 
Interested adolescents are defined by the students‘ self-report 
of his level of interest as compared with his peers. (4) It is 
once again found that most adolescents who enjoy two-way 
communication with their parents are interested in China affairs. 
Nevertheless, the final correlations with each parent once again 
reveal no significant difference in the three subsamples. 
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The attempt failed finally in building up a relationship on 
the pattern of communication and the transmission of parental 
•alues. It is found that those a d o l e s c e n t s who are h a v i n g 
frequent communication with the parent are at the same time 
communicating in a two-way mould and are also having a high level 
of political interest• No obvious change is observed when those 
who are having two-way communication with parents, and then those 
who are also having higher interest in politics are taken out to 
examine their correlations. The adolescents' political interest, 
and their frequency and pattern of communication with parents are “ 
therefore likely to be related, i.e. the interested adolescents • 
are likely to talk more with parents, and parents who respond to� 、�
them and allow them to express their opinions freely may in turn 
reinforce the adolescents to be more interested. The cycle allows 
the adolescents to understand more the attitudes of the parents, 
and the rewarding communication experience may at the same time 
render the parents influential figures in the formation of the 
adolescents' attitudes. On the other hand, the communication 
cycle may stop early if the parents do not respond to the 
adolescents or they dominate the talk w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g the 
adolescents to voice their feedback. 
Hypothesis two is therefore not substantiated. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Communication pattern with parents and political interest 
T h e h y p o t h e s i s s t a t e s t h a t a d o l e s c e n t s h a v i n g t w o - w a y 
communication with parents are politically more interested. 
The overall sample is employed in this hypothesis due to the 
small number of cases available on parents who do not allow their 
a d o l e s c e n t s to v o i c e t h e i r f e e d b a c k in the c o u r s e of 
communication. In table 4.3, adolescents' political interest 
increase merely with increasing c o m m i m i c a t i o n with p a r e n t s . 
Correlations with fathers and mothers are similar, which are .24 
and .23 respectively. If allowance for f e e d b a c k from the 
adolescents is controlled, the c o r r e l a t i o n s are o b v i o u s l y 
stronger when the adolescents are allowed to voice their opinions 
quite frequently, i.e. the communication is two-way than when 
opinion expression is rarely allowed, i.e. one-way communication. 
The relation is true for both fathers and mothers. 
Another analysis is conducted to see w h e t h e r the mean 
political interest of the adolescents d i f f e r s when they are 
having different communication pattern with parents. When pattern 
of communication is taken as defined in hypothesis two, it can be 
seen in tables 4.4a and 4.4b that for those parents who are 
communicating frequently with their adolescents, the majority of 
them allow their adolescents to voice their feedback frequently. 
Nearly four-fifth of the neutral school fathers are having two-
way communication with the adolescents. The rate is even higher 
in the commimication with mothers. Leftist school fathers are 
more open in their communication with the adolescents than the 
neutral school fathers. The rightist school parents are the least 
open, but still more than three q u a r t e r s of the parents are 
having two-way communication with the adolescents. 
In table 4.5, respondents on the average are interested in 
China affairs no matter their communication pattern with parents 
is one way or two. Despite that, the level of interest is 
significantly higher when the c o m m u n i c a t i o n is two w a y . The 
influence of mothers is greater in view of the higher level of 
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political interest obtained. The d i f f e r e n c e in the level of 
political interest is also less substantial, which indicates that 
a substantial level of political talks b e t w e e n m o t h e r s and 
adolescents alone is adequate to arouse the political interest of 
the adolescents. It does not matter whether feedback from the 
adolescents is allowed. Mothers who are having more political 
t a l k s w i t h a d o l e s c e n t s are l i k e l y to be t h e m s e l v e s m o r e 
politically interested. Politicised mothers are likely to have 
greater influence on the adolescents than m o t h e r s who are 
apathetic to politics, they are also likely to have g r e a t e r 
impact than fathers in socialising the adolescents due to the 
generally closer mother-adolescent relationship.(5) 
Hypothesis three is therefore substantiated. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Heterogeneous verses homogeneous parents 
The hypothesis states that adolescent whose parents share similar 
political attitudes (homogeneous) are more likely to agree with 
the parents' attitudes than those whose parents disagree with 
each other. 
In table 4.6b, associations with the parents' attitudes are 
obviously stronger when the parental attitudes are homogeneous in 
the neutral school subsample.(6) Correlations with homogeneous 
parents range from .43 to .69, which are much stronger than 
heterogeneous parents by .26 to .40 in the correlations with 
fathers, and .07 to .49 in the case of mothers. In Jennings’ 
study, he found in partisanship a lower of .17 in the correlation 
measured in tau-b between father and adolescent in the case of 
heterogeneous parents, and a .22 lower in the mother-offspring 
correlation in partisanship. In the case of political trust, the 
difference is far less, which is only a lower of .01 in 
father.(7) Therefore the difference obtained in the present study 
is quite prominent, indicating that adolescents do agree more 
with the parents who agree with each other. Homogeneous parents 
are thus playing an important role in the socialisation of the 
adolescents. It is likely that similarity between parents results 
in liigher perceptual accuracy of parental attitudes, which is 
conducive to effective transmission of parental attitudes.(8) 
Nevertheless, perceptual accuracy of p a r e n t a l a t t i t u d e s can 
itself be an independent variable for future studies. Another 
possible explanation is that the message is more salient and�、�
clear to the child when the parents agree with each o t h e r , 
salience of the issue is also likely to bring about more 
effective transmission,(9) p r o b a b l y in case that rebellion 
against parental attitudes does not occur. 
When association with mothers and fathers are contrasted in 
heterogeneous parents, the asseirtion that mother is more 
influential than father in the socialisation of the adolescent‘s 
affective sentiments holds quite satisfactorily. The difference 
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between fathers and mothers is .13 in patriotism, and is .19 for 
trust towards the communist government. 
In table 4.6a, correlations with homogeneous parents range 
from .49 to .69 in leftist schools, V7hich are much higher than 
heterogeneous parents by .19 to .58 in the correlations with 
fathers, and .18 to .41 in the correlations with mothers. In 
table 4.6c, correlations with homogeneous parents range from .49 
to .71 in rightist school students, which are much higher than 
heterogeneous parents by .18 to .55 in the correlations with 
father, and .13 to .13 in the c o r r e l a t i o n s with m o t h e r s . 
Correlations with homogeneous parents are generally higher in the 
two subsamples. This might be due to the possibility that parents 
in these two groups generally have more� 、extreme, attitudes, thus 
when they agree with each other, they are likely to p r o v i d e 
greater stimuli to the adolescents. 
In heterogeneous parents, leftist school mothers are again 
more influential then fathers in the s o c i a l i s a t i o n of the 
adolescents, affective s e n t i m e n t s . The d i f f e r e n c e is . 40 in 
patriotism, and .20 in trust towards the communist government. 
Similar assertion is noted in the r i g h t i s t school m o t h e r -
adolescent pairs only in the trust level, the correlation is .14 
higher than with fathers. 
Hypothesis four is therefore substantiated. 
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Hypothesis 5 
Protection of parents and the consequential political attitude 
The hypothesis states that adolescents of more protective parents 
aire likely to show more distrust towards the authority. 
It is expected that adolescents of more protective parents 
are more sceptical of the e n v i r o n m e n t , and d i s t r u s t towards 
people- The scepticism is believed to have originated from a 
s e n s e of i n s e c u r i t y w h e n the a d o l e s c e n t s are out of the 
protective family environment. Scepticism of the adolescents 
towards the near environment may then be generalized to a feeling 
of distrust towards the more distant political authority.(10) 
In general, most of the parents are giving the adolescents a 
m o d e r a t e a m o u n t of c a r e , the a d o l e s c e n t s are a l s o q u i t e 
independent of the parents emotionally. In their relationship 
with fathers, only 1.6% of the adolescents considered themselves 
as being overprotected, and 7% of them are seriously ignored. 
Mothers are more protective generally. Despite that, only 5.1% 
overprotected and 2.5% seriously ignored a d o l e s c e n t s are 
reported. The few in number of cases of overprotective parents 
suggests that Chinese parents are playing a more balanced role in 
satisfying the needs of and in disciplining the adolescents. 
Moreover, Chinese families generally have more siblings and the 
c a r e of p a r e n t s for e a c h c h i l d is t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d . In 
consideration of the few number of cases counted in the two 
extremes, the overall sample will be used for analysis. One-way 
ANOVA is conducted to compare mean scores of the four groups in 
each attitude item of the adolescent. 
In tables 4.7a and 4.7b, it can be seen that students who 
perceive their parents as moderately protective are the least 
negative towards the ruling of the communist government. They are 
also less hostile towards the ideology guiding the communist 
government and are higher in the affective love for the country. 
Those who are moderately ignored by the parents are slightly more 
n e g a t i v e t o w a r d s the c o m m u n i s t r u l e and t o w a r d s C h i n e s e 
socialism. Their patriotism is more or less the same as the 
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moderately protected groups. As expected, the overprotected and 
the seriously ignored adolescents are generally more negative 
towards the ruling of the communist government, more negative / 
towards Chinese socialism, and are less in their affective love 
for China, and the seriously ignored adolescents are also lower 
in their behavioural propensity to contribute to the country. 
Similar pattern is observed in both mothers and fathers, though 
the pattern is more consistent in fathers. 
Therefore, the different degree of protection exerted by the 
parents towards the adolescents do have some effect on the 
personality of the adolescents. Moderately protected adolescents 
tend to hold more moderate attitudes towards the a u t h o r i t y , 
Overprotected adolescents are likely to view their environment 
with greater scepticism, which is not only bounded to their near 
environment, but to a more distant a u t h o r i t y . Their g e n e r a l 
hostility and the sense of i n s e c u r i t y when they face the 
environment may also hinder their development of affective love 
which accounts for their lower in affection for the country. 
Nevertheless, their willingness to contribute their strength to 
the country are not similarly a f f e c t e d . A d o l e s c e n t s who are 
seriously ignored by the parents are similar to the overprotected 
adolescents in their attitudes. The ignored adolescents may have 
a feeling of being abandoned by the society, which is likely to 
have generalized from the parents ‘ i g n o r a n c e . The p o s s i b l e 
development of anti-social attitudes thereafter may account for 
their hostility towards the political authority. 
Hypothesis five is therefore substantiated. Moreover, the 
sense of hostility of the overprotected and seriously ignored 
adolescents seems to have a deeper root in the personality of the 
adolescents, which forms the basis of the adolescents' attitudes. 
They are likely to be relatively stable which remain even when 
the a d o l e s c e n t s are p r o v i d e d w i t h f a i r e r and m o r e o p e n 
environment in school. 
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Hypothesis 6 
Length of settlement in the PRC and parental attitudes 
The hypothesis states that the longer the period of settlement of 
the parents in the PRC, the more negative the orientations of 
them towards the PRC government 
In table 4.8a in the neutral school subsample, correlations 
between fathers' attitudes and their period of stay in the PRC 
are very weak. On items concerning the ruling of the communist 
government, all correlations of the neutral school fathers are 
below .10. Surprisingly, many of the correlations are negative, 
indicating that the longer the stay in the Mainland, the less 
negative the fathers are towards the ruling of the communist 
g o v e r n m e n t . In t a b l e 4 . 8 b , n e u t r a l s c h o o l m o t h e r s h a v e 
correlations ranging from .02 to .20, which are considerably 
higher than those of fathers. The highest correlation is on 
trust towards the communist government. All correlations are 
negative. 
On attitude towards Chinese socialism, the correlation is 
only .01, which is too low to have any meaningful implication. 
Correlation of mother is stronger at .14, the negative sign again 
indicates that the longer the period of stay, the less negative 
they are towards the ideology. Correlations with patriotism for 
fathers and mothers are .11 and .15 respectively, and that the 
longer the period of stay in the Mainland, the more patriotic are 
the parents. 
S i m i l a r l y , l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t s c h o o l f a t h e r s h a v e 
attitudes concerning the ruling of the comniunist g o v e r n m e n t 
weakly correlated with their period of stay in the Mainland, with 
some negative signs noted. Higher correlation is noted in the 
rightist school fathers in their party loyalty, which is .25, 
correlation of the leftist school fathers is .11, and that the 
longer the stay, the greater the party loyalty of fathers in both 
subsamples. The correlations are obviously higher in the case of 
mothers. Correlations of leftist school mothers on the ruling of 
the communist government range from .03 to .37. Correlations 
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reach significance on items concerning the present ruling of the 
communist government and on party l o y a l t y . C o r r e l a t i o n s of 
rightist school mothers are similarly high, which range from .15 
to .33. Significance in correlations are obtained similarly on 
attitude towards the present ruling of the communist government, 
party loyalty, and on trust towards the commimist government. 
All the items correlate negatively with the years of stay in the 
Mainland. 
For attitude towards Chinese socialism, leftist and rightist 
school fathers have less negative attitude if they stay in the 
Mainland longer. The correlation of leftist school fathers is 
stronger at .19, while that of the rightist school fathers is 
very weak at .03. Mothers who stayed in the Mainland for a longer 
period of time are less negative towards C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m . 
Their correlations are much higher than those of fathers at ,23, 
and .37 in the l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s u b s a m p l e s 
respectively. Patriotism of leftist and rightist school fathers 
correlate positively with their period of s t a y , though the 
correlations are similarly weak. Similar relationship is obtained 
in mothers, but the correlation is p a r t i c u l a r l y high in the 
leftist school mothers, which is .31. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is only partially substantiated. 
The relationship is more satisfactorily established in mothers, 
who are likely to have deeper sentiments with objects that they 
have been in contact with for a long period of time. Fathers' 
attitudes towards the ruling of the communist government, the 
ideology of Chinese socialism, and the patriotic feeling do not 
relate much to the length of stay in the Mainland, Despite that, 
the direction of relationship that the longer the period of stay, 
the more negative the attitudes can be observed in both parents. 
The generally positive sentiments of the parents with longer 
period of stay in the Mainland may simply because of that one 
should have at least some positive sentiments for the authority 
if one chooses to stay. Or if one has no choice but to stay, one 
has to justify one's circumstance of remaining in the country. 
The latter may be due to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l need of self-
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justification who are under communist rule: as the performance of 
the authority is worse than e x p e c t e d , one may e x p e r i e n c e 
cognitive dissonance, in order to restore consonance, one may try 
to change the objective situation or to adjust one's attitude so 
as to perceive the authority in a more positive way, or to simply 
direct one's sentiment to a love for the country. Since it is 
unlikely to change the objective situation under the dictatorial 
rule of the communist government, the a d j u s t m e n t of one ‘ s 
internal state is more likely to be the case. 
T h e c a s e t h a t l e f t i s t m o t h e r s are h a v i n g s t r o n g e r 
association may be due to the fact that more leftist s c h o o l 
mothers have stayed in Mainland China for a longer period of 
time. Consistent with the former explanation, they need stronger 
sentiment to support their relatively longer period of stay in 
the mainland. Another explanation is possible, as over 40% of 
them have stayed in the mainland for over 31 years, more of them 
are likely to experience the economic reform initiated by the 
communist government since the third plenum of the 11th National 
People's Congress. They are therefore more likely to contrast 
the change before and after the reform, and thus evaluating the 
communist government more p o s i t i v e l y . They are thus having 
greater hope in Chinese socialism, and having stronger love for 
the goodness of the country. 
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Influence of the grandparents on the attitudes of fathers and 
mothers 
In this section, attempts are made to trace the influence of 
the grandparent generation on a t t i t u d e s of both fathers and 
mothers. It is expected that the experience of the grandparent 
generation with the communist g o v e r n m e n t w i l l i n f l u e n c e the 
political attitudes of both fathers and mothers towards the same 
government to certain extent. 
Hypothesis 7 
SES of grandparents and parental attitudes 
The hypothesis states that the higher the SES of the grandparents 
b e f o r e the l i b e r a t i o n of C h i n a , the m o r e n e g a t i v e the 
orientations of the parents towards the PRC. 
Among the various determinants, it is e x p e c t e d that the 
socio—economic status of the older generation can best affect 
their experience with the communist p a r t y d u r i n g the early 
liberation movement and their political experience thereafter, 
SES of the grandfather generation also d e t e r m i n e to certain 
extent the experience of the family in the political campaigns 
under the rule of the communist government when remnants of the 
former bourgeoisies and landlords are identified as major targets 
of attack. 
Since many students are unable to report the socio-economic 
status of their grandparents, the overall sample is employed in 
the analysis. Only the status of the grandfathers are considered, 
status of the grandmothers are assumed to be similar to that of 
the grandfathers. Two variables concerning the socio- economic 
status of the grandfathers will be c o n s i d e r e d , one is the 
economic status before liberation, which is their richness. (11) 
The other is the social status, which is their occupations at 
that time. (12) 
In table 4,9, the expected relationship is obtained: the 
richer the grandfathers, the more negative the attitudes of the 
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fathers and mothers towards the communist government and the 
ideology of Chinese socialism, they are also less p a t r i o t i c 
towards China. Nevertheless, the associations are generally 
w e a k . On i t e m s conceirning the r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t 
government, no item has correlation higher than .13 in both the 
correlations of fathers and m o t h e r s . C o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n 
richness of grandparents and attitudes of the parents towards 
Chinese socialism and patriotism are also weak. Direction of 
relationship can be established that the richer the grandparents, 
the more negative the parents towards the ideology and are less 
patriotic. 
The generally weak in associations i n d i c a t e s that the 
economic status and the consequential political experience of the 
grandparents and the family do not have much influence on the 
attitudes of both parents towards the communist government. They 
are likely to be influenced more by their own personal experience 
in the course of maturity. 
A further analysis concerning the w e a l t h i n e s s of the 
grandfathers is conducted by dividing the grandfathers into two 
groups of rich and poor according to their reported level of 
richness. Means of fathers and mothers in the two corresponding 
groups are compared using t-test. Similar results are obtained. 
Parents who are having richer fathers are on the average more 
negative towards the communist rule. However, the differences are 
not quite significant. In tables 4.10a and 4.10b, four out of 
five items concerning the ruling of the communist government 
reach significance only at the .05 level for fathers, while only 
two items reach significance at the same level for m o t h e r s . 
Parents having rich parents are also s l i g h t l y more n e g a t i v e 
towards Chinese socialism and are less patriotic, but difference 
between the means is insignificant. 
To assess the influence of the grandfathers, social status 
on the attitudes of fathers and mothers, grandparents are divided 
into the suppressed and the liberated groups according to their 
occupations before liberation. (13) In tables 4.11a and 4.11b, 
mean attitude scores of fathers and m o t h e r s whose fathers 
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belonged separately to the liberated and the suppressed groups 
are compared. Similar difference is observed. Parents having 
suppressed fathers are more negative towards the communist rule, 
they are also more hostile towards Chinese socialism, and are 
l e s s p a t r i o t i c . B o t h f a t h e r s and m o t h e r s w h o are h a v i n g 
suppressed fathers are significantly more negative towards the 
past performance of the communist government, which is likely to 
have provided them or their family with bitter experience. The 
parents are also significantly less trustful of the communist. 
Fathers having suppressed fathers hold more s t r o n g l y that 
officials in the government are corrupted, while mothers in the 
corresponding group also deny more strongly their loyalty to the 
communist party. 
Difference in attitude towards Chinese socialism is very 
mild, and therefore parents who are having suppressed fathers do 
not necessarily have more negative sentiment towards the ideology 
guiding the communist government. Fathers' love for the country 
is also not significantly affected by the unhappy experience, 
while mothers who have suppressed fathers are significantly less 
patriotic. 
The similarity in finding when the s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c 
status of the grandparents are controlled separately renders that 
they are similar indicators. It is likely that richness and 
social status are more closely related when social mobility in 
the community is less fluid, especially in the older societies 
before communist rule. Grandfathers of the three subsamples do 
not differ much in their socio-economic background: SES of the 
grandfathers do not differ much from each other, the ratio of 
fathers having suppressed to liberated fathers is approximately 4 
to 6 in all the three groups, only neutral school mothers are 
having more fathers in the suppressed g r o u p ; richness of 
grandparents are also similar in all the three groups for both 
parents. The grandfathers generation is thus exerting similar 
influence on the parents in the three subsamples. 
The hypothesis is therefore s u b s t a n t i a t e d , though the 
relations obtained are generally weak. 
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Hypothesis 8 and 9 
Family background and parental attitudes 
Hypothesis 8 states that the higher the SES or educational level 
of the parents, the more distrust their attitudes towards the / 
PRC. 
Hypothesis 9 states that the level of patriotism of the parents 
will vary with their educational level and SES. 
Since both hypotheses predict about the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
parental political attitudes with their educational level and 
socio-economic status, they are thus analysed together. It is 
expected that the higher the SES and the educational level of the 
parents, the more hostile they are towards the ruling of the 
communist government, which have a bad record in treating the 
capitalists and the intellectuals. (14) 
In tables 4.12a and 4.12b, the finding generally agrees with 
prediction in the hypothesis that those who are having higher 
social and economic status are more hostile against the communist• 
government. Mean scores of the high SES fathers differ from the 
low SES ones at the .05 significant level on items concerning the 
past and present ruling of the communist government, and also on 
party loyalty. High SES fathers are s l i g h t l y though not 
significantly more hostile towards Chinese socialism and are less 
patriotic towards China. The same pattern is generally found in 
mothers, high SES mothers are more negative than low SES mothers 
towards the ruling of the communist government, and evaluate 
Chinese socialism more negatively* They are on the other hand 
slightly more patriotic. On the whole, difference across the 
groups are very mild. 
In tables 4.13a and 4.13b, fathers who have high educational 
level are generally more negative towards the ruling of the 
communist government as expected. More educated fathers, on the 
other hand, are less negative towards Chinese socialism: fathers 
who have received secondary education are significantly less 
negative than those having primary e d u c a t i o n . More educated 
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fathers are thus better able to a p p r e c i a t e the m e r i t s of 
socialism from its principles. Finally, more educated fathers are 
also more patriotic. 
Similar to that of fathers, more educated mothers are in 
general more negative towards the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t , 
g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y are a l s o l e s s n e g a t i v e t o w a r d s C h i n e s e 
socialism, and are more patriotic. Mothers who have received 
tertiary education or higher are significantly more patriotic 
than those receiving primary education or below. 
Hypotheses eight and nine are therefore substantiated. 
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Tables for Chapter Four 
Table 4.1 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents and 
Adolescents (control for strictness of parents) 
a. Father 
Very Lenient Lenient Strict Very Strict 
CP present ruling -0.20 ( 10) 0.29** (351) 0 . 3 3 " (355) 0.62 ( 13) 
CP past ruling 0.32 ( 7) 0 . 3 7 " (231) 0.51** ( 228 ) 0.15 ( 10} 
C? corruption 0.33 ( 10) 0.40** (345) 0.44** (365) -0.23 ( 12) 
CP loyalty 0.00 ( 6} 0.52** (294) 0.31** (284) -0.13 ( 10) 
Trust towards CP 0.30 ( 10) 0.39** (311) 0.31** (320) O.o2 ( 12) 
Chinese socialism -0.21 ( 10) 0.48** (324) 0.43** (338) 0.63 ( 13) 
C-eneral patriotism 0.34 ( 7) 0.53", (299) 0 . 50** (337) 0 . 24 ( 11) 
* p ( .01 ** p < .001 
b. Mother 
Very Lenient Lenient Strict Very Strict 
CP present ruling 0.44 ( 13) 0.36** (350 ) 0 . 3”* (327) 0 . 57 ( 8) 
CP past ruling 0 . 32 ( 11) 0 . 35** {2U) 0.55** (259) 0 . 12 ( 8 ) 
CP corruption 0 J 4 ( 13) U 7 " (353) 0.35** (328) O J l ( 9) 
CP loyalty -0.36 { 11) 0.44** (284) 0.25** (267) -0.03 { 7) 
Trust towards CP 0,4G ( 14) 0.44** (318) 0.40** (307) 0.97 { S) 
Chinese socialism 0 . 24 ( 12) 0.41 ** (317) 0 . 32** (231) 0 J 3 ( 7) 
General patriotism 0.59 ( 9} 0.56** (293} 0.59** (273) 0.55 ( 10} 
* p < .01 “ p < .001 
Table 4.2 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents 
and Adolescents 
(control for level of communication, communication 
pattern, and adolescents' level of political interest) 
a. Leftist school father 
Level of C o M u n i c a t i o n Coaiunication Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
CP present ruling 0 . 52** ( 93 ) 0 . 27 ( 56 ) 0 .47** ( 85) 0 . 5 5 " { 66) 
CP past ruling 0.53** ！:� 81) 0 J 9 “ ( 51) 0.50** ( 74) 0.55** ( 60) 
CP corruption 0.51** ( 94) 0.50** ( 66) 0.49** ( 85) 0 . 4 9 " ( 64) 
CP loyalty 0.33* { 70) 0 . 5 2 " ( 40) 0 . 36 * { 61) 0.37* ( 46) 
Trust towards CP 0.26* ( 35) 0.21 ( 54) 0.22 { 74) 0.24 ( 56) 
Chinese socialism 0.35** ( 53) 0.5?** { 62) 0.44** ( 34) ( M l * * ( c5) 
General patriotism 0.45** ( 52) 0.34* ( 51) 0.48** ( 37) 0.45** { 71! 
L 丄� 1 — 
* p < .01 " p < .001 
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b. Leftist school mother 
lievel of C o M u n i c a t i o n Communication Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
CP present ruling 0.45** ( 64) 0.28* ( 81) 0.44** ( 60) 0.43* ( 47) 
CP past ruling 0.45** ( 54) 0,43** ( 71) 0.38* ( 55) 0.37* ( 44) 
CP corruption 0.40** ( 63) 0.45** ( 86) 0.37* ( 59} 0.28 ( 45) 
CP loyalty 0.62** ( 48) 0.29 ( 49) 0.65** ( 45) 0.57** ( 34) 
Trust towards CP 0.32* ( 57) 0.41** ( 73) 0.25 ( 53) 0.27 ( 44) 
Chinese socialism 0.46** ( 63) 0.37** ( 81) 0.42** ( 62) 0.45** ( 48) 
General patriotism 0.76** ( 59} 0.50** ( 73) 0.80** ( 60) 0.78** ( 49) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
c. Neutral school father 
Level of Conmunication C o M u n i c a t i o n Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
CP present ruling 0.21* (160) 0.15 (210) 0.19 (150) 0.22 (105) 
CP past ruling 0.21* (128) 0.49** (163) 0.32** (121) 0.33** ( 86) 
CP corruption 0 . 5 5 " (157) 0.22** (218) 0.51** (148) 0.61** (107) 
CP loyalty 0.47** (143) 0.10 (174) 0.36** (133) 0.39** { 95) 
Trust towards CP 0.33** (147) 0.34** (197) 0.34** (137) 0.33** ( 98) 
Chinese socialisi 0.37** (157丨 0.25** (191) 0.35** (149) 0.37** (107) 
General patriotism 0.58** (151) 0.46** (176) 0.54** (141) 0.52** (102) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
d. Neutral school mother 
111 I III • I I III III II II I • I 
Level of Coiiunication Coiiunication Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
释一一"""一—一一 一一一 一一一 一 一 • 麵 霸 一 — 曙 • 一 ― • 籍 • • 一 一 鍾 • 
CP present ruling 0.34** (134) 0.23** (225) 0.28** (134) 0.46** ( 99) 
CP past ruling 0.41** (110) 0.38** (176) 0.45** (112) 0.44** ( 81) 
CP corruption 0.33** (135) 0.30** (231) 0.33** (135) 0.40** (101) 
CP loyalty 0.53** (117) 0.19* (196) 0.42** (116) 0.41** ( 85) 
Trust towards CP 0.46** (132) 0.36** (210) 0.46** (124) 0.39** (190) 
Chinese socialism 0.35** (119) 0.31** (187) 0.34** (119) 0.36** ( 83) 
General patriotism 0.66** (116) 0.55** (176) 0.64** (116) 0.54** ( 86) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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e. Rightist school father 
一 一 一 一 • 一 一 麵 一 — 拳 — 一 漏 — 一 一 — _ 酵 一 一 一 — — 一 — 一 一 教 一 一 一 一 一 _ 一 _ 一 一 _ _ 一 一 — • 一 
Level of C o M u n i c a t i o n C o M u n i c a t i o n Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
CP present ruling 0.28* ( 83) 0.38** (118) 0.30* ( 75) 0.33* ( 67) 
CP past ruling 0.43** ( 75) 0.37** ( 90) 0.50** ( 68) 0.46** ( 62) 
CP corruption 0.37** ( 84) 0.47** (116) 0.52** ( 68} 0.38** ( 67} 
CP loyalty 0, 39** ( 77) 0.40** ( 91) 0.45** ( 69) 0 . 4 1 " ( 63) 
Trust towards CP 0.35** { 80) 0.31* ( 93) 0.32* ( 69) 0.32* ( 63) 
Chinese socialist 0.53** ( 82) 0.58** (104) 0.54** ( 74) 0.57** ( 66) 
General patriotism 0.69** ( 78) 0.56** ( 97) 0.66** ( 72) 0.66*^ ( 61) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 — — 
f. Rightist school mother 
一 一 • 一 — • 一 雄 • — 飄 _ _ 一 一 T 一 — • 一 一 一 一 T 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 ― 一 
Level of Coimunication Comiunication Political interest 
Pattern of adolescents 
Hi Low Two-way High 
• • • 一 • • 一 I I I ,1 I, I, I • • 
CP present ruling 0.44** ( 73) 0.39** (118) 0.44** ( 64) 0.43** ( 57) 
CP past ruling 0.41** { 67) 0.46** ( 81) 0.42** ( 63) 0.36* ( 56) 
CP corruption 0.34* ( 75) 0.42** (111) 0.28 ( 65) 0.16 ( 58) 
CP loyalty 0.13 ( 67) 0.30* ( 91) 0.15 ( 59) 0.20 ( 54) 
Trust towards CP 0.5”* ( 68) 0.35** (106) 0. 58** ( 60) 0.61** ( 54) 
Chinese socialism 0.29* ( 66) 0.36** (100) 0.29 ( 59) 0.28 ( 52) 
General patriotism 0.56** ( 62) 0.68** (102) 0.57** ( 55) 0.53** ( 49) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 4.3 Correlation of Frequency of Communication 
with Adolescents‘ Political Interest 
(control for communication pattern with parents) 
Father Mother 
General 0.24** (863) 0.23^* (865) 
One-way 0.12 (196) 0.10 (177) 
Two-way 0.20** (521) 0.18** (527) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Table 4.4 Communication Pattern with Parents 
a. Father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
One-way 16 (13.9%) 41 (19.9%) 26 (24.8%) 
Two-way 99 (86.1%) 165 (80.1%) 79 (75.2%) 
No. of cases 115 206 105 
b. Mother 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
One-way 13 {15.9%) 23 (13.6%) 20 (22.7%) 
Two-way 69 (84.1%) 146 (86.4%) 68 (77.3%) 
No, of cases 82 169 88 
Table 4*5 Mean Scores of Adolescents' Political Interest for 
Different Communication Pattern with Parents 
一 一一一一—一一一一 _ _ 一冊一 一一一•一场一••一 一 一 _ ^ 一 • 一 一 — — 场 一 — 一 嫌 一 一 一 — 供 _ _ _ 供…一^^舞^^一 ••一一剩如 
Father Mother 
One-way Two-way One-way Two-way 
Prob. Prob. 
f^ean (SD) Kean (SD) 1-tail Mean (SD) Kean (SD) l-tail 
3.59 (0.99) 3.90 (0.98) ** 3.64 (0.97) 3.92 (1.00) * 
* p < .05 “ p < .01 … p ( .001 
Table 4.6 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents 
and Adolescents 
{control for heterogeneity and homogeneity of parents) 




CP present ruling 0.52** ( 60) 0.33* ( 74) 0.18 ( 74) 
CP past ruling 0.63** 丨 54} 0.41** ( 51) 0.24 ( 61) 
CP corruption 0.64** ( 75) 0.31* ( 66) 0.23 ( 66) 
CP loyalty 0 . 6 3 " ( 44} 0.14 ( 45} 0.36* ( 45) 
Trust towards CP ( 56) -0.01 { 57) 0.19 ( 57) 
Chinese socialisn 0.64** ( 5c) 0 J 4 * * ( 53) 0 . 29* ( 68) 
General patriotisi 0.69** ( 60 ) 0 . 11 ( 66) 0 . 5 1 " ( 55) 
* p < .01 “ p�〈 .001 
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b. Neutral school 
I" -• • — 一 




CP present ruling 0.43** (163) 0.03 (168) 0.09 (168) 
CP past ruling 0.55“ (127) 0.21 (124) 0.33** (124) 
CP corruption 0.49** (181) 0.19* (163) 0.00 (163) 
CP loyalty 0.45** (173) 0.18 (110) 0.24* (110) 
Trust towards CP 0.48** (154) 0.22* (158丨 0.41** (158) 
Chinese socialist 0.49** (124) 0.17 (163) 0.28** (163) 
General patriotism 0.69** (120) 0.39** (150) 0.52** (150) 
* p < .01 ** p ( .001 
c. Rightist school 




CP present ruling 0.59** ( 98) 0.04 ( 81) 0.29* ( 81) 
CP past ruling 0.54** ( 82) 0.36* ( 55) 0.18 ( 55) 
CP corruption 0.68** (112} 0.15 ( 63) -0.05 ( 63) 
CP loyalty 0.51** ( 94) 0.22 ( 54) -0.12 ( 54) 
Trust towards CP 0.49** ( 82) 0.22 ( 74) 0.36** ( 74) 
Chinese socialism 0.69** ( 70) 0.48** ( 83) 0.02 ( 83) 
General patriotism 0.71** ( 69) 0.52** ( 80) 0.52** ( 80) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 4.7 Mean Attitude Scores of Adolescents' at Different 
Level of Protection From Parents 
a. Father 
Seriously 
Overprotected Protected Ignored ignored 
• I II I • I I I — 一 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
維 • • 導 喝 謹 一 晒 一 _ •一 "•^•••••••"••••一 一”••一 ••一 • • 峰 • 一 _ • 脚 M••一• 
CP present ruling 5.23 (0.83) 5.07 (1.06) 5.06 (1.01) 5.27 (1.15) 
CP past ruling 4.42 (1.78) 4.05 (1.39) 4.17 (1.37) 4.67 (1.32) 
CP future ruling 4.64 (1 . 42) 4.11 (1 .29) 4 .12 (1 . 21) 4.35 (1 J 2 ) 
CP corruption 5.00 (1.13) 4.98 (1.26) 5.18 (1.06) 5.26 (1.03) 
CP loyalty 4.92 (1.50) 5.23 (1.26) 5.37 (1.06) 5.51 (1.22) 
Trust before crisis 4.07 (1.14) 3.67 (1.18) 3.76 (1,15) 3.85 (1.29) 
Trust after crisis 5.79 (0,58) 5.38 (0.86) 5.52 (0.84) 5.34 (1.14) 
NP replaces CP 3.58 (1.31) 3.33 (1.34) 3.39 (1.25) 3.53 (1.20丨 
Basic law drafting 4.69 (1.38) 4,21 (1.36) 4.22 (1.28) 4.76 (1.12) 
Chinese socialism 4.21 (1.12) 3.54 (1.29) 3.63 (1.26) 4.06 (1.38) 
General patriotism 3.54 (1.71} 4.06 (1.34) 4.06 (1.38) 3.61 (1.51) 




Overprotected Protected Ignored Ignored 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling 5.24 (0.98) 5.06 (1.02) 5.06 (1.06) 5.23 (1.31} 
CP past ruling 4.25 (1.54) 4.14 (1.38) 4.18 (1.42) 4.21 (1.08) 
CP future ruling 4.32 (1.40) 4.12 (1.23) 4.14 (1.28) 4.00 (1.30) 
CP corruption 5.18 (1.26) 5.05 (1.19) 5.17 (1.07) 5.30 (0.80) 
CP loyalty 5.50 (0.98) 5.28 (1.19) 5.36 (1.11) 5.25 (1.52) 
Trust before crisis 4.08 (1.29) 3.68 (1.13) 3.79 (1.20) 3.85 (1.35) 
Trust after crisis 5.67 (0.61) 5.43 (0.85) 5.48 (0.92) 5.27 (1.28) 
NP replaces CP 3.69 (1.00) 3.39 (1.29) 3.38 (1.31) 3.15 (1.31) 
Basic law drafting 5.03 (1.08) 4.22 (1.31) 4.21 (1.30) 4.35 (1.42) 
Chinese socialism 3.76 (1.22) 3.59 (1.30) 3.66 (1.26) 3.74 (1.24) 
General patriotism 3.76 (1.62) 4.09 (1.31) 3.98 (1.45) 3.78 (1.52) 
Specific patriotism 4.37 ( 1 •⑷ 4. 15 (1 . 30) 4 . 10 (1 . 29) 3 . 94 ( 1 . 60) 
一 " " 一 一 一 一 一 — 丄 一 一 • 一 一 一 一 一 • 丄 一 • • 一 一 一 • 一 一 一 一 一 _ 
Table 4.8 Correlation of Parental Attitudes with Increasing 
Years of Stay in the Mainland 
a. Father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling -0.02 (114) -0.02 (221) -0.05 (132) 
CP past ruling 0.02 (104) -0.06 (191) 0.03 (117) 
CP corruption -0.08 (115) -0.01 (225) -0.02 (134) 
CP loyalty -0.11 ( 97) -0.05 (204) -0.25* (118) 
Trust towards CP 0.05 (111) -0.04 (214) 0.03 (119) 
Chinese socialism -0.19 (115) 0.01 (219) -0.03 (129) 
General patriotism 0.13 (118) 0.11 (215) 0。07 (118) 
* p < .01 大大 p < .001 
b. Mother 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling -0.29* (105) -0.08 (168) -0,33** ( 98) 
CP past ruling -0.03 (102) -0.08 (143) -0.15 { 80) 
CP corruption -0.15 (107) -0.02 (171) -0.19 ( 96) 
CP loyalty -0.37** ( 90) -0.05 (158) -0.29* ( 85) 
Trust towards CP -0.18 (103) _0.20* (162) -0.27* (102) 
Chinese socialism -0.23* (106) -0.14 (149) -0.37** { 87) 
General patriotism 0.31** (102) 0.15 (152) 0.11 ( 87) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
1 0 0 
Table 4.9 Correlation of Parental Attitudes with Increasing 
Richness of Grandparents 
Father Mother 
CP present ruling 0.10 (375) 0.10 (312) 
CP past ruling 0.12 (331) 0.13 (266) 
CP corruption 0.11 (378) 0.07 (306) 
CP loyalty 0.12 (336) 0.10 (289) 
Trust towards CP 0.13* (351) 0.12 (310) 
Chinese socialism 0.06 (368) 0.05 (287) 
General patriotism -0.07 (348) -0.08 (284) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 4.10 Mean Attitude Scores of Parents at Different 




Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (1-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.87 (1.17) 4.58 (1.29) * 
CP past ruling 4.24 (1.32) 3.94 (1.46) N.S. 
CP corruption 5.13 (1.15) 4.78 (1.47) * 
CP loyalty 4.98 (1.31) 4.64 (1.63) * 
Trust towards CP 4.28 (1.39) 3.89 (1.40) * 
Chinese socialism 3.65 (1.37) 3.45 (1.36) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.11 (1.42) 4.28 (1.30) N.S. 




Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (1-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.10 (1.08) 4.81 (1.29) * 
CP past ruling 4.39 (1.47) 3.97 (1.42) * 
CP corruption 5.07 (1.24) 4.86 (1.51) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.10 (1.35) 4.84 (1.42) N.S. 
Trust towards CP 4.51 (1.36) 4.24 (1.36) N.S. 
Chinese socialism 3.63 (1.59) 3.56 (1.32) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.73 (1.69) 3.97 (1.51) N.S. 
* p� 〈 .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001 N.S. non significant 
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Table 4,11 Mean Attitude Scores of Parents at Different 




Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (1-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.86 (1.33) 4.40 (1.78) N.S. 
CP past ruling 4.33 (1.50) 3.89 (1.34) ** 
CP corruption 5.14 (1.24) 4.84 (1.35) * 
CP loyalty 4.95 (1.40) 4.69 (1.52) N.S. 
Trust towards CP 4.40 (1.45) 3.98 (1.35) 大大 
Chinese socialism 3.71 (1.56) 3.46 (1.36) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.09 (1.57) 4.30 (1.26) N.S. 




Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (1-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.98 (1.22) 4.84 (1.17) N.S. 
CP past ruling 4.45 (1.53) 3.97 (1.25) * 
CP corruption 5.09 (1.30) 4.88 (1.27) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.19 (1.37) 4.70 (1.39) ** 
Trust towards CP 4.59 (1.36) 4.15 (1.33) ** 
Chinese socialism 3.58 (1.67) 3.33 (1.18) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.61 (1.72) 4,07 (1.46) * 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
Table 4.12 Mean Attitude Scores of Parents at Different SES 
a. Father 
Low Medium High 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling @4.62 (1.26) 4.73 (1.44) @4.90 (1.13) 
CP past ruling #@3.90 (1.40) # 4.18 (1.40) @4.29 (1:30) 
CP corruption 4.84 (1.37) 5.03 (1.23) 4.99 (1.33) 
CP loyalty @4.77 (1.48) & 4.72 (1.48) &@5.08 (1.18) 
Trust towards CP 4.04 (1.29) 4.07 (1.39) 4.19 (1,42) 
Chinese socialism 3.57 (1.35) 3.38 (1.30) 3.66 (1.38) 
General patriotism 3.91 (1.44) 4.06 (1.34) 3.82 (1.47) 
@ # & denote significant pairs (p < .05) 
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b. Mother 
Low Medium High 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling 4.74 (1.31) 4.91 (0.95) ~ 5 T 0 6 (1.11) 
CP past ruling @3.76 (1.40) @4.15 (1.44) 4.26 (1 31) 
CP corruption 4.72 (1.38) 4.93 (1.25) 4.78 (1,50) 
CP loyalty 4.75 (1.40) 4.96 (1.27) 5.16 (1.13) 
Trust towards CP 4.12 (1.27) 4.29 (1.17) 4.20 (1.27) 
Chinese socialism 3.50 (1.37) 3.45 (1.20) 3.57 (1.57) 
General patriotism 3.79 (1.49) 3.71 (1.55) 3.92 (1.41) 
@ denotes significant pairs (p < .05) 
Table 4.13 Mean Attitude Scores of Parents at Different Educational Levels 
a. Father 
Pirimairy Secondary Tertiary 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling 4.62 (1.25) 4.75 (1.21) (1.08) 一 
CP past ruling 4.04 (1.42) 4.02 (1.44) 4.25 (1.36) 
CP corruption 4.88 (1.42) 4.96 (1.32) 5.00 (1.22) 
CP loyalty 4.88 (1.44) 4.75 (1.47) 4.98 (1.29) 
Trust towards CP 4.15 (1.32) 4.02 (1.42) 4.35 (1.44) 
Chinese socialism @3.67 (1.41) @3.41 (1.32) 3.44 (1.28) 
General patriotism 3.88 (1.39) 4,03 (1.44) 4.21 (1.34) 
@ denotes significant pairs (p < .05) 
b. Mother 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
CP present ruling 4.96 (1.10) 5.04 (1.04) 4.91 (1.19) 
CP past ruling 4.06 (1.39) 4.09 (1.47) 4.35 (1.35) 
CP corruption 4.86 (1.34) 5.00 (1.24) 5.13 (1.17) 
CP loyalty 4.97 (1.33) 5.00 (1.30) 5.03 (1.17) 
Trust towards CP 4.43 (1.22) 4.33 (1.30) 4.53 (1.22) 
Chinese socialism 3.57 (1.34) 3.59 (1.41) 3.24 (1.41) 
General patriotism @3.52 (1.53) 3.73 (1.58) @4.16 (1:55) 
@ denotes significant pairs (p < .05) 
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Chapter Five Socialisation in the school 
The pro-communist and the p r o - n a t i o n a l i s t schools are 
e x p e c t e d to p l a y v e r y u n i q u e r o l e s in s o c i a l i s i n g the 
adolescents' attitudes towards the communist government and the 
ideology guiding it: pro-communist schools are to socialise the 
students to more favourable attitudes, while the pro-nationalist 
schools are to socialise the students to the other e x t r e m e , 
B e s i d e s , as e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e y p r o v i d e the 
information and incentives for learning, thus motivating the 
adolescents to acquire more knowledge on the affairs concerning 
both Taiwan and the Mainland • Since political activities are 
essentially prohibited in the school environment by the Hong Kong 
government, influence of the schools is more likely to be exerted 
informally through discussions between teachers and students, 
talks and activities organized by the school authority, or even 
via the newspapers assigned the students to read. 
Hypothesis 10 
Acquisition of political knowledge 
The hypothesis states that adolescents studying in pro-communist 
and p r o—n a t i o n a l i s t s c h o o l s w i l l be p o l i t i c a l l y m o r e 
knowledgeable. 
In t a b l e 5 . 1 , 1 e f t i s t s c h o o l s t u d e n t s are the inost 
knowledgeable, their mean knowledge score out of a total of 14 is 
4.85, whereas mean score of the rightist school students is the 
lowest at 2.92. Neutral school students have a mean score of 
4.33. Mean score of the rightist school s t u d e n t s differs 
significantly from that of the n e u t r a l and leftist school 
s t u d e n t s at the ,05 l e v e l . On k n o w l e d g e c o n c e r n i n g the 
nationalist government, the neutral school students have the 
highest mean score, while the rightist school students score the 
lowest, means of the two groups differ significantly at the .05 
level. As expected, leftist school students have the highest mean 
score on knowledge concerning the communist government, which is 
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2.93 out of a total score of 9, neutral school students rank 
second, rightist school students rank l a s t . They all differ 
significantly from each other at the .05 level. 
The higher level of knowledge of the neutral school students 
may be due to the fact that the neutral schools are in general at / 
a higher academic level than the leftist and rightist schools,‘ 
which are mostly private schools. Despite that knowledge on the 
two governments is not part of the normal school curriculum, 
brighter students are still able to perform better: they tend to 
be richer in common sense and are more knowledgeable on matter 
outside the textbooks. Since information on individual student's 
academic performance is difficult to obtain and different schools 
have different standards in e v a l u a t i n g their s t u d e n t s , the 
general academic level of the school rather than the performance 
of individual student is controlled for comparison. (1) 
In table 5.2, after the academic level of the schools is 
controlled, mean score of the neutral schools depreciates greatly 
from 6.39 to 1.56 in the overall s c o r i n g , k n o w l e d g e on the 
nationalist government decreases from 3.23 to .78, and knowledge 
on the communist government d e c r e a s e s from 3.13 to .77 on 
knowledge concerning the communist government. Within the low 
grade schools, mean scores of both leftist and rightist school 
students are distinctively higher, and leftist school students 
are more knowledgeable than rightist s c h o o l s t u d e n t s in the 
overall mean score. On knowledge concerning the nationalist 
government, mean scores of the two subsamples do not differ much, 
while mean score of the leftist school students is distinctively 
higher than that of rightist school s t u d e n t s on k n o w l e d g e 
concerning the communist government. 
T h e r e f o r e , the l e f t i s t s c h o o l s t u d e n t s are m o r e 
k n o w l e d g e a b l e on the a f f a i r s of b o t h the c o m m u n i s t and� ��
n a t i o n a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s m a y be a t t r i b u t e d to the 
socialisation practice in these schools where the provision of 
general knowledge on China is much emphasised. Such effort is 
lacked in the rightist schools. However, rightist school students 
are politically more interested, they are thus more motivated to 
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acquire more knowledge concerning the China affairs, possibly 
through a number of channels like discussion with peers and 
teachers, or even from their parents. 
Hypothesis ten is therefore substantiated. 
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Hypothesis 11 and 12 
Socialisation roles of the pro-communist and pro-nationalist 
schools 
Two closely related hypotheses are taken together as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 11 states that p r o - c o m m u n i s t and p r o - n a t i o n a l i s t 
schools will socialise the students to attitudes in line with the 
schools and 
Hypothesis 12 states that adolescents in pro-communist and pro-
nationalist schools who perceive higher exposure of political 
information in the school environment will be more likely to be 
socialised to attitudes in line with the school 
In earlier analysis, it has already been shown that leftist 
school students have quite different political attitudes from 
those of the rightist and neutral schools'. They are less hostile 
towards the ruling of the communist government, less willing to 
deny Chinese socialism and are more p a t r i o t i c . The r i g h t i s t 
school students, except for their higher level of patriotism, do 
not differ much from the neutral school students. Hypothesis 12 
is thus an attempt to identify some variables pertinent to the 
schools, particularly within the p r o - c o m m u n i s t and the pro-
nationalist ones, which render them more or less e f f e c t i v e 
agents of socialisation. The identification of school exposure as 
a variable is based on information gained from prior interviews 
with some students and on pirevious research findings• It is 
expected that in pro-communist and p r o - n a t i o n a l i s t s c h o o l s , 
information provided by the school authority and the teachers are 
generally compatible with the stand of the school authority. 
Students who perceive higher exposure of political information in 
school are therefore more likely to be socialised to attitudes in 
line with those of the school's. (2) 
In table 5.3, the strength and direction of association is 
somewhat as expected in the leftist school students. Generally, 
the relationship can be established that the more the school 
107 
exposure, the more positive the students towards the ruling of 
the communist government. With more school exposure, they are 
significantly less negative to the past p e r f o r m a n c e of the 
communist government, more hopeful of a better ruling of the 
government in future, and are more trustful of the government 
before June 4 crisis. The correlations are .26, .24 and .26 
respectively. They are also less n e g a t i v e t o w a r d s C h i n e s e 
socialism, the correlation is .21. Moreover, increasing school 
exposure is also mildly associated with increasing patriotic love 
of the adolescents at .13. The association is stronger in the 
willingness of the adolescents to contribute their strength to 
China. The association is .24. 
In the rightist schools, a s s o c i a t i o n s b e t w e e n s c h o o l 
exposure and attitudes of the adolescents towards the ruling of 
the communist government, the ideology of Chinese socialism, and 
patriotism are very weak. The strongest correlation is with the 
willingness of the adolescents to contribute their strength - to 
China, which is only .13. Most correlations do not exceed .10. 
Finding on the neutral schools is very similar to that of 
the rightist schools, attitudes of the a d o l e s c e n t s are only 
weakly associated with the amount of school exposure. On items 
concerning the ruling of the communist government, none of them 
exceed .10. The associations also fluctuate between the positive 
and negative directions without revealing any regular patterns. 
Correlations with attitudes towards Chinese socialism is also 
weak as .03. Correlations are stronger with p a t r i o t i s m , an 
association of .14 is obtained on patriotic love, and .19 on the 
willingness to contribute their strength. The neutral schools are 
therefore playing a considerable role in socialising the students 
to be more patriotic. Moreover, in view of the generally positive 
correlations between increasing school exposure and negativity of 
attitudes towards the ruling of the communist government and the 
ideology of Chinese socialism, the schools are playing a mild 
role in the anti-communist sentiments of the students• 
The above findings hence support the prediction made on the 
leftist schools. Nevertheless, instead of understanding the 
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students merely as passive recipients, the relationship between 
school exposure and political orientation of the students can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d in the o t h e r w a y r o u n d , i . e . s t u d e n t s w h o s e 
orientation is consistent with that of the school are more aware 
of the political information in the school environment and are 
more willing to expose to it. 
Influence of the neutral schools is apolitical as expected. 
The very mild anti-communist e n v i r o n m e n t may be due to the 
generally anti-communist attitudes of the t e a c h e r s , since a 
generally anti-communist subculture is prevailing in the older 
generation here, as is shown in the a t t i t u d e s of the p a r e n t 
generation reported by the neutral school students. The teachers 
may influence the adolescents with filtered information and their 
own opinions. The weak associations between school exposure and 
political attitudes of the students may be due to that political 
information provided is likely to be more random. Opinions of the 
teachers may also vary over a wide range. 
Rightist school students are the most apathetic, and they 
are little affected by the amount of school exposure. Two of them 
are subsidiary schools and are run by religious groups. The 
school authority actually plays no active role in reinforcing any 
particular political oirientation despite that they are in a pro-
nationalist community and are participating in its rituals and 
activities. The schools therefore do not have any manifested 
political orientations visible to the s t u d e n t s . S y s t e m a t i c 
socialisation practice is also lacked. The third school is a 
p r i v a t e s c h o o l w h i c h is r e g i s t e r e d in the n a t i o n a l i s t 
government's Ministry of Education. Similarly, the school has 
paid no effort in pushing forward any political orientation, the 
school environment is essentially apolitical. More importantly, 
most of the students in this subsample are not original school 
students. The schools in the subsample are of a lower academic 
level in Hong Kong, they have to accept Form Four students who 
were failed by the assessment examination in Form Three and had 
to leave their schools. Students in these schools therefore come 
from a diversity of schools which include subsidiary school or 
even some privately run leftist s c h o o l s . Such p h e n o m e n o n is 
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common in schools having similar political background. 
Further analysis is conducted to see whether it makes any 
difference if the students are taking a more active role in the 
discussion with schoolmates and teachers.(3) Since the inter-item 
correlation between school exposure and frequency of discussion 
participation is quite high at .33, it is likely that the effect 
of school exposure is exerted through the student's participation 
in discussion i.e. the student perceives higher school exposure 
because he participates more in the discussions. 
In table 5.4, a replication of the findings is obtained 
between increasing school e x p o s u r e and n e g a t i v i t y of the 
adolescents' attitudes in the r i g h t i s t and n e u t r a l s c h o o l s . 
However, in leftist schools, associations decrease considerably 
in the high participation group with the exception of general 
patriotic love, which has stronger correlation with increasing 
school exposure when the frequency of p a r t i c i p a t i o n is l o w . 
Therefore in leftist schools, mere e x p o s u r e to p o l i t i c a l 
information will influence those who have low participation in 
discussion, i.e. the passive recipients. Those who have more 
discussions with teachers and classmates are likely to be more 
active and have independent thinking of their own, and increasing 
exposure will have different effect on this group by reinforcing 
the attitudes of some while hindering the others, resulting in 
the weak relationship. However, the lower in general patriotism 
with increasing school exposure when the participation is low 
indicates that patriotism is reinforced by sharing the sentiment 
with others, i.e. mere exposure to information might simply bored 
a person to withdraw or even develop more negative sentiment 
against the messages transmitted in the school setting. 
Besides active participation in discussion, it is expected 
that the way employed by the teachers in p r e s e n t a t i o n and 
discussion may also have different socialisation effect. A more 
objective presentation style which tenders both sides of the 
issue is more likely to carry one's idea through, and hence will 
thus be more influential. Objective teachers will therefore help 
to reinforce the stand of the school. In general, teachers of the 
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three schools are quite objective in their presentation style, 
(4) S i n c e c a s e s a r e few w h e n t e a c h e r s a r e p e r c e i v e d as 
subjective, the presentation style of teachers is controlled by 
taking out the group who perceives their t e a c h e r s as being 
objective for comparison. H o w e v e r , as seen in table 5.5, no 
obvious change in the correlations between school exposure and 
the attitudes of the students is noted. 
Hypothesis twelve is therefore substantiated in the leftist 
s c h o o l s . H o w e v e r , t h e y are p l a y i n g o n l y a m i l d r o l e in 
socialising the students to orientations compatible to their own 
in view of the weak evidence thus o b t a i n e d . The p r e d i c t e d 
relationship does not hold in the rightist schools. They are not 
playing any observable role in shaping an a n t i - c o m m u n i s t 
orientation in the students, at least in the sense that the 
schools are exerting their influence t h r o u g h e x p o s i n g the 
adolescents to selected information concerning China affairs. 
Neither is the frequency of participation in related discussions 
nor the style of the teachers in presenting the information have 
any distinctive influence. The negligible role played by the 
rightist schools in this aspect is s i m i l a r to that of the 
apolitical neutral schools. 
Variables attempted earlier are by no means u s e f u l in 
accounting for the leftist school students' unique pattern of 
attitudes• Besides being provided by the schools, the information 
the adolescents are exposed may be provided by some other sources 
in school. The newspapers they read are also providing them with 
information concerning China affairs. A high proportion of the 
students in the subsample have the habit of reading pro-communist 
newspapers assigned by the s c h o o l . A m o n g the three leftist 
schools, two of them assign their students to read Wen Hui Pao 
during lessons. As a result, 48.6% of the leftist school students 
read Wen Hui Pao sometimes or always, while only 8.8% neutral 
school students and 16.5% rightist s c h o o l s t u d e n t s do s o . 
Moreover, 11.3% of the leftist school students report reading Ta 
Kung Pao sometimes and always, and only 5.1% of the n e u t r a l 
school students and 7.2% of rightist school students do so. The 
socialisation effect of the two leftist n e w s p a p e r s is thus 
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examined in leftist school students to see whether they relate to 
their generally less hostile attitudes towards the ruling of the 
communist government and Chinese socialism, and their generally 
higher level of patriotism. On the o t h e r h a n d , only a low 
percentage of the students read Hong Kong T i m e s , which is 
generally taken as an anti-communist newspaper. Only 3.7% of the 
leftist school students, 5.8% of the neutral school students and 
7.1% of the rightist school students report reading the newspaper 
sometimes or always. The effect of the Hong Kong Times is 
therefore skipped due to the low rate of c o n s u m p t i o n which 
renders it a relatively unimportant agent of socialisation. 
Prior analysis found that the direction and intensity of the 
influence of Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao are quite similar. On 
attitudes concerning the ruling of the communist government, 
correlations between the frequency of reading Ta Kung Pao and the 
attitude items range from .03 to .36. And those of Wen Hui Pao 
ranges from .19 to .36. Since correlations with the two pro-
communist newspapers are very s i m i l a r , a s u m m a t i o n score is 
calculated for the frequency of p r o - c o m m u n i s t n e w s p a p e r s 
consumption. 
From table 5.6, it can be seen that the more frequently the 
students read the pro-communist newspapers, the less negative 
they are towards the ruling of the communist government and the 
ideology of Chinese socialism. Seven out of ten correlations 
reach significance at .001 l e v e l , and the s t r e n g t h of the 
associations ranges from .16 to .44. Only correlations of three 
items do not reach significance, i.e. trust towards the communist 
government before the June 4 crisis, and the two hypothetical 
items, i.e. the expected performance of the communist government 
in future, and the performance of the nationalist government if 
it is to take over the role of the communist government. The 
latter two can be explained by the nature of newspapers, which 
reports and comments only on occurred events. Nevertheless, it 
is q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e t h a t n e w s p a p e r c o n s u m p t i o n 
correlates little with trust towards the communist government 
before the June 4 crisis, but on the other hand c o r r e l a t e s 
significantly with trust after the June 4 crisis at .33, Some 
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latent socialisation effect of the pro-commimist newspapers is 
thus observed, which can serve to manipulate support for the 
communist government duiring and after a crisis. Higher exposure 
to p r o - c o m m u n i s t n e w s p a p e r s a l s o c o r r e l a t e s w i t h h i g h e r 
patriotism of the students, which is .35 for the g e n e r a l 
patriotic love and .40 for the more specific item on whether they 
are willing to contribute their strength to China. 
In table 5.7, means of the h i g h e r e x p o s u r e and lower 
exposure group are also compared. Students who read sometimes or 
always either one of the two newspapers are defined as the higher 
consumption group. Those who seldom or never read both of the 
newspapers are defined as the low e x p o s u r e g r o u p . The high 
exposure group is significantly less negative in items concerning 
the r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y are a l s o 
significantly less negative towards Chinese socialism except for 
the hypothetical item that the nationalist government will do a 
better job than the communist government if it is to replace the 
latter. The higher exposure group is also significantly more 
patriotic and politically more interested in the China affairs. 
In conclusion, exposure to the two pro-communist newspapers 
does relate to the typical attitudes of leftist school students. 
Nevertheless, the direction of i n f l u e n c e still cannot be 
established, i.e. whether students with the typical attitudes 
tend to read more pro-communist newspapers or the relationship is 
just vice versa. 
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Hypothesis 13 
Cultivation of political interest towards the China Affairs 
The hypothesis states that adolescents perceiving higher exposure 
of political information in the school e n v i r o n m e n t will be 
politically more interested. 
A prior recognition of an object and an issue is a necessary 
condition for the development of interest in it, and interest is 
likely to grow gradually with further enrichment in knowledge. 
Therefore, it is expected that the role of the s c h o o l in 
providing information to the adolescents may at the same time 
contribute in arousing the interest of the adolescents on various 
affairs. The amount of information provided to the adolescents is 
again conceptualized as the amount of exposure perceived by the 
adolescents. It is expected that students who perceive higher 
exposure of political information in school will be politically 
more interested. The activeness of the a d o l e s c e n t s in the 
acquisition of knowledge as m e a s u r e d by the f r e q u e n c y of 
discussion participation is then controlled. The influence of the 
presentation style of teachers, and the a m o u n t of n e w s p a p e r 
consumption is also considered. 
Political interest of the neutral school students on the 
China affairs increases with h i g h e r e x p o s u r e to p o l i t i c a l 
information in school. The correlation is .28. Nevertheless, when 
discussion participation in the China affairs is controlled, the 
correlations becomes lower in both the high and low participation 
group, though correlation of the high participation group is 
stronger than the low participation group. It is therefore likely 
that discussion participation is a more important variable than 
mere exposure to political information in d e t e r m i n i n g the 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t of the a d o l e s c e n t s . W h e n d i s c u s s i o n 
participation is tested directly with political interest, the 
correlation is stronger at .40. T h e r e f o r e , mere i n f o r m a t i o n 
exposure is not sufficient condition for political interest to 
develop. Active participation in discussion may stimulate more 
intellectual exercise, giving rise to more questions which will 
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motivate the students to know more and are then more interested. 
In table 5.5, when the presentation style of the teachers is 
controlled. The correlation with school exposure is replicated in 
the group who perceive their teachers as objective. The interest 
of the adolescents is therefore little influenced by the style of 
the teachers. 
In leftist and rightist s c h o o l s , a s i m i l a r l y lower in 
correlations between school exposure and political interest is 
o b s e r v e d w h e n d i s c u s s i o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n is c o n t r o l l e d . 
Correlations of the low participation group is much weaker than 
the high participation group. Correlations of the leftist school 
students are .12 and .03, in the high and low p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
groups. The correlations are .28 and .08 respectively for the 
rightist school students. The finding once again substantiates 
the conclusion drawn from the neutral school subsample. The low 
participation group is distinctively a p a t h e t i c towards the 
information provided by the schools. In the leftist schools, it 
is likely that greater pressure exists in the school environment 
to strive for conformity in the s t u d e n t s ‘ p o l i t i c a l s t a n d , 
students who are not willing to participate actively in school 
discussion are likely to be more alienated, and their political 
interest may also be further suppressed. Particularly higher 
c o r r e l a t i o n is o b s e r v e d in the r i g h t i s t schools‘ h i g h 
participation group. As mentioned earlier, a good proportion of 
the rightist school students are not original school students and 
that the coherency in school is relatively weaker. Those who are 
high in participation are likely to be more active in personality 
and are more self-motivated, they are therefore more interested 
in their environment and are more sensitive of the information 
prevailing in the school environment. 
In the leftist schools, higher correlation between political 
interest and school exposure is observed when the teachers are 
perceived to be objective. Objective teachers therefore serve to 
enhance the political interest of the adolescents by helping them 
to utilise better the generally more information available in the 
leftist school environment without imposing in the students their 
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own view points. The students are therefore motivated to know 
more. Moreover, the pro-communist newspapers assigned by the 
schools are also playing a role in the students' interest on 
China affairs. Political interest of the students do correlates 
positively with increasing consumption and is high as .42. 
Hypothesis thirteen is therefore substantiated only when the 
students are having a high level of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in s c h o o l 
discussion. 
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Hypothesis 14 
Profiles of schools 
The hypothesis states that adolescents in different schools will 
differ in political attitudes towards the PRC. 
It is expected that different s c h o o l s differ in their 
teaching and peer group environment, and are thus unique in their 
socialisation pattern. One-way analysis is conducted to compare 
mean scores of the sixteen schools on three items: patriotic 
feeling of the students towards China, attitude towards Chinese 
socialism, and a summation score of all items concerning the 
iruling of the communist government. Special attention is drawn 
towards the ranking of the pro-communist and pro-nationalist 
schools. Students in the two government and one elitist school 
are also examined. Students in the elitist school are generally 
smarter academically. They are more likely to advocate the status 
quo since they are not only the beneficiaries of the present 
education system, but are also better prepared for achievement in 
future's social and economic system. Students in the government 
schools are likely to be more favourable towards the ruling of 
the Hong Hong and the British government. Students in both groups 
are therefore likely to be more negative towards the communist 
influence. 
F probability is .000 on all the three i t e m s , which 
indicates that the difference between the schools are highly 
significant. Mean scores of patriotism ranges from 3.21 to 5.30, 
that of attitude towards Chinese socialism range from 2.45 to 
4.29, while the summation scores on the ruling of communist 
government range from 19.48 (an average of 3.90 for each it era) to 
25.59 (an average of 5,12 for each item) . Among the sixteen 
schools, two of the leftist schools are most outstanding, with 
their students being the most patriotic on the average, and are 
the least hostile towards the ruling of the communist government 
and towards Chinese socialism. The three rightist schools show 
no sign of particularly anti-communist as compared with the 
neutral schools. 
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Students in the two government schools are very negative 
towards the ruling of the communist government. In the summation 
score item, mean scores of their students are the second and 
third most negative. However, they are not particularly negative 
towards Chinese socialism. They are also not distinctively low 
in their level of patriotism. The elitist school reveals less 
difference from other neutral s c h o o l s . Its s t u d e n t s are not 
particularly negative towards the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
government and the ideology of Chinese socialism, though their 
level of patriotism is quite high. 
Significant differences are also o b s e r v e d in s t u d e n t s 
enrolling in different streams of studies. In table 5,8, more 
distinctive difference is found between arts and s c i e n c e 
students. Arts students are in general more negative towards the 
ruling of the communist government and the ideology of Chinese 
socialism, and are less patriotic. Students in the two streams 
differ significantly at .05 level on a t t i t u d e s towards the 
present and future ruling of the communist government, party 
loyalty, performance of the nationalist government if it is to 
replace the communist government, Chinese socialism and general 
patriotism. 
The difference between them is s o m e w h a t d i f f i c u l t to 
explain as the students normally are separated into different 
streams of studies only in Form Four. It is therefore not proper 
to attribute the difference to the training peculiar to arts and 
science studies. However, it is likely that students who prefer 
one stream of study to another are h a v i n g quite d i f f e r e n t 
dispositions from each other. The potential science students are 
likely to be more rational and are more sceptical in dealing with 
knowledge, which may result in the s t u d e n t s more m o d e r a t e 
attitudes towards the authority. It is hard to explain why they 
are more patriotic than arts students in both affective love and 
the willingness to work for the country's goodness. Arts students 
are generally stereotyped to be more nationalistic, in view that 
they have greater interest in history and hence in the stories of 
nations. A possible explanation is that since arts students are 
more negative towards the communist rule, their disappointment 
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with the leadership may lower their love for the country, whereas 
the opposite is true in science students. If it is true, the 
patriotic love of the students are to a certain extent link to 
their evaluation of the commimist leadership. 
Students in the technical class are generally less negative 
towards the ruling of the communist government than the science 
students, except for party loyalty and trust towards the 
communist government after the June 4 crisis. They are also more 
negative ideologically: they are more s c e p t i c a l towards the 
drafting of the basic law, and are more likely to think that the 
nationalist government will do a better job than the communist 
g o v e r n m e n t if it is to r e p l a c e the l a t t e r . H o w e v e r , no 
distinctive difference is observed in the ideology of Chinese 
socialism. Their patriotism is lower than the science students. 
Similar to arts students, commerce students are generally more 
negative towards the ruling of the c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t and 
Chinese socialism as compared with s c i e n c e and technical 
students. They are also less patriotic than arts students. 
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Tables for Chapter Five 
Table 5.1 Adolescents‘ Level of Knowledge 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
General Knowledge @4.85 (3.75) # 4.33 (3.43) #@2.92 (2.57) 
Knowledge on NP 1.92 (1.52) # 2.19 (1.74) # 1.77 (1.46) 
Knowledge on CP &@2.93 (2.50) #&2.13 (1.52) #@1.15 (1.52) 
@ # & denote significant pairs (p < .05) 
Table 5.2 Adolescents‘ Level of Knowledge 
(control for academic level of schools) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
General Knowledge —— #6.39 (2.90) —— 
4.85 (2.75) 1.56 (1.70) 2.92 (2.57) 
Knowledge on NP — #3.23 (1.41) — 
1.92 (1.52) 0.78 (0.98) 1.77 (1.46) 
Knowledge on CP —— #3.13 (1.86) — 
2.93 (2.50) 0.77 (1.00) 1.15 (1.52) 
# - Average score of higher grade school 
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Table 5.3 Correlation of Adolescents' Political Attitudes 
with Increasing School Exposure 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling -0.10 (183) 0.02 (437) -0.02 (229) 
CP past ruling -0,26** (160) -0.08 (378) 0.05 (205) 
CP future ruling -0.24* (159) 0.02 (374) -0.01 (203) 
CP corruption -0.14 (181) -0.01 (432) -0.02 (224) 
CP loyalty -0.07 (140) 0.01 (401) -0.09 (205) 
Trust before crisis -0.26** [ l U ) 0.01 (409) -0.01 (210) 
Trust after crisis -0.13 (181) 0,05 (439) -0.10 (229) 
NP replaces CP 0.00 (150) -0.03 (335) 0.02 (181) 
Basic law drafting -0.10 (171) 0.03 (401) 0.12 (207) 
Chinese socialist -0.21* (179) 0.03 (411) 0.00 (219) 
General patriotism 0.13 (179) 0.14* (398) 0.07 (218) 
Specific patriotism 0.24* (167) 0.19** (372) 0.13 (193) 
Political interest 0.19* (192) 0.28** (453) 0.19** (234) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5 Correlation of Adolescents' Political Attitudes 
with Increasing School Exposure 
(when the teachers are perceived as objective) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling -0.07 (115) -0.03 (333) 0.01 (134) 
CP past ruling -0.25* (100) -0.15* (286) -0.03 (118} 
CP future ruling -0.19 (101) 0.04 (281) -0.11 (115) 
C? corruption -0.05 (116) 0.04 (333) -0.04 (128) 
CP loyalty -0.12 ( S5) 0.00 (311} -0.17 (122) 
Trust before crisis -0.37** (108) 0.02 (311) 0.10 (120) 
Trust after crisis -0.11 ( I H ) 0 . 04 (335) -0 . 11 (134) 
NP replaces CP 0,01 ( 97) 0.01 (252) -0.06 (105) 
Basic law drafting -0.00 (110) 0.00 (306) 0.12 (118) 
Chinese socialism -0.22* (114) 0.05 (314) -0.03 (126) 
General patriotism 0.13 (113) 0.16* (306) 0.11 (129) 
Specific patriotism 0.20 (106) 0.19** (222) 0.12 (113) 
Political interest 0.34** (121) 0.28** (347) 0.14 (137) 
* p < .01 “ p < .001 
Table 5.6 Correlation of Adolescents' Political 
Attitudes with Exposure to Leftist Newspapers 
(Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao) 
CP present ruling 0.37** (132) 
CP past ruling 0.34** (116) 
CP future ruling 0.18 (117) 
CP corruption 0.29** (134) 
CP loyalty 0.34** ( 99) 
Trust before crisis 0.16 (126) 
Trust after crisis 0.33** (134) 
NP replaces CP 0.21 (108) 
Basic law drafting 0.44** (123) 
Chinese socialism 0.43** (130) 
General patriotism -0.35** (130) 
Specific patriotism -0.40** (122) 
Political interest -0.42** (140) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Table 5.7 Mean Attitude Scores of Adolescents at Different 
Level of Exposure to Leftist Newspapers 
(Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao) 
Leftist school 
Exposure to Leftist Newspaper 
High Low 
~~— Probability 
Nean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.43 (1.16) 4.99 (0.95) *大 
CP past ruling 3.37 (1.43) 4.27 (1.31) 大*大 
CP future ruling 3.52 (1.41) 4.03 (1.19) * 
CP corruption 4.46 (1.42) 5.13 (1.08) ** 
CP loyalty 4.39 (1.57) 5.06 (1.39) * 
Trust before crisis 3.16 (1.06) 3.57 (1,21) • 
Trust after crisis 4.89 (1.18) 5.48 (0.92) ** 
NP replaces CP 2.89 (1.24) 3.07 (1.24) N.S. 
Basic law drafting 3.49 (1.40) 4.35 (1.27) 大 
Chinese socialism 2.79 (1.36) 3.50 (1.21) ** 
General patriotism 4.90 (1.21) 4.18 (1.51) ** 
Specific patriotism 4.79 (1.17) 3.81 (1.58) *** 
Political interest 3.98 (1.08) 3.20 (1.17) 大•大 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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Table 5.8 Mean Attitude Scores of Students enrolling 
in Different Streams of Study 
Arts (A) Science (S) Technical (T) C o M e r c e (C) | 
--丁 Significant 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Kean (SD) Mean (SD) pairs (p < .05} 
• I 
CP present ruling 5.23 (0.97) 4.95 (1.06) 4.92 (0.86) 5.13 (1.06) A-S 一 
CP past ruling 4.23 (1.44) 4.11 (1.40) 3.82 (1.54) 4.21 (1.29) 
CP future ruling 4.32 (1.23) 4.06 (1.30) 3.38 (0.52) 4.05 (1.24) A-S A-C 
CP corruption 5.20 (1.12) 5.04 (1.16) 4.92 (1.32) 5.06 (1.13) 
CP loyalty 5.48 (0.97) 5.20 (1.31) 5.67 (0.65) 5.28 (1.16) A-S 
Trust before crisis 3.85 (1.16) 3.66 (1.18) 3.33 (0.65) 3.82 (1.21) 
Trust after crisis 5.49 (0.84) 5.39 (0.95) 5.46 (0.78) 5.52 (0.78} 
NP replaces CP 3.60 (1.27) 3.29 (1.31) 4.25 (0.46) 3.27 (1.19) A-S A-C S-T T-C 
Basic law drafting 4.31 (1.25) 4.13 (1.33) 4.42 (1.08) 4.42 (1.35) S-C 
Chinese socialism 3.74 (1.26) 3.48 (1.34) 3.45 (0.93) 3.77 (1.17) A-S S-C 
General patriotism 3.82 (1.45) 4.39 (1.22) 3.92 (1.00) 3.63 (1.48) A-S S-C 
Specific patriotisn 4.15 (1.34) 4.33 (1.21) 3.55 (1.21) 3.71 (1.39) A-C S-C 
f - k 
Chapter Six Interaction among Agents 
Political Knowledge and Political Interest 
Hypothesis 15 
Interaction of parents with other socialisation agents 
The hypothesis states that the i n f l u e n c e of the p a r e n t s is 
smaller if the influence of other agents is larger. 
Interactions of parents with socialisation agents in the 
adolescents‘ immediate environment including peers, teachers and 
mass media are examined.(1) In table 6.1b, opinions of the mass 
media are strongly agreed upon by most neutral school students. 
Agreement with teachers ranks second, and then fathers, mothers 
and peers in descending order. In table 6.1a and 6 . 1 c , the 
sequence of agreement is the same in the leftist and rightist 
school subsamples. Opinions of the teachers and the mass media 
are more strongly agreed upon by the rightist school students, 
vrhile the leftist school students rank s e c o n d . O p i n i o n s of 
fathers and mothers are more strongly agreed upon by the leftist 
school students. 
Correlations of the adolescents’ attitudes with those of the 
p a r e n t s are t h e n e x a m i n e d w h e n the i n f l u e n c e of o t h e r 
socialisation agents is controlled.(2) The students are divided 
into the low and the high influenced groups for each agent, i.e. 
the mass media, teachers and peers. 
Interaction of mass media and parents 
In table 6.2b, correlations of the neutral school students 
with both parents remain very much the same when influence of the 
mass media is reported as high. For those adolescents who report 
low level of influence from the mass media, the correlations are 
considerably weaker with obvious drop in the significance of the 
correlations in a number of items including the present and past 
ruling of the communist government, party loyalty and trust 
towards the government with both parents. Influence of the mass 
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media and the parents are therefore reinforcing each other. It is 
likely that the media consumption behaviour of the adolescents 
are guided or influenced by the p a r e n t s , i . e . p a r e n t s and 
a d o l e s c e n t s r e a d the s a m e n e w s p a p e r s , or w a t c h the s a m e 
television news programme, and indeed a good p o r t i o n of the 
adolescents report that the newspapers they read are bought by 
the parents.(3) Since parents and adolescents are subjected to 
similar influence by the mass media, so when the influence of the 
mass media is large, conformity with parental attitudes are more 
likely. 
On the contrary, strength of the correlations on Chinese 
socialism and patriotism is weaker when the influence of the mass 
media is perceived as high. Mass media, therefore, are likely to 
hinder the parents‘ influence as well, It is expected that mass 
media are exerting greater influence on the adolescents in the 
attitudes towards Chinese socialism and the s e n t i m e n t of 
patriotism by providing them with information and comments on the 
people's livelihood in the Mainland and the performance of the 
communist government. The attitudes of the parents are likely to 
have deeper root in their own life experience which extends over 
a longer time span. The mass media are then playing less the role 
a common source of influence of the two generations. When the 
perceived influence of the mass media is high, adolescents are 
likely to have more independent a t t i t u d e s from the p a r e n t s . 
Finally, attitude on the corruption of the government do not 
differ much when the influence of the mass media is controlled. 
It is t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y t h a t c o r r u p t i o n in the c o m m u n i s t 
bureaucracy is more a fact than opinion which is generally agreed 
upon by both parents and adolescents. 
Most of the correlations are c o n s i d e r a b l y weaker when 
influence of the mass media is perceived as low in both the 
leftist and rightist school subsamples, as seen from table 6.2a 
and 6.2c. The reinforcement relationship between the parental 
influence and mass media can once again be substantiated. The 
suppressing effect of mass media on the influence of parents on 
p a t r i o t i s m h o l d s as in the n e u t r a l s c h o o l s u b s a m p l e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , on a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m the 
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suppressing effect holds only with the influence of fathers, 
mothers are considerably less influential. 
Interaction of teachers and parents 
In table 6.3b, correlations of the neutral school students 
with fathers on the past and present ruling of the communist 
government, and also on party loyalty are c o n s i d e r a b l y less 
significant when influence of the teachers is perceived as low. 
It indicates that teachers are to a small extent reinforcing the 
influence of the fathers towards the adolescents. Nevertheless, 
strength of the correlations does not differ much in most of the 
items. Correlations are also very similar across the high and low 
influenced group in the case of mother. Therefore, influence of 
the parents on the adolescents are essentially unaffected by the 
teachers. 
In table 6.3a, some correlations b e t w e e n leftist school 
students and parents are vreaker when the influence of teachers is 
perceived as low, while in other i t e m s , c o r r e l a t i o n s are 
consideiralDly stronger when the influence of teachers is high. 
Teachers are therefore reiiiforcing the influence of the parents 
in certain instance, while suppressing them in other instance. 
Ill table 6.3c in the rightist school subsample, when the 
influence of teachers is perceived as low, correlations with 
parents are essentially s t r o n g e r . In the c o r r e l a t i o n s with 
father, six out of seven items are stronger and one remains the 
same in the low influenced group. All correlations with mothers 
are stronger when influence of the teachers is perceived to be 
low. The influence of teachers is therefore suppressing the 
influence of both parents. Moreover, a higher proportion of the 
r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s t u d e n t s as c o m p a r e d w i t h the o t h e r two 
subsamples perceive the influence of the teachers as high. The 
comparatively greater influence exerted by r i g h t i s t school 
teachers is likely to be determined by the t e a c h e r - s t u d e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e i r t e a c h i n g s t y l e in g e n e r a l or o t h e r 
characteristics which are pertinent to teachers in these schools. 
However, the information is not available in the present study. 
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Moreover, very prominent difference is o b s e r v e d in a t t i t u d e 
t o w a r d s the p a s t r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t p a r t y in the 
correlations with both parents. Rightist school teachers seems to 
play an important role in the students' understanding and hence 
evaluation of past events, which is compatible with the teachers' 
role as instructors. 
Interaction of peers with parents 
In table 6.4b, from the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
adolescents on attitude items across the two groups, it can be 
seen that a majority of the students perceive the influence of 
the peers as low. Some correlations with fathers do not show much 
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the h i g h and low i n f l u e n c e d g r o u p s , 
Correlations with mothers are considerably weaker when influence 
of the peers is high. The difference suggests that part of the 
role which mothers is playing is likely to be substituted by 
peers, which results in the weaker associations when influence of 
the peers is perceived as high, whereas the role of fathers is 
more difficult to be affected by the p e e r s . M o t h e r s are in 
general playing a more important role than fathers in satisfying 
the needs of the adolescents, particularly the need of love, 
which can be seen from the closer in relationship between mothers 
and adolescents.(4) Peers can provide its members with the social 
need of affection, support and care, which may to certain extent 
substitute the role of mothers. Fathers on the other hand, are 
likely to exercise its influence as authoritative figures whose 
opinions are less likely to be challenged. Within the peer group, 
members are of equal status, and opinions from peers are taken 
essentially for reference. The power relationship between fathers 
and adolescents are ultimately different from that between peers, 
the role of fathers is by no means replaceable. 
The relationship is again very obvious in the leftist school 
subsample, as seen from, table 6,4a. Leftist school niothers are 
less influential when the influence of peers is perceived as 
high. Correlations with fathers do not differ much in the two 
groups, despite that considerably weaker a s s o c i a t i o n s are 
observed in the present and past ruling of the c o m m u n i s t 
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government when the influence of the peers is perceived as high, 
while correlations on party loyalty and trust towards the 
communist government are weaker when the influence of the peers 
is perceived as low. This suggests for p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n 
between the influence of fathers and peers, that the influence 
exerted by peers either reinforces or suppresses the influence of 
the fathers, which varies according to different issues. Peer 
group in the leftist schools are therefore likely to be more 
politicised and have more sophisticated discussions on political 
affairs as motivated by the generally more politicised school 
environment. They are therefore more influential. 
In t a b l e 6 . 4 c , r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s t u d e n t s h a v e w e a k e r 
correlations with fathers and mothers on some attitude items when 
the influence of the peers is perceived as high. Peer groups in 
the rightist schools are likely to be more p o l i t i c i s e d and 
influential towards its members. As mentioned earlier, a good 
proportion of the rightist school students entered the school 
only in Form Four, and a good sense of belonging in the school is 
not yet well developed. Under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , peers are 
playing a relatively more important role in s a t i s f y i n g the 
adolescents' need of security in the school environment, which 
renders them more influential. 
Hypothesis fifteen is therefore not s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Mass 
media are more likely to be reinforcing to the influence of 
parents, while the influence of teachers and peers is weak, it is 
l i k e l y to be m o r e r a n d o m of b e i n g e i t h e r reinfoirciiig or 
suppressing, the effect of which is issue specific. 
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Hypothesis 16 
Political knowledge, political interest and media behaviour 
The hypothesis states that the higher the interest of the 
adolescent in the political affairs of the P R C , the more 
politically knowledgeable he will be. 
It is found from the overall sample that p o l i t i c a l 
knowledge do relate to political i n t e r e s t : the higher the 
interest, the more knowledgeable the a d o l e s c e n t s a r e . The 
correlation is .26 {p<.001), In table 6 , 5 , when p o l i t i c a l 
interest is broken down into three levels, those who are high in 
political interest have distinctively high scores in the general 
knowledge on both the communist and nationalist governments. Mean 
scores of the low, medium and high interest groups are 2.89,�3。93 
and 6.32 respectively. 
Hypothesis sixteen is therefore substantiated. Further test 
is conducted so as to find out the source of political knowledge. 
One possible source is the mass media, and media exposure is 
contributory to knowledge gain. Newspaper is also found to be a 
more important source of political knowledge than television. 
Newspaper reliance is related to higher gains in knowledge than 
television reliance during political campaigns. (5) In table 6.6, 
it is surprising to find that knowledge on both governments does 
not relate much to mass media exposure. The level of knowledge is 
not related to the amount of exposure to newspaper, television 
documentary, television and radio news. The electronic media 
news exposure is even found to be negatively related to political 
knowledge, i.e. the higher the exposure, the less knowledgeable 
the adolescents. Political knowledge is only marginally related 
to news magazine exposure at .09 (p<.01). In table 6.7, political 
interest is also not related to media news exposure. Very mild 
relationship is found with the consumption of news magazine, the 
correlation is .13 (p<.001) The low correlation of political 
knowledge with news media consumption may be due to that quite a 
number of knowledge items are not corapatible with informations 
provided by the media. The students are more likely to learn 
from teachers and other sources like parents and books. 
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Tables for Chapter Six 
Table 6.1 Agreement with the Opinions of Parents, Peers, 
Teachers, and Mass Media on China Affair (in percent) 
a. Leftist School 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Father 24.2 48.5 16.1 11.2 195 
Mother 17.9 47.9 19.5 14.4 195 
Peer 10.0 56.5 20.0 13.4 195 
Teacher 34.0 51.4 8.6 6.1 195 
Mass Media 45.8 38.9 9.6 5.7 195 
b. Neutral School 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Father 21.8 46.8 20.7 10.6 455 
Mother 13.5 51.9 22.2 12.4 455 
Peer 8.1 50.0 29.0 12.9 455 
Teacher 26.1 48.4 17.0 8.5 455 
Mass Media 36.8 46.1 11.4 5.7 455 
c. Rightist School 
Very Very No. 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree of cases 
Father 20.3 50.0 18.0 11.7 235 
Mother 17.7 50.5 19.1 12.7 235 
Peer 9.4 52.9 22.4 15.2 235 
Teacher 39.0 47.5 7.6 5.8 235 
Mass Media 50.2 37.8 6.2 5.8 235 
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Table 6.2 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents and 
Adolescents (control for level of influence of mass media) 
a. Leftist school 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.45** (129) 0.39 ( 30) 0.39** (120) 0.31 ( 28) 
CP past ruling 0.51** (110) 0.56* ( 23) 0.44** (108) 0.37 ( 19) 
CP corruption 0.52** (131) 0.48* ( 29) 0.41** (125) 0.56* ( 26) 
CP loyalty 0.38** { 93 ) 0 . 46 ( 18) 0 . 45** ( 86 ) O J l " ( 14) 
Trust towards CP 0.29* (113) 0.03 ( 26) 0.42** (109) 0.22 ( 23) 
Chinese socialism 0.43** (126) 0.57** ( 28) 0.41** (122) 0.36 ( 25) 
General patriotism 0.39** (125) 0.51* ( 28) 0.61** (113) 0.64** ( 21) 
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* P < .01 “ P < .001 
b. Neutral school 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.17* (313) 0.28 ( 57) 0.29** (296) 0.15 ( 60) 
CP past ruling 0.37** (242) 0.37* ( 50) 0.40** (231) 0.36* ( 53) 
CP corruption 0.35** (315) 0.39** ( 60) 0.29** (304) 0.40** ( 59) 
CP loyalty 0.29** (267) 0.37* ( 51) 0.30** (253) 0.41* ( 52) 
Trust towards CP 0.35** (295) 0.22 ( 48) 0.41** (290) 0.36* ( 49) 
Chinese socialism 0.29** (292) 0.45** ( 55) 0.29** (256) 0.51** ( 47) 
General patriotism 0.51** (274) 0.62** ( 55) 0.56** (250) 0.71** ( 41) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
c. Rightist school 
•一― ••一 *—一一一一一一•一一—丁—******* 一一 一一一—一一一一脚—一— *一一—一一一•丁 •一一 ••» 一—一一———》一一—一——一—•一一一——一一一， 
Father Mother 
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High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.33** (171) 0.32 ( 28) 0.42** (167) 0.55* ( 23) 
CP past ruling 0.39** (143) 0.51* ( 23) 0.41** (128) 0.51 ( 20) 
CP corruption 0.47** (170) 0.25 ( 29) 0.38** (162) 0.41 ( 24) 
CP loyalty 0.38** (148) 0.50 ( 20) 0.17 (140) 0.40 ( 17) 
Trust towards CP 0.31** (149) 0.42 ( 23) 0.40** (153) 0.57 ( 21) 
Chinese socialism 0.52** (161) 0.75** ( 26) 0.33** (144) 0.29 ( 21) 
General patriotism 0.60** (154) 0.75** { 21) 0 . 62** (144) 0 J 4 * * ( 21) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Table 6.3 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents and 
Adolescents (control for level of influence of teachers) 
a. Leftist school 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.37** ( 87) 0.50** ( 70) 0.37** ( 85) 0.37* ( 61) 
CP past ruling 0.42** ( 76) 0.62** ( 55) 0.32* ( 74) 0.56** ( 51) 
CP corruption 0 . 5 2 " ( 88) 0.53** ( 69) 0.36** ( 86) 0.53** ( 62) 
CP loyalty 0.38** ( 66) 0 . 39* ( 42) 0 .44** ( 60) 0.55*'* f 38) 
Trust towards CP 0.39** ( 80) 0.07 ( 57) 0.44** ( 78) 0.31 ( 52) 
Chinese socialism 0.38** ( 84) 0.55** ( 68) 0.47** ( 83) 0.34* ( 62) 
General patriotism 0.34** ( 88) 0.49** ( 63) 0.51** ( 78} 0.75** ( 54) 
* p < .01 “ p < .001 
b. Neutral school 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.21* (202) 0.14 (167) 0.29** (195) 0.21* (161) 
CP past ruling 0.46*^ (156) 0.25* (135) 0.39** (153) 0.38** (131) 
CP corruption 0.27** (204) 0.47** (168) 0.21* (193) 0.39** (169) 
CP loyalty 0.37** (169) 0.22* (148) 0.34** (165) 0.29** (145) 
Trust towards CP 0.40** (186) 0.25*^ (155) 0.36** (184) 0.41** (154) 
Chinese socialism 0.33** (187) 0.26** (160) 0.28** (165) 0.34** (138) 
General patriotism 0.53** (178) 0.55** (150) 0.54** (164) 0.65** (127) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
c. Rightist school 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.29* (123) 0.10** ( 74) 0.40** (119) 0.51** ( 68) 
CP past ruling 0.20 (103) 0.75** ( 60) 0.32* { 89) 0.58** ( 55) 
CP corruption 0.41** (120) 0.45** ( 76) 0.36** (117) 0.43** ( 65) 
CP loyalty 0.30** (108) 0.42** { 57) 0.14 ( 99) 0.19 ( 55) 
Trust towards CP 0.26* (102) 0.45** ( 57) 0.35** (103) 0.50** ( 67) 
Chinese socialism 0.54** (116) 0.54** ( 68) 0.28* ( 98) 0.34* ( 63) 
General patriotism 0.50** (108) 0.78** ( 64) 0.61** (106) 0,68** ( 57) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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T a b l e 6 . 4 C o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n P o l i t i c a l A t t i t u d e s o f P a r e n t s a n d 
A d o l e s c e n t s ( c o n t r o l f o r l e v e l o f i n f l u e n c e o f p e e r s ) 
a . L e f t i s t s c h o o l 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.41* ( 46) 0.45** (110) 0.48** ( 45) 0.31** (100) 
CP past ruling 0.43* ( 41) 0.55** ( 90) 0.28 ( 43) 0.48** { 82) 
CP corruption 0.51** ( 48) 0.53** (109) 0.28 ( 47) 0.52** (102) 
CP loyalty 0.54** ( 32) 0.33* ( 77) 0.58** ( 32) 0.45** ( 66) 
Trust towards CP 0.48** ( 41) 0.16 ( 95) 0.35 ( 39) 0.40** ( 90) 
Chinese socialism 0.49** ( 49) 0.44** (101) 0.28 ( 47) 0.44** { 97) 
General patriotism 0.47** ( 48) 0.38** (101) 0.61** ( 44) 0.64** { 86) 
丄 丄 
* p < .01 “ p < .001 
b . N e u t r a l s c h o o l 
Father Mother 
一睡••一 ‘ ‘ I 一 " "一 •••••丨圓."•••••••,•• .•_ 一- _ _ M •••Ill I 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.23* (109) 0.16* (259) 0.44** (107) 0.18* (248) 
CP past ruling 0.40** ( 87) 0.36** (202) 0.40* ( 86) 0.40** (197) 
CP corruption 0.34** (112) 0.37** (259) 0.43** ( 96) 0.34** (254) 
CP loyalty 0.25* ( 95) 0.33** (221) 0.30* ( 95) 0 . 3 4 " (214) 
Trust towards CP 0.34** (103) 0.34“ (238) 0.37** ( 99) 0.41** (238) 
Chinese socialism 0.33** (107) 0.29** (238) 0.19 (107) 0.26** (206) 
General patriotism 0.54** ( 97) 0.55** (229) 0.55** ( 91) 0.61** (199) 
L一一一一 - « —一一 一 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 一 一 丄 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 一 一 一 一 _ « 一 • 一 一 一 一 嫌 ^ ^ 一 场 一 一 — 一 丄 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 一 峡 — 一 一 — 一 一 一 _ _ _ ^ 曲 一 
* P < .01 ** P < .001 
C. R i g h t i s t s c h o o l 
Father Mother 
High Low High Low 
CP present ruling 0.36* ( 59) 0.33** (140) 0.48** ( 57) 0.42** (132) 
CP past ruling 0.40* ( 47) 0.41** (118) 0.48** ( 39) 0.39** (107) 
CP corruption 0.38* ( 57) 0.44** (141) 0.56** ( 55) 0.32** (129) 
CP loyalty 0.28 { 50) 0.40** (117) 0.07 ( 48) 0.25* (108) 
Trust towards CP 0.46** ( 55) 0.28* (116) 0.42** ( 52) 0.43** (120) 
Chinese socialisi 0.60** ( 57) 0.53** (128) 0.27 ( 49) 0.35** (114) 
General patriotism 0.48** ( 49) 0.67** (125) 0.60** ( 49) 0.66** (115) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Table 6.5 Mean Knowledge Scores at Different 
Level of Political Interest 
Mean (SD) Cases 
Low 2.89 (2.72) 123 
Medium 3.93 (3.31) 592 
High 6.32 (3.35) 119 
Table 6.6 Correlation between Political Knowledge 
and Media Consumption 
Exposure : 
Newspaper 0.03 (883) 
Television documentary -0.04 (859) 
Television news -0.03 (859) 
Radio news -0.07 (860) 
News magazine 0,09* (883) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table 6.7 Correlation between Media Consumption and 
Political Interest 
Exposure : 
Newspaper 0.06 (880) 
Television documentary 0.05 (853) 
Television news 0.04 (855) 
Radio news 0.01 (856) 
News magazine 0.13** (879) 
* p < .01 ** p� 〈 .001 
f - k 
Chapter Seven Conclusion 
A profile of attitudes of the two generations 
Attitudes of the adolescents in Hong Kong are to be 
generalised from the neutral school subsample. The adolescents 
are negative towards the ruling of the communist government: 
intense negative sentiments are directed towards the present 
leadership in its performance and the problem of corruption in 
the bureaucracy. Over 90% of them disagree that the communist 
government manages China very w e l l , and that most of the 
officials in the government are not corrupted. A similarly high 
percentage of the adolescents deny that they are loyal to the 
communist party. On the other hand, their trust level towards 
the government before the June 4 crisis is quite high. About 40% 
of them admit being trustful of the government. A sharp contrast 
is therefore noted in their n e g a t i v i t y towards the present 
leadership against the relatively high level of trust towards the 
same leadership before the June 4 crisis. A possible explanation 
can be attributed to the characteristic of the a d o l e s c e n t s . 
Adolescence is a state when the individual is still under the 
pirotection of the family and the school, the individual tends to 
be more optimistic though he is not i g n o r a n t of the outside 
world. The adolescents thus on the one hand know the reality 
with the communist government, i . e . it is not m a n a g i n g the 
Mainland well, since there are so many problems existing in the 
country and corruption in the bureaucracy is actually a commonly 
agreed fact; whereas on the other hand, they are having good hope 
that it will do better, which can also be shown from the response 
that more of them agree that the ruling of the communist 
government will be better in future. 
Nevertheless, it is more likely to be the case that the 
attitudes of the adolescents towards the present leadership are 
loaded by the negative impact of the June 4 c r i s i s . The 
adolescents‘ change in their level of trust after the crisis is 
drastic. Nearly 40% of the adolescents change from an originally 
trustful attitude to different level of distrust. The drastic 
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event is therefore having some s o c i a l i s a t i o n effect on the 
adolescents, though the lasting effect of which is not to be 
answered in the present research. 
On the ideology of Chinese socialism, the adolescents are 
having more moderate attitudes. About half of them disagree that 
no merit is found in Chinese socialism, and slightly less think 
that the nationalist government will manage China better than the 
communist government. On the other hand, they are less trustful 
of the government's sincerity in handling the issue of Hong Kong 
: o v e r three quarters of them agree that the communist leadership 
neglects the interest of the Hong Kong people in drafting the 
basic law. 
Finally, the adolescents are quite patriotic, around 70% of 
them agree that they love China very much, and a similarly high 
percentage of them are willing to contribute their strength to 
the country. This sentiment of patriotism coexists with, the 
adolescents‘ strong sense of Hong Kong identity: more of them 
count themselves as Hongkongese rather than as Chinese, and less 
than one-tenth of them prefer reuniting with the Mainland under 
the sovereignty of the PRC after 1997. 
Under the consideration that the adolescents are generally 
negative towards the present communist leadership and that their 
level of trust towards the government dropped drastically after 
the June 4 crisis, their level of support directed towards the 
communist leadership is likely to be rather low. Although they do 
not have too negative a sentiment towards the ideology of Chinese 
socialism, they do have great tendency to reject the communist 
rule. Their patriotism towards the country are likely to be more 
words than actions, and their interest are essentially Hong Kong 
oriented. 
When the adolescents are divided into boys and girls for 
analysis, boys are found to be less negative towards the ruling 
of the communist government in general, the sex difference may be 
attributed to that boys are likely to be more tolerant of 
political authority. Since they have higher level of political 
interest, they are likely to have more frequent p o l i t i c a l l y 
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relevant communications than girls, and they are thus better 
informed,(1) and a better understanding based on knowledge is 
believed to be conducive to more open political attitudes and 
tolerance to opposition ideas and a c t s . Boys are also more 
patriotic than girls. This may be due to that boys are generally 
more global-minded, and have greater tendency to direct their 
sentiment towards more distant objects out of their family and 
the immediate social environment. 
Attitudes of the older generation are o b t a i n e d from the 
adolescents as perceived attitudes of their fathers and mothers. 
Fathers are having more moderate attitudes towards the ruling of 
the communist government, though they are still very negative. 
The distribution pattern of mothers' political attitudes are just 
in between that of the adolescents and the f a t h e r s . On the 
average, mothers are not so moderate as fathers, especially in 
t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of the p r e s e n t r u l i n g of the c o m m u n i s t 
government and their trust towards it, but they are also less 
radical than the adolescents on the other h a n d . Fathers and 
adolescents do not differ much in their evaluation of Chinese 
socialism and their patriotism to the country, whereas mothers 
are also similar to the adolescents in evaluating the ideology, 
though their level of patriotism is considerably lower. 
The observation that the attitudes of the parents are more 
moderate than the adolescents may be attributed to a life-cycle 
effect, that one tends to be less radical in the course of aging. 
Moreover, similar sex difference as observed in the adolescents 
is observed between fathers and mothers: mothers are generally 
more negative than fathers in the evaluation of the communist 
rule and of Chinese socialism, and are less p a t r i o t i c . This 
suggests for some generational continuity of sex difference in 
political attitudes. However, only very mild mother-daughter 
similarity is observed, while no prominent influence of fathers 
over mothers is observed in the sons. Therefore sex difference in 
political attitudes is likely to be p e r t i n e n t to the social 
environment of males and females in g e n e r a l , and does not 
necessarily confine to the mother-daughter and father-son pattern 
of transmission. 
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Finally, neither fathers nor m o t h e r s d e m o n s t r a t e d to be 
more influential figures in shaping the political attitudes of 
the adolescents. The stereotype of male d o m i n a n c e in the 
socialisation of the political attitudes of the offsprings does 
not hold. On the other hand, the affectionate mothers are also no 
more influential than fathers though a closer relationship is 
observed between mothers and adolescents. 
The second part of the research a t t e m p t s to identify 
variables that are conducive to effective socialisation of the 
adolescents. The socialisation task is conceptualized as the work 
of socialisation agents, which are essentially the family and the 
school• Both agents provide the adolescents with th^Bir immediate 
environment. Parents and teachers are also b e l i e v e d to be 
authoritative figures who have considerable influence in shaping 
the adolescents' attitudes and personality. 
Family as socialisation agent 
The parent-adolescent agreement is quite prominent in both 
the diirection and intensity of variance and also in absolute 
parent-adolescent agreement. The correlations between the parents 
and the adolescents are high in all the three subsamples. The 
highest father-adolescent correlations are .52, . 54 and .62 in 
leftist, neutral and rightist schools respectively; the highest 
correlation in the mother-adolescent pairs are ,62, .60, and ,64 
in the three subsamples respectively. The highest correlations 
are generally obtained in patriotism of the parent-adolescent 
pairs. The lowest correlation is no less than .18 in the father-
adolescent pairs, and no less than .22 in the mother-adolescent 
pairs when the three subsamples are taken t o g e t h e r . The 
correlations are generally strong particular in view that some of 
the attitude items are specific which concern with the problem 
within the communist government and also its p e r f o r m a n c e in 
different periods of time. 
The unprecedingly high in parent-adolescent correlations 
leads to the suspicion that there is possible methodological 
problem of over-estimating the similarity with parental attitudes 
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by the adolescents. Niemi reported that the student-'perceived 
parent‘ correlation in partisanship is likely to be higher than 
the actual student-parent correlation by about .10, and is within 
the range of .05 to .15 for most of the time. (2) The perception 
is l i k e l y to be m o r e i n a c c u r a t e in o t h e r i t e m s . The 
methodological problem, regretfully, cannot be directly tackled 
with in the present research. The only solution is to obtain 
information directly from the parents for comparison. Since take 
home questionnaire to be filled in by p a r e n t s are no less 
problematic,(3) more reliable findings are to be obtained from 
direct interviews with p a r e n t s . The latter m e t h o d is very 
resource intensive and is therefore cannot be achieved in the 
present study. 
To ease the problem, a probing question is introduced to 
identify the source of parental attitudes.(4) Those who report 
the parental attitudes by wild guess do tend to overestimate the 
father-adolescent similarity in most of the items, the range is 
from .03 to .12, but 4 out of the six overestimated items have 
differences no more than .05. Both over and under-estimation are 
noticed in mother-adolescent correlations. The difference ranges 
from .07 to .21, and five out of seven items have difference less 
than .10. Moreover, about four-fifth of the sample report that 
they obtain the information directly or indirectly by overhearing 
the parents. The perceived attitudes o b t a i n e d then can be 
treated as having a considerable degree of r e l i a b i l i t y in 
reflecting the parental a t t i t u d e s . In view of the strong 
correlations, the parents are likely to be very influential in 
the formation of the adolescents‘ attitudes. 
Factors conducive to effective parental influence 
Taking family as a socialisation agent, variables concerning 
the parent—child relationship which are expected to help or 
hinder the direct and indirect influence of parents are examined. 
On the direct influence of p a r e n t s , neither the rearing 
style of the parents as either very strict or very lenient, nor 
the parent-adolescent communication as being one-way or two has 
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m u c h i n f l u e n c e in the s o c i a l i s a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r e n t s and 
adolescents. Very strict and very lenient parents are rarely 
identified by the students. The few number of cases found in the 
former is somewhat unexpected, since the rearing style of Chinese 
parents are known to be stricter than p a r e n t s in w e s t e r n 
countiries. Rebellions against parents who employ extreme rearing 
style is likely since occasional n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s are 
obtained and the correlations are generally weaker. Nevertheless, 
the cases are so few in number for reliable conclusion to be 
made. Extreme parental type is therefore not a prominent feature 
in parents of the younger generation. A possible explanation is 
that parents are still playing an important role in providiiig for 
the needs of the adolescents, which render their strictness less 
u n b e a r a b l e . M o r e o v e r , s t r i c t n e s s is a r e l a t i v e m e a s u r e . 
Adolescents therefore do not feel particularly negative if their 
parents are strict but are not much s t r i c t e r than a v e r a g e . 
Correlations with parents do not reveal much difference when the 
parents are perceived simply as strict or lenient. 
Strictness of parents seems not to be detrimental to the 
parent-adolescent relationship, and that strictness does not 
necessarily lead to rebellions. Other d e t e r m i n a n t s may also 
intervene in the parent-adolescent relationship. One of which is 
the closeness witli parents. (5) An analysis made with the overall 
sample reveals that most of the correlations with fathers and 
mothers are considerably stronger when the a d o l e s c e n t s are 
reporting a high level of closeness with the parents. The feeling 
of closeness does not necessarily relate to the strictness of 
parents (6), which implies that adolescents can feel as close to 
parents even if the parents are s t r i c t . This may again be 
accounted for by the dependency of adolescents on parents for 
satisfaction of basic and emotional needs no matter the parents 
are strict or not. Moreover, Chinese offsprings are likely to 
treasure more a harmonious relationship with parents under the 
traditional Chinese virtue of filial piety. The adolescents are 
therefore less likely to be rebellious. 
Another variable that may affect the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
transmission of message from parents to the adolescents is the 
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communication pattern. Higher correlations are found in parent-
adolescent pairs when the parents ‘ level of communicatioii is 
perceived to be high. No prominent difference is found when the 
parents allow the adolescents to voice his feedback, and when the 
adolescents are interested in China affairs. In fact, most of 
the adolescents whose parents communicate to them frequently are 
allowed to voice their feedback, most of them are also interested 
in the China affairs. When is very d i f f e r e n t from the prior 
expectation that communication between parents and adolescents 
are essentially one-way in Chinese family. It so happens that on 
political affairs, the communication pattern is either frequent 
and is t w o - w a y , or h a r d l y any c o m m u n i c a t i o n at a l l . T h e 
adolescents seem to have no interest and patience in listening to 
the one-way talk of the parents. 
It is l i k e l y t h a t the f r e q u e n c y and p a t t e r n of 
communication, and the political interest of the adolescents form 
a positive reinforcement cycle: interested adolescents talk with 
parents more, and the positive feedback from parents further 
motivates the adolescents to be more interested and thus talking 
even more. It is probably the rewarding communication experience 
that enables the adolescents to know more about the parents' 
p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s , and a l s o r e n d e r s the p a r e n t s m o r e 
persuasive. The suggestion is supported by another finding that 
the political interest of the adolescents are higher when the 
parents are communicating more with them, particularly when their 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n p a t t e r n is t w o - w a y w i t h f e e d b a c k from the 
adolescents frequently allowed. However, more discriminating 
indicators for more effective control can still be tested in 
future studies, e.g. political news consumption or participation 
in political discussion rather than self report of political 
interest can be used in identifying the political interest of 
adolescents.(7) 
Nevertheless, single indicator of p a r e n t - a d o l e s c e n t 
relationship like closeness between parents and adolescents, and 
the level of communication are not adequate in accounting for the 
relatively high parent-adolescent correlations. Neither do the 
correlations change much when a single variable is controlled. 
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More fruitful research is therefore to focus more on the overall 
atmosphere within the family. Multiple indicators are used for 
defining the parental type. Good parent-adolescent relationsliip 
are likely that the parents are warm, and the relationship is 
close, parents are moderate in their disciplinary methods, with 
adequate guidance provided. Parent-adolescent commimication is 
also to be good and satisfactorily, vfith the opinions of the 
adolescents being taken with respect. 
Another variable tested in the research is the impact of the 
a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the p a r e n t s on the p a r e n t - a d o l e s c e n t 
a g r e e m e n t s . T h e f i n d i n g s are p r o m i n e n t in all the t h r e e 
subsamples. Parents who agree with each others have stronger 
correlations with their adolescents. The effect may be understood 
from the reinforcement given to the adolescents. The parental 
cues are likely to be more salience when the parents agree with 
y 
each other. The adolescents are thus more likely to perceive the 
message accurately, and perceptual a c c u r a c y is c o n d u c i v e to 
effective transmission of parental attitudes. Another possible 
explanation is that agreement between parents is related to a 
more harmonious relationship within the family, the warmth in the 
environment provides more motivation for the a d o l e s c e n t s to 
identify with the parents. 
When effectiveness of socialisation is considered in terms 
of the reinforcement provided by the parents, the homogeneity 
between parents, no matter in their a t t i t u d e s , or in their 
rearing style, is likely to be important determinant of parent-
adolescent congruency. It is found from the overall sample that 
when the parents are similar in their level of protection towards 
the adolescents, the parent-adolescent associations are also 
stronger. (8) 
Besides the direct influence of the parents, the parents are 
influential in shaping the personality of the adolescents, which 
probably helps in structuring the attitudes of the adolescents. 
It is found that overprotective as well as extremely ignorant 
parents are more likely to have adolescents who are hostile to 
the political authority on the average. Nevertheless, the number 
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of cases of overprotective and extremely ignorant parents is few, 
which renders their impact on the o v e r a l l culture of the 
political community rather limited. 
In short, the parents do play an important role in shaping 
the political attitudes of the adolescents, in vievz of the high 
parent-adolescent correlations in all the three subsamples when 
the i m p a c t of the s c h o o l is c o n s i d e r a b l y c o n t r o l l e d . 
Nevertheless, the factors that are conducive to the effective 
t r a n s m i s s i o n of p a r e n t a l v a l u e s are not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
identified. Further researches can take into consideration the 
overall rearing pattern of the parents, and also the agreement 
between the parents in their rearing style and opinions. 
Factors that shape the attitudes of parents 
It is found that experience of the parents‘ generation with 
the communist government, which is p a r t l y d e t e r m i n e d by the 
social economic status of the grandparents before the communist 
rule, is having mild but by no means negligible influence on the 
attitudes of the parents towards the communist government. It 
seems common sense to find out that g r a n d p a r e n t s who have 
suffered the ruling of the communist government are more likely 
to have offsprings more hostile to the same political authority. 
Nevertheless, the correlations are weak, indicating that parental 
attitudes are susceptible to influence of experience which came 
later in life. 
The length of stay of the parents in the Mainland is also 
related to the parental attitudes. Interestingly, parents who 
have a longer period of stay in the Mainland are more positive 
towards the communist rule. This may be due to a mechanism of 
self-justification, or that a person should by and large have 
some good reasons for choosing to stay in the country. 
The parental attitudes are also to a very mild extent 
influenced by their social economic status, which determines in 
turn the social class they are in* And people in higher social 
class are likely to be more negative towards communist rule since 
the l a t t e r is i d e o l o g i c a l l y b o u n d e d to l o o k at them as 
f - k 
、exploiters，�of the people. As expected, parents who have higher 
socio—economic status are more hostile towards the communist 
rule. Nevertheless, the difference is not prominent. This may be 
due to the high mobility of the Hong Kong society in which the 
SES of a person is rather fluid. Similar pattern is found in 
parents at different educational levels. More educated parents 
are in average more hostile towards communist rule. On the other 
hand, they are less negative towards Chinese socialism and they 
also share the sentiment of Chinese intellectuals as being more 
patriotic. 
School as socialisation agent 
Students in the leftist schools are found to have attitudes 
quite different from the other two subsamples. They are generally 
more positive towards the ruling of the communist government, 
less negative towards Chinese socialism, and are more patriotic.、” 
Rightist schools students, on the other h a n d , do not r e v e a l 
particularly anti-communist political attitudes. In fact, they 
share political characteristics similar to those of the neutral 
school students except for their being more patriotic. 
The finding that the rightist school students are similar to 
the neutral school students i n d i c a t e s that the so d e f i n e d 
r i g h t i s t s c h o o l s a r e l i k e l y to h a v e l i t t l e if not n o n e 
socialisation practice towards an anti-communist orientation. The 
two schools in Rsnnie‘s Mill V i l l a g e are t h e r e f o r e not m u c h 
influenced by the subculture in the pro-nationalist community. 
The third one, Tf/hich is financed q u i t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y by the 
nationalist government, is also facing raany limitations common to 
many private schools which hinder the introduction of effective 
socialisation p r a c t i c e s . F i r s t , it lacks a w e l l f a c i l i t a t e d 
school setting, the limitation of manpower and resources renders 
the implementation of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e set of s o c i a l i s a t i o n 
measures difficult. Moreover, the mobility of the students is 
high for socialisation to be effective, actually most of the 
students enter the school only in Form Four after their failure 
in the assessment examination. 
f - k 
T h e p r o - c o m m u n i s t s c h o o l s are in a m o r e f a v o u r a b l e 
situation. They can generally provide a rather well facilitated 
school setting for the students. They also have a more definite 
socialisation goal to achieve which is to instill in the students 
a sense of patriotism towards the motherland. However, their 
i n f l u e n c e on the s t u d e n t s and how it o p e r a t e s are not 
satisfactorily identified in the present study. 
Influence of the school, which is thought to be exercised 
informally through exposing the students to political discussions 
and through the personal influence of teachers, is found to be 
very limited. In leftist schools, increasing school exposure is 
only mildly correlated with more positive attitudes towards the 
c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t and C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m , and g r e a t e r 
patriotism of the students. Discussion participatioii is likely 
to intervene in the relationship in a way that the passive 
recipients are more likely to have the defined attitudes with 
increasing school exposure except for the sentiment of patriotic 
love, which is likely to be reinforced by more sharing with 
others. The correlations do not differ much when the teachers are 
objective, though the more open presentation style is expected to 
be more persuasive. 
The neutral schools is playing no observable role in the 
students‘ attitudes towards the communist government and Chinese 
socialism as far as its role of introducing the adolescents to 
the relevant information is concerned. However, the adolescents 
are more patriotic when they perceived a higher i n f o r m a t i o n 
exposure in school. It is therefore likely that p a t r i o t i c 
students are more motivated to know about the country they love 
and are more aware of the information a v a i l a b l e in their 
environment. The influence of the rightist schools is essentially 
negligible when the effect of increasing school exposure is under 
concern. 
D e s p i t e that i n f o r m a t i o n e x p o s u r e is p l a y i n g no 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g r o l e on the p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s of the 
adolescents, it is related to more inteirested adolescents, which 
is true in all the three subsamples. N e v e r t h e l e s s , passive 
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exposure to political information seems inadequate for greater 
political interest to take shape. The effective condition should 
be that exposure to political information is accompanied by a, 
high level of participation in discussion. 
The influence of pro—communist newspapers is prominent among 
the leftist school students. Quite a large portion of them report 
reading Wen Hui Pao or Ta Rung Pao, and it is found that students 
who consume more frequently these newspapers are holding more 
strongly the typical attitudes as being less negative towards the 
c o m m u n i s t r u l e and C h i n e s e s o c i a l i s m , and are a l s o m o r e 
patriotic. 
Students in different subsamples also cliffei: in their level 
of k n o w l e d g e . W h e n the a c a d e m i c l e v e l of the s c h o o l s is 
controlled, students of higher academic level are found to be 
more knowledgeable. It is likely that these students are having 
better language ability and other cognitive skills of learning, 
they are therefore better able and are also more motivated to 
acquire more knowledge. All the leftist and rightist schools in 
the sample belong to the lower grade schools, they are found to 
be more knowledgeable than the neutral school students in the 
same category. The knowledge level of the leftist school students 
are considerably higher than the r i g h t i s t school s t u d e n t s , 
particularly in the knowledge of the communist government. The 
finding agrees with the socialisation practice observed in the 
leftist schools. In these schools, general knowledge on China as 
a whole is introduced to the students by means of talks, sharing 
in assembly, and also messages on boards, which covers both past 
and recently occurred prominent e v e n t s . As for the rightist 
school students, they are on the average more interested in 
politics than students in the other two subsamples,(9) and higher 
level of political interest generally provides greater motivation 
for information seeking, T^ rhich may account for their higher level 
of political knowledge. 
Mass media are also playing a considerable role in enriching 
the political knowledge of the adolescents. However, only the 
consumption of news magazines are mildly related to increasing 
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political knowledge. Newspaper, radio and television news and 
documentary programme consumption contiributes little to the 
political knowledge of the adolescents. It may be accounted for 
by the nature of the knowledge items, which ask on a varieties of 
topics including peirsonalities, ideologies and national days of 
the commimist and the nationalist governments. Most of them are 
rarely covered by the newspapers and electronic media which used 
to report on more superficial and current events. More detailed 
information is more likely to be found in news magazines, which 
provide for more in-depth and comprehensive information for the 
adolescents. 
In conclusion, an increase in school exposure does not have 
much effect on the political a t t i t u d e s of the n e u t r a l and 
rightist school students, even after the obj e c t i v e n e s s of 
teachers and the level of participation in political discussion 
are controlled. Considerably stronger irelationship is obtained in 
the leftist school students. However, the direction of influence 
is still not clear, a positive correlation does not necessarily 
mean that increasing information exposure is conducive to the 
pro-communist attitudes of the adolescents, the relation can be 
on the other way round, i.e. those who are having stronger pro-
communist attitudes are more aware of the political information 
prevailing in school since the information provided are likely to 
be in consonance with the attitudes of the a d o l e s c e n t s . A 
probable relationship is that the influence is two way； i.e. 
students who are having greater pro-coiTimimist sentiments are more 
aware of the information provided and the information on the 
other hand further strength the beliefs of the a d o l e s c e n t s . 
Similar puzzle is observed in the positive irelationship betv/een 
political interest and school exposure in all three subsamples. 
Interested adolescents are therefore likely to be more conscious 
about the information prevailing in the environment, and the 
satisfaction in obtaining the information in turn stimulate them 
to be more interested. 
Nevertheless, in view of the generally weak correlations 
obtained, it is difficult to establish that the partisan schools 
are playing any distinctive socialisation role in the formation 
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of the political attitudes of the adolescents. For more precise 
and fruitful findings, more controls can be introduced in future 
studies, Two assumptions are taken on the i n f l u e n c e of the 
schools in the present study, i.e. both the information provided 
by the school and the political orientations of the teachers are 
consistent with the stand of the partisan schools. For a better 
understanding of the socialisation role played by the school, the 
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by the s c h o o l s and the p o l i t i c a l 
orientations of the teachers s h o u l d be taken as o b j e c t s for 
study. 
The influence of teachers is by no means negligible simply 
by observation, since they have the expertise and the formal 
authority which are generally superior to those of the parents, 
Therefore, the stand of the teachers should match with the stand 
of the students so as to identify factors pertinent to their 
agreements and d i s a g r e e m e n t s . M o r e o v e r , there are f a c t o r s 
pertinent to the personality of the student that will influence 
his perception of and respond to the stimuli in school. Different 
students are likely to respond differently to stimuli from the 
s a m e t e a c h e r , and t h a t s o m e m a y p e r c e i v e the t e a c h e r as 
influential while others do not. 
Moreover, some students are m o t i v a t e d in a p o l i t i c i s e d 
environment while some respond in the o t h e r way r o u n d . The 
criteria for effective s o c i a l i s a t i o n m e a s u r e s in the s c h o o l 
environment are thus relative, which should be contingent upon 
the nature of the socialised, e.g. passive students are likely to 
be influenced by subjective and assertive teachers, while the 
active ones gain more when the teachers are more objective since 
the active students may have more independent thinking and are 
better able to make judgment on pro and con informations； while 
the passive students tend to rely on the teachers for answers. A 
more political environment where high e x p o s u r e of p o l i t i c a l 
information is perceived by the students may have motivational 
effect on active students while on the other hand may be 
irritating to the passive students. If the students are taken 
together, they are likely to cancel out the response of each 
o t h e r . Therefore, more fruitful r e s u l t s in the i n f l u e n c e of 
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school should identify different types of s t u d e n t s who w i l l 
response differently to the same socialisation measures for the 
sake of control. 
F i n a l l y , a r o u g h i d e a on the i n t e r a c t i o n of o t h e r 
socialisation agents with the i n f l u e n c e of the parents is 
obtained. It is found that the mass media are reinforcing the 
socialisation role of parents, probably by serving as common 
source of influence to both the p a r e n t s and a d o l e s c e n t s . 
Influence of the parents are e s s e n t i a l l y u n a f f e c t e d by the 
teachers, whereas the peers are h i n d e r i n g the i n f l u e n c e of 
mothers, probably due to that they can to certain extent 
substitute the role of mothers to provide for the social need of 
the adolescents. The influence of fathers is on the other hand 
little affected by the peers, since the possible role of fathers 
as authoritative instructors is less likely to be replaced by the 
peers who interact with each other on more equal basis. 
Implication for political socialisation 
Political authorities which are able to establish a more 
positive image in the people are more likely to enjoy more 
support in their rule. In the case of Hong Kong, mors positive 
attitudes of the citizens towards the communist government raay 
facilitate the ruling of the future government of the Special 
Administirative Region, since positive attitudes are likely to be 
conducive to a smoother relationship b e t w e e n the communist 
g o v e r n m e n t and the f u t u r e S p e c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e g i o n 
government. 
The main obstacle in the s o c i a l i s a t i o n of the younger 
generations to more positive attitudes towards the communist 
leadership lies in countering the i n f l u e n c e of p a r e n t s , who 
happen to be very influential, but that they are essentially 
anti-communist. A possible way out is to promote a warm and open 
family environment, which is not to be too protective. The warra 
environment with suitable amount of p a r e n t a l g u i d a n c e is 
conducive to a lower level of hostility towards the political 
authority. Nonetheless, the effect of which is very mild. 
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This study provides little insight on the possible role of 
school. They may work to enhance the political interest of the 
adolescents by exposing them to more i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g 
China. Interested adolescents are likely to be more curious for 
knowledge, and if their information seeking propensity can be 
satisfied in the pro-commimist newspapers, they are likely to 
have more positive attitudes towards the communist rulers！ 
Finally, the most crucial influence seems to lie in the 
performance of the communist government itself. In view of the 
drastic change in trust level towards the communist government 
after the June 4 crisis, the attitudes of adolescents towards the 
government are likely to be quite flexible. The direction and 
intensity of which are contingent upon the performance of the 
communist government. If the government can perform in such a way 
so as to satisfy also the wish and a f f e c t i v e love of the 
adolescents for the goodness of the country and the people, the 
support it will enjoy is likely to be greater in view of the 
strength of patriotism in driving man to action. 
f - k 
Notes 
Chapter One 
1. Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 1986 
(4th ed.) , Oxford Univeirsity Press, p.235. 
2. J. L. Stocks, Patriotism and the Super-State, London and New 
York, 1920, p.14-44. 
3. Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, Greenwood 
Press, 1972, 2nd, ed. p.156. 
4. ibid, p.148. 
5. Gabriel A . Almond and Sydney V e r b a , The Civic C u l t u r e : 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Little 
Brown and Co., 1963, p.14. 一 
6. William S. Scott 'Attitude Measurement,‘ in Gardner Lindzey 
and Elliot Aronson (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology 
(2nd ed.), vol. 3, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co,, Reading, 
Mass, 1969, p.151. 
7. T h e N e w E n c y c l o p a e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , 1 9 8 4 {15th e d , ) , 
Micropaedia vol. IX (Ready Reform and Index), Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc., p.313. The Random House Encyclopaedia, 1983 
(new revised ed.), Random House Inc., p.2628. B, Stacey, 
Political Socialization in Western Society: an analysis from 
an life-span perspective, Edward Arnold ltd., 1978, p.2. 
8. Jack Dennis et.al., "Political Socialization to Democratic 
Orientations in Four Western Systems,‘ in Socialization to 
Politics: a Reader, Jack Dennis (ed.), 1973, p.228. 
9. ibid. 
10. David Eastern and Jack Dennis, ‘ A P o l i t i c a l Theory of 
Political Socialization, ‘ in C h i l d r e n in the Politic;^l 
System: Origins of Political Legitimacy, by David Easton and 
Jack Dennis, McGraw Hill Inc., 1969, p.47-70. 
11. David Easton and Jack Dennis, 'The Child's Acquisition of 
Regime Norms: Political Efficacy,， American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 61, p.25-38. 
12. R i c h a r d M . M e r e1m a n , ‘Revi t a l i z a t i n g P o l i t i c a l 
Socialization,‘ in Political Psychology, Margaret G. Hermann 
(ed.), Jossey-Bass Inc., 1986, p.279-319. 
13. Fred I. Greenstein, ‘Political s o c i a l i z a t i o n , ‘ 1968 , in 
Encyclopedia of the Social Science 14, D . L . S i l l s (ed.), 
London: Macmillan and the free press, p.551 
14. Gabriel A. Almond, op. cit. p.268-269. 
f - k 
15. D o n a l d D . S e a r i n g et a l . ^ T h e S t r u c t u r i n g P r i n c i p l e : 
Political Socialization and B e l i e f S y s t e m s ' , Zimerican 
Political Science Review, vol. 67, 1973, p.415. "" 
16. Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1965, p . " ^ 
17. J a m e s C . D a v i e s ,� 、The f a m i l y ' s r o l e in p o l i t i c a l 
socialization,， in Learning about P o l i t i c s : a r e a d e r in 
political socialization, by Roberta S.Sigel (ed.), Random 
House, 1970, p.11. 
18. Donald D. Searing et al., op. cit., p.416. 
19. James C.Davies, op* cit., p.108. 
20. Fred I. Greenstein,� 、The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images 
of Political Authority,‘ American Political Science Review, 
vol. 54, 1960, p.934-943.“ 
21. Robert D . Hess and David Easton,� 、The Child's Changing Image 
of the President,， Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 24, 1960, 
p.632-644. 
22. P . R . Abramson and R. Inglehart, The Development of 
Systematic Support in Four W e s t e r n D e m o c r a c i e s , 1 9 7 0 , 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 2, p.419-442. 
23. Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics. 
24. Fred I . Greenstein, 'The B e n e v o l e n t L e a d e r R e v i s i t e d : 
Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies,’ 
Americam Political Review, vol. 69, 1975, p.1371-1398, 
25. The specific issue attitudes i n c l u d e g r o u p e v a l u a t i o n , 
spectator politicisation of media consumption and political 
interest; and general o r i e n t a t i o n s i n c l u d e p o l i t i c a l 
knowledge, c o s m o p o l i t i c i a n i s m , p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , good 
citizen attributes, political trust and recognition of party 
differences, among which only one rose above that observed 
for party identification- in Kent M. Jennings and Richard G. 
N i e m i , The Political Character of A d o l e s c e n c e . P r i n c e t o n 
University Press, 1974. 
26. K . L . Tedin, ‘The Influence of P a r e n t s on the P o l i t i c a l 
Attitudes of Adolescents, ‘ A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 
Review, 68, p.1597-1592. ^ 
27. R . M i d d l e t o n and S . P u t n e y , ' P o l i t i c a l E x p r e s s i o n of 
Adolescent Rebellion,, in Learning About Politics: A Reader 
in Political Socialization, by Robert R. Sigel (ed,), 1970, 
Random House, p.132-141 
28. Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization Oxford University 
Press, 1969, p.28-29. 
29. Robert E, Lane, 'Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political 
Beliefs，， American Sociological Review, vol. 24, p.502-511. 
f - k 
30. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, ^Parental Attitudes and Behaviors as 
Determinants of Children's Responses to the Threat of Nuclear 
War,‘ in Sigel, op. cit., p.142-147. 
31. M a r t i n L . L e v i n , ^ S o c i a l C l i m a t e and P o l i t i c a l 
Socialization,' in Sigel, op.cit., p.353-362. 
32. Frank A . Pinner, 'Parental O v e r p r o t e c t i o n and P o l i t i c a l 
Distrust,‘ in Sigel, op.cit., p.208. 
33. ibid. 
34. B. Stacey, Political Socialization in Western Society, op. 
cit.• p.135. 
35. Kent M . Jennings and Richard G . N i e m i , The P o l i t i c a l 
Character of Adolescence, Princeton University Press, 1974. 
36. Rumjahn Hoosain, 'Perceptual P r o c e s s of the Chinese’， in 
Michael H. Bond (ed.), The Psychology of the Chinese People, 
Oxford University Press, H.K., 1986, p.50. 
37. K e n n e t h P . L a n g t o n and K e n t M . J e n n i n g s , ‘Political 
Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the 
United States,, American Journal of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 
vol.62, p.852-867 
38. Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, 
Boston: Little, Brown, p.166; Sigel, p. cit, p.315; and L. H. 
E h m a n , ‘An A n a l y s i s of the R e l a t i o n s h i p s of S e l e c t e d 
Educational Variables with the Political Socialization of 
High School Students,‘ American Education Research Journal, 
vol. 6, no.4, p.559-580. 
39. L. H. Ehman, 'An Analysis of the Relationships of Selected 
Educational Variables with the Political Socialization of 
High School Students‘, op. cit., p.579. 
40. B. Stacey, Political Socialization in Western Society, op. 
cit., p.24-25. 
Chapter Two 
1. The seven schools are Fukien Middle School, Pui Kiu Middle 
School, Mongkok Workers‘ Children School (Secondary), Hon Wah 
Middle School, Heung To Middle S c h o o l , Chung Sang Middle 
School, and Yuk Wah Middle School. 
Chapter Three 
1. On analysing the frequency distribution of the attitudes, the 
points strongly and moderately disagree are aggregated into 
one as strongly disagree, similar a r r a n g e m e n t is made in 
points strongly and modereatly agree at the opposite end of 
the scale. 
f - k 
2. K.L.Tedin,� 、The Influence of P a r e n t s on the P o l i t i c a l 
Attitudes of Adolescents,‘ op.cit. p.1580. 
3. P.R.Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and 
change, W.H.Freeman and Company, 1983, p.91.~~~ 
4. The original association .47 is calculated in tau-b, in Kent 
M . Jennings and R . Niemi's, The P o l i t i c a l C h a r a c t e r of 
A d o l e s c e n c e : the I n f l u e n c e of F a m i l i e s and S c h o o l s ,, 
Princeton University Press, 1974, p.38. 
Chapter Four 
1. The respondents are divided into four groups accordingly in 
the order of very strict to very l e n i e n t . The degree of 
strictness is measured by questionnaiire items 52 and 53. They 
are modified from a question employed by K. P. Langton, in 
Political Socialization, op. cit., p.25. The strictness is 
derived from two items asking for the self-perception of the 
respondents on the strictness of the parents, and also a 
report on the frequency of the parent in letting the 
respondent to have a say in his own affairs. 
2. They have response in the same direction as their parents as 
agree or disagree rather than directly opposing the response 
of the parents, though differ in the level of agreement or 
disagreement. 
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businessmen, factory workers and military personnels of the 
Communist Party. Members of the s u p p r e s s e d group are 
expected to be more negative towards the communist government 
while those of the liberated group are expected to be more 
positive. 
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14. The social status is defined by the type of occupation the 
parent is engaging in. The economic status is defined by the 
type of house the parent is living in, which is u s u a l l y 
determined by the financial condition of the parent. Total 
family income is dropped as i n d i c a t o r since many of the 
students are unable to report it. Fathers and mothers are 
analysed separately since they are l i k e l y to engage in 
different occupations, and are thus having quite different 
social environment of their own. 
Two groups with high and low social status respectively are 
then defined from the occupations of the parents. The high 
status group composes of professionals; high level employees 
in large commercial firms, non-profitable organizations, and 
in the Hong Kong government; and also owners or partners of 
smaller commercial firms. Lower status group includes medium 
and low level employees in large c o m m e r c i a l f i r m s , non-
profitable organizations and in the Hong Kong government. It 
also includes the factory foreman and workers, and employees 
of smaller firms, primary and s e c o n d a r y school t e a c h e r s , 
hawkers, fishermen and farmers. Three levels of e c o n o m i c 
status are defined from the type of house one is living in. 
The high level housing includes private flats; rented private 
flats and hostel constitutes the medium level; public housing 
and squatter huts belong to the low level. 
The SES score is created by matching the social status with 
the economic status. If both score high, or high in social 
status and medium in economic statues, the SES is high. If 
both score low, or low social status with medium economic 
status, the SES is low. Low in social status but high in 
economic status or vice versa ranks medium in SES. 
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Chapter Five 
1• The sixteen schools are divided into two groups accordinglye 
Strict criteria are employed to rule out only those schools 
with very high academic level. The first group consists of 
schools having better academic performance, they all have the 
following chairacteiristics: it is either a government, or a 
subsidiary or aided school; most of its Form Four students 
should be original school students; and an average of over 
70% passing rate in the Hong Kong C e r t i f i c a t e E d u c a t i o n 
Examination. Government s c h o o l s , or s u b s i d i a r y or aided 
schools are more likely to take up better students under the 
present student allocation system in Hong Kong: p r i v a t e 
schools tend to be shelters for Mrop-outs' of the public 
examinations. Better schools can also recruit back most of 
their own students under the assessment scheme in Form Three. 
Finally, the performance of the students in the HKCEE is also 
a good indicator of the school‘s academic level. 
The arrangement is under the consideration that the academic 
level of the leftist schools is more difficult to assess. 
They generally choose to be private schools so as to maintain 
an independent status in Hong Kong‘s e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . 
However,they are still able to attract competitive students 
with low school fees. The mobility of their students is thus 
relatively lower. Moreover, they also take up students who 
are new comers from China, who may be bright but their 
educational level is often difficult to assess. 
2. School exposure is measured by questiormaiire items 66 and 68. 
It is defined as the perceived information exposure on China 
affairs in the school environment. A summation score of two 
items asking about the perceived amount of d i s c u s s i o n s 
initiated by teachers and among the students is calculated, 
3. It is measured by questionnaire item 69, where the amount of 
discussion with the schoolmates and teachers is obtained. 
4. It is measured by questionnaire item 67. 
Chapter Six 
1. The influence of each agent is report by the adolescent on a 
six point scale from very great to very small, which can be 
found in questionnaire item 71. Whether the adolescent agree 
with the opinion of the agents is also reported on a six 
point scale from very agree to very disagree. The very agree 
and moderately agree, very disagree and moderately disagree 
are then aggregated into one item for a n a l y s i s . It is 
measured by questionnaire item 72. 
2. Correlation between the attitudes of parents and adolescents 
in the three subsamples can be found in tables 3.9 and 3.14 
for fathers and mothers respectively. 
3. Questionnaire item 5, frequency displayed in Appendix G. 
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4. Substantially more adolescents report feeling closer to their 
mothers when a difference in the degree of closeness with the 
parents is observed. The finding is noted in table E.2. 
5. Jack M.Mcleod, Carroll J.Glynn, and D a n i e l G , M c D o n a l d , 
^Issues and Images: The Influence of Mass Media Reliance on 
Voting Decisions,’ Communication Research, 10, January 1983, 
p.37-58. 
Chapter Seven 
1. An analysis on the overall sample find that boys have an 
average score higher than girls on k n o w l e d g e towards the 
communist and nationalist governments. The mean score of boy 
is 4.88 out of a total score of 14, while that of girls is 
3.31. 
2. Richard. G. Niemi, Political Socialization, op. cit., p,127; 
and also in 'Collecting Information About the F a m i l y : A 
Problem in Survey Methodology,‘ in Jack Dennis, Socialization 
to Politics: A Reader, op. cit,, p.464-490. 
3. R . W . Connell, ‘Political S o c i a l i z a t i o n in the A m e r i c a n 
Family: the Evidence Re-examined,，Public Opinion Quarterly, 
No.36, 1972, p. 323-333. 
4. It is measured by questionnaire item 51, The correlations of 
those who report that they obtain the information by wild 
guess, and those who learn the parental attitudes directly 
from parents are compared. 
5. With reference to table E.3, adolescents‘ correlations with 
b o t h p a r e n t s are c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r w hen t h e i r 
relationship with the parents are very and moderately close. 
Their closeness with parents is measured by questionnaire 
item 55. Six out of seven correlations with fathers are 
stronger, the difference ranges from .03 to .15, and five out 
of s e v e n c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h m o t h e r s are s t r o n g e r , the 
difference ranges from .02 to .15. 
6. The correlations between closeness and strictness for leftist 
school fathers and mothers are .06 and .07, ,06 and .04 in 
neutral school fathers and m o t h e r s , and , 05 and .01 in 
rightist school fathers and mothers, regardless of sign. 
7. Interestingly, when level of consumption of news on China is 
taken as indicator of political i n t e r e s t . In the o v e r a l l 
sample, higher correlations with fathers are g e n e r a l l y 
obtained when the communication is two-way and when the 
adolescent is interested in politics. But correlations with 
mothers are lower when the communication is two-way and when 
the adolescent is interested. It is likely that mothers are 
less informed than fathers, they are therefore less able to 
give good rationales to their a t t i t u d e s , and a better 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of mothers‘ a t t i t u d e s in a t w o - w a y 
communication is likely to lead to more disagreement with 
mothers, 
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8. In table E.4, it is found from the overall sample that when 
fathers and mothers are the same in their level of protection 
towards the adolescents, the father-adolescent correlations 
are considerably stronger. 
9. The mean political interest scores of boys and girls in 
rightist, neutral and leftist schools are 3.87 and 3.64, 3.58 
and 3.47, 3.82 and 3.39 respectively. 
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Appendix A Demographic Data 
Table A.l Sex of Adolescents (by type of school) 
Government Aid—subsidized Private 
Female 57 (78.0%) 209 (49.8%) 171 (45.1%) 
Male 16 (22.0%) 211 (50.2%) 208 (54.9%) 
No. of cases 73 420 379 
Table A.2 Sex of Adolescents (by partisan school) 
Leftist Neutral Rightist Total 
Feaale 74 (38.1%) 258 (57.7%) 105 (45.5%) 437 ( 5 0 . U ) 
Male 120 (61.9%) 189 ( 4 2 . 3宅） 1 2 6 (54.5%) 435 (49.9%) 
No. of cases 194 447 231 872 
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Table A.3 Age of Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
14 4 { 2.1%) 16 { 3.6%) 12 ( 5.3%) 
15 17 ( 8.8%) 180 (40.0%) 58 (25.4%) 
16 62 (32.1%) 169 (37.6%) 70 (30.6%) 
17 64 (33.2%) 63 (14.0%) 65 (28.5%) 
18 37 (19.2%) 20 ( 4.4%) 19 ( 8.3%) 
19 8 ( 4.1%) 2 ( 0.4%) 2 { 0.9%) 
20 1 { 0.5%) 0 ( 0.0%) 1 { 0.4%) 
21 0 { 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 1 ( 0 .4%) 
No. of cases 195 450 228 
Table A.4 Adolescents‘ Year of Stay in H.K. 
(for those who once live out of H.K.) 
No. 
Mean (SD) Mode of cases 
Leftist school 5.65 (4.48) 2,00 108 
Neutral school 9.64 (2.93) 10.00 83 
Rightist school 8.85 (3.45) 10.00 60 
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Table A.5 Adolescents' Place of Birth 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
China 107 (55.2%) 73 (16.3%) 57 (24.6%) 
Hong Kong 84 (43.3%) 373 (83.1%) 170 (73.3%) 
Taivzan 0 { 0.0%) 0 ( 0.0%) 2 ( 0.9%) 
Others 3 { 1.5%) 3 { 0.6%) 3 ( 1.2%) 
No. of cases 194 449 232 
Table A . 6 Fathers' Place of Birth 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
China 148 (81.8%〉 288 (72.5%) 164 (79.6%) 
Hong Kong 23 (12.7%) 89 (22.4%) 27 (13.1%) 
Taiwan 0 ( 0.0%) 2 { 0.5%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Others 10 ( 5.5%) 18 ( 4.6%) 15 ( 7.3%) 
No. of cases 181 397 206 
Table A.7 Mothers' Place of Birth 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
China 137 (75.7%) 218 (55.6%) 126 (62.1%) 
Hong Kong 38 (21.0%) 151 (38.5%) 53 (26.1%) 
Taiwan 0 ( 0.0%) 1 ( 0.3%) 1 { 0.5%) 
Others 6 { 3.3%) 22 ( 5.6%) 23 (11.3%) 
No. of cases 181 392 203 
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Appendix B Profile of Two Generations 
Table B.l Correlation between Political Attitudes of Fathers 
and Mothers 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
CP present ruling 0.50** (136) 0.42*^ (337) 0,39** (183) 
CP past ruling 0.57** (123) 0.49** (265) 0.70** (141) 
CP corruption 0.65** (143) 0.40*=^ (354) 0.41** (177) 
CP loyalty 0,57** (107) 0.47** (300) 0.36”（156) 
Trust towards CP 0.71** (121) 0.62** (334) 0.57** (165) 
Chinese socialism 0.51** (139) 0.37** (301) 0.32** (158) 
General patriotism 0.57** (132) 0.61** (293) 0.58** (152) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table B.2 Mean Attitude Scores of Fathers and Mothers 
a. Leftist School 
Father Mother 
_ _ _ _ _ _ Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.36 (1.27) 4.59 (1.26) * 
CP past ruling 3.53 (1.39) 3.50 (1.40) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.91 (1.33) 4.78 (1.32) N.S. 
CP loyalty 4.21 (1.71) 4.53 (1.45) * 
Trust towards CP 3.48 (1.46) 3.88 (1.41) *** 
Chinese socialism 2.91 (1.14) 3.12 (1.27) * 
General patriotism 4.48 (1.28) 4.10 (1.57) *** 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 嫩 p < .001 N.S. non significant 
b . Neutral School 
Father Mother 
~~— Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 4.77 (1.20) 5.09 (0.96) *** 
CP past ruling 4.27 (1.33) 4.26 (1.35) N.S. 
CP corruption 4.97 (1.26) 5.03 (1.21) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.07 (1.25) 5.18 (1.15) N.S. 
Trust towards CP 4.29 (1.27) 4.55 (1.14) … 
Chinese socialism 3.70 (1.32) 3.71 (1.36) N.S. 
General patriotism 3.73 (1.40) 3.43 (1.43) *** 
* p� 〈 .05 " p� 〈 .01 *** p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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c. Rightist School 
Father Mother 
Probability 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (2-tail) 
CP present ruling 5.04 (1.15) 5.17 (1.00) N.S. | 
CP past ruling 4.25 (1.56) 4.22 (1.55) N.S. 
CP corruption 5.03 (1.44) 5.02 (1.28) N.S. 
CP loyalty 5.25 (1.25) 5.06 (1.40) N.S. 
Trust towards CP 4.34 (1.44) 4.27 (1.23) N.S, 
Chinese socialism 3.94 (1.48) 3.75 (1.41) N.S. 
General patriotism 4.09 (1.55) 3.83 (1.58) * 
* P < .05 ** p < .01 嫩 p < .001 N.S. non significant 
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Appendix C Socialisation Agent - Family 
Table C.l Child Rearing Style of Parents 
Father Mother 
Very Strict 15 { 1.7%) 13 { 1.5%) 
Strict 428 (49.6%) 399 (45.7%) 
Lenient 407 (47.2%) 441 (50.6%) 
Very Lenient 13 { 1.5%) 19 ( 2.2%) 
Table C.2 Protection of Parents 
Father Mother 
Seriously ignored 61 { 7.0%) 22 ( 2.5%) 
Ignored 486 (56.1%) 320 (36.8%) 
Protected 305 (35.2%) 484 (55,6%) 
Overprotected 14 ( 1.6%) 44 ( 5.1%) 
Table C.3 Wealthiness of Grandparents before Liberation 
a. Father‘s father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Very rich 6 { 5.9%) 23 (10.8%) 11 (11.1%) 
Quite rich 28 (27.5%) 52 (24.5%) 28 (28.3%) 
Not rich, not poor 38 (37.3%) 60 (28.3%) 36 (36.4%) 
Quite poor 22 (21.6%) 46 (21.7%) 17 (17.2%) 
Very poor 8 ( 7.7%) 31 (14.7%) 7 ( 7.0%) 
No. of cases 102 212 99 
b. Mother‘s father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Very rich 8 ( 8.8%) 20 (11.1%) 8 ( 8.8%) 
Quite rich 26 (28.6%) 52 (28.9%) 25 (27.5%) 
Not rich, not poor 30 (33.0%) 59 (32.8%) 34 (37.4%) 
Quite poor 22 (24.2%) 30 (16.7%) 13 (14.3%) 
Very poor 5 ( 5.4%) 19 (10.5%) 11 (12.0%) 
No. of cases 91 180 91 
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Table C.4 Social Status of Grandfathers before Liberation 
a. Father's father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Suppressed Class 28 (36.4%) 57 (37.3%) 34 (40.5%) 
Liberated Class 49 (63.6%) 96 (62.8%) 50 (59.5%) 
No. of cases 77 153 84 
b. Mother‘s father 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Suppressed Class 22 (31.4%) 53 (43.4%) 26 (34.7%) 
Liberated Class 48 (68.6%) 69 (56.6%) 49 (65.3%) 
No. of cases 70 122 75 
Table C.5 Subjective SES of Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Upper 72 (38.9%) 126 (28.4%) 83 (37.2%) 
Middle 92 (49.7%) 248 (55.8%) 108 (48.5%) 
Lower 21 (11.4%) 70 (15.8%) 32 (14.3%) 
No. of cases 185 444 223 
Table C.6 Mean Attitude Scores of Adolescents 
(control for subjective SES) 
a. Leftist School 
Lower Middle Upper 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Chinese socialism 2.99 (1.44) 3.10 (1.12) 3.80 (1.40) 
General patriotism 5.05 (0.97) 4.24 (1.45) 3.94 (1.71) 
CP ruling 22.14 (4.32) 21.47 (4.09) 23.63 (4.06) 
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b. Neutral School 
Lower Middle Upper 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Chinese socialism 3.87 (1.30) 3.77 (1.20) 3.84 (1.17) 
General patriotism 3.82 (1.26) 3.68 (1.30) 3.93 (1.31) 
CP ruling 24.26 (3.15) 23.92 (3.42) 24,66 (4.12) 
c. Rightist School 
Lower Middle Upper 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Chinese socialism 3.51 (1.15) 3.63 (1.33) 4.29 (1.33) 
General patriotism 4.35 (1.50) 3.88 (1.43) 4.03 (1.43) 
CP ruling 24.57 (3.77) 23.01 (3.60) 25.29 (3.41) 
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Appendix D Socialisation Agent - School 
Table D.l Adolescents' Year of Stay in School 
No. 
Mean (SD) Mode of cases 
Leftist school 2.94 (1.62) 5.00 185 
Neutral school 3.30 (1,29) 4.00 440 
Rightist school 2.58 (1.48) 1.00 220 
Table D.2 Presentation Style of Teachers 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Very subjective 20 (10.3%) 18 ( 4.2%) 34 (15.3%) 
Subjective 51 (26.3%) 67 (15.5%) 51 (23.0%) 
Objective 105 (54.1%) 292 (67.6%) 109 (49.1%) 
Very Objective 18 { 9.3%) 55 (12.7%) 28 (12,6%) 
No. of cases 194 432 222 
Table D.3 Frequency of Reading Partisan Newspapers 
a. Pro-communist - Ta Kung Pao 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Always 2 ( 1.4%) 3 ( 0.8%) 0 ( 0.0%) 
Sometimes 14 ( 9.9%) 17 ( 4.3%) 14 { 7.2%) 
Seldom 9 ( 6.4%) 21 ( 5.3%) 17 ( 8.8%) 
Never 116 (82.3%) 355 (89.6%) 163 (84.0%) 
No. of cases 141 396 194 
b. Pro-communist - Wen Hui Pao 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Always 44 (24.0%) 4 { 1.0%) 4 ( 1.9%) 
Sometimes 45 (24.6%) 32 ( 7.8%) 30 (14.6%) 
Seldom 27 (14.8%) 34 ( 8.2%) 26 (12.6%) 
Never 67 (36.6%) 341 (83.0%) 146 (70.9%) 
No. of cases 183 411 206 
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c. Pro-nationalist — H.K. Times 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Always 2 ( 1.5%) 2 ( 0.5%) 3 { 1.5%) 
Sometimes 3 ( 2.2%) 21 ( 5.3%) 11 ( 5.6%) 
Seldom 10 ( 7.3%) 21 ( 5.3%) 23 (11.7%) 
Never 122 (89.1%) 353 (88.9%) 159 (81.1%) 
No. of cases 137 396 196 
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Appendix E Tables for Conclusion 
Table E.l Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents 
and Adolescents 
(control for source of information by wild guess) 
Father fiother 
Yes No Yes No 
CP present ruling 0.33** (120) 0.29** (597) 0.30** (135) 0.38** (545) 
CP past ruling 0.54** ( 88) 0.42** (489) 0.33** ( 99) 0.45** (449) 
CP corruption 0.45** (124) 0 . 4 2 " (598) 0.40** (130) 0.33** (553) 
CP loyalty ( 90) 0 . 38** (496 ) 0 . 53** ( 96) 0 . 32** ( 460) 
Trust towards CP 0.33** ( 93) 0.33** (550) 0.31** (120) 0.44** (510) 
Chinese socialism 0.46** (108) 0.43** (569) 0.30** (112) 0 . 3 9 " (487) 
General patriotism 0 . 5 1 " (100) 0.56** (541) 0,70“ (113) 0.61“ (464) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
Table E.2 Relative Closeness of Parents to Adolescents 
Leftist Neutral Rightist 
Close to both 99 (51.8%) 211 (48.0%) 103 (45.6%) 
Closer to father 8 { 4.2%) 30 ( 6.8%) 19 { 8.4%) 
Closer to mother 84 (44.0%) 199 (45.2%) 104 (46.0%) 
No. of cases 191 440 226 
Table E.3 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents 
and Adolescents (control for level of closeness) 
Father Mother 
Hi Low Hi Low 
CP present ruling j 0.35** (259) 0.28** (469) 0.42** (439) 0.27** (258) 
CP past ruling 0.49** (220) 0.39** (357! 0.44** (355) 0.45** (204) 
CP corruption 0.41** (255) 0.42** (469) 0.31** (437) 0.41** (265) 
CP loyalty 0.48** (221) 0.33** (373) 0.40** (362) 0.26** (205) 
Trust towards CP 0.43** (241) 0.31** (413) 0.48** (410) 0 . 3 5 " (237) 
Chinese socialism 0.51** (251) O J O * * (436) 0 . 38 " (386) 0.35 ** (231) 
General patriotisi 0.56** (249) 0.53** (403) 0.63** (375) 0.61** (215) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Table E.4 Correlation between Political Attitudes of Parents 
and Adolescents 
(control for consistency of parents' protection) 
Father Mother 
Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent 
CP present ruling 0.30** (470) 0.34** (252) 0.34** (441) 0.43** (245) 
CP past ruling 0.42** (377) 0.45** (205) 0.46** (355) 0.42** (194) 
CP corruption 0.35** (470) 0.52** (256) 0.29** (447) 0.43** (243) 
CP loyalty 0.37** (382) 0.44** (208) 0.31** (360) 0.43** (199) 
Trust towards CP 0.29** (419) 0.45** (230) 0.40** (410) 0.48** (226) 
Chinese socialism 0.42** (441) 0.48** (240) 0.41** (383) 0.28** (221) 
General patriotism 0.51** (411) 0.60** (238) 0.63** (361) 0.62** (219) 
* p < .01 ** p < .001 
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Appendix F Abbreviations 
CP present ruling 
The communist government manages China very well 
CP past ruling 
On ifeighing the past performance of the communist government, its 
merits outnumber demerits 
CP future ruling 
Be patient, and the communist government‘s management of China 
will get to improve 
CP corruption 
Most of the officials in the communist government are not 
corrupted 
CP loyalty 
I am loyal to the communist party 
trust before crisis 
Level of trust towards the communist government before the June 4 
crisis 
trust after crisis 
Level of trust towards the communist government after the June 4 
crisis 
NP replaces CP 
If nationalist government is to rule China, it will do a better 
job than the communist government 
basic law drafting 
The leadership of the communist government neglects the interest 
of the Hong Kong people when drafting the basic law 
Chinese socialism 
No merit is found in Chinese socialism 
general patriotism 
I love China very much 
specific patriotism 
I am vrilling to contribute my strength to China 
1 -7 Q 
丄.， 
Appendix G Frequency table for the overall sample 
Question 
A. Media consumption behaviour 
Range Mean 
(minutes) (minutes) 
1. Daily television consumption 
a. total exposure 0 - 750 195.3 
b. news exposure 0 - 390 37.0 
c. documentary programme 0 - 430 34.0 
exposure 
2. Daily radio consumption 
a. total exposure 0 - 900 79.0 
b. news exposure 0 - 630 19.6 
c. documentary programme 0 — 645 9,8 
exposure 
3. Habit of reading newspaper yes 75% no 25% 
4. Daily newspaper consumption Range 0 — 480 minutes 
Mean 30.0 minutes 
5. Newspaper read 
a i. most frequently read newspaper (the first three) 
Oriental Daily 35.8% 
Tin Tin Daily 13.4% 
Sing Pao 13.1% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 27.6% 
Dought by family 60,7% 
assigned by teachers 9.7% 
recommended by peers 1.0% 
others 1.1% 
b second frequently read newspaper (the first three) 
Oriental Daily 18.9% 
Ming Pao 14.7% 
Tin Tin Daily 12.4% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 22.6% 
Dought by family 49.0% 
assigned by teachers 19.5% 
recommended by peers 2.5% 
others 5.9% 
c i. third frequently read newspaper (the first three) 
Oriental Daily 17.3% 
South China Morning Post 12.4% 
Ming Pao 11.6% 
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ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 18.4% 
bought by family 42.4% 
assigned by teachers 21.6% 
recommended by peers 7.1% 
others 10.6% 
d i. fourth frequently read newspaper (the first three) 
South China Morning Post 13.7% 
Tin Tin Daily 12.3% 
Ming Pao 10,3% 
Sing Tao Jih Pao 10.3% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 22.1% 
Dought by family 37.2% 
assigned by teachers 17.9% 
recommended by peers 6.2% 
others 15.9% 
6. Newspaper consumption according to different pages 

























7. Weekly Magazine consumption R3Lrige 0 一 998 minutes 
Mean 103,0 minutes 
8. Habit of reading news magazine yes 15.8% no 33.2% 
9. Weekly news magazine exposure Range 0 - 420 minutes 
Mean 14.3 minutes 
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10. News magazine read 
a i. most frequently read news magazines {the first three) 
next 13.6% 
Asiaweek—Chinese 7.0% 
Tseng Ming 5.6% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 59.9% 
！Dought by family 31.6% 
assigned by teachers 1.4% 
recommended by peers 4.7% 
others 2.4% 
b i. second frequently read news magazines (the first three) 
next 7.1% 
Tseng Ming 6.2% 
Asiaweek-Chinese 4,4% 
ii. reason for reading 
Dersonal liking 46.0% 
Dought by family 40.7% 
assigned by teachers ,9% 
recommended by peers 8.0% 
others 3.5% 
c i. third frequently read news magazines (the first three) 
next 7.4% 
Tseng Ming 5.6% 
Pai Shing 3.7% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 51.9% 
nought by family 27.8% 
assigned by teachers 5.6% 
recommended by peers 9.3% 
others 5.6% 
d i. fourth frequently read news magazines (the first three) 
Ninties 3.7% 
Pai Shing 3.7% 
Contemporary 3.7% 
ii. reason for reading 
personal liking 48.1% 
Dought by family 25.9% 
recommended by peers 18.5% 
others 7.4% 
11. Frequency of reading news concerning China affairs (news 
concerning the PRC and the ROC) in the following newspapers 
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B. Adolescent's attitudes 
12. The communist government manages China very well 
strongly agree 1.0% 
moderately .3% 
slightly 5.4% 
slightly disagree 19.7% 
moderately 27.0% 
strongly 43.4% 
no opinion 3.2% 
13. I love China very much 
strongly agree 14.9% 
moderately 16.0% 
slightly 35.8% 
slightly disagree 12.1% 
moderately 3.9% 
strongly 8.0% 
no opinion 9.3% 
14. Most of the officials in the communist government are not 
corrupted 
strongly agree 1.3% 
moderately 2.5% 
slightly 4.7% 
slightly disagree 16.6% 
moderately 22.1% 
strongly 48.5% 
no opinion 4.3% 
15. No merit is found in Chinese socialism 
strongly agree 10.4% 
moderately 12.1% 
slightly 19.4% 
slightly disagree 39.4% 
moderately 5.9% 
strongly 5.2% 
no opinion 7.6% 
16. The leadership of the communist government neglects the 
interest of the Hong Kong people when drafting the basic law 
strongly agree 19.6% 
moderately 17.8% 
slightly 28.5% 
slightly disagree 16.1% 
moderately 3.3% 
strongly 3.8% 
no opinion 10.9% 
f - k 
17. I am loyal to the communist party 
strongly agree 1.7% 
moderately 1.7% 
slightly 3.7% 
slightly disagree 9.4% 
moderately 12.5% 
strongly 56.6% 
no opinion 14.4% 
18• On weighing the past performance of the communist government, 
its merits outnumber demerits 
strongly agree 4.1% 
moderately 5.5% 
slightly 16.0% 
slightly disagree 25.5% 
moderately 14.4% 
strongly 19.5% 
no opinion 15.1% 
19. Be patient, and the communist government's management of 
China will get to improve 
strongly agree 2.3% 
moderately 2.5% 
slightly 23.7% 
slightly disagree 24.5% 
moderately 14.7% 
strongly 16.6% 
no opinion 15.8% 
20, I am willing to contribute my strength to China 
strongly agree 13.0% 
moderately 18.8% 
slightly 32.6% 
slightly disagree 10.3% 
moderately 3.0% 
strongly 5.8% 
no opinion 16.4% 
21- If nationalist government is to rule China, it will do a 
better job than the communist government 
strongly agree 4,0% 
moderately 8.2% 
slightly 26.6% 
slightly disagree 21,0% 
moderately 8,0% 
strongly 8.5% 
no opinion 23.7% 
22. Level of trust towards the communist government after the 
June 4 crisis 
strongly trust .7% 
moderately .6% 
slightly 1.6% 
slightly distrust 10.1% 
moderately 21.6% 
strongly 62.1% 
no opinion 3.4% 
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23. Level of trust towards the communist government before the 
June 4 crisis 
strongly trust 1.4% 
moderately 8.2% 
slightly 32.8% 
slightly distrust 27.6% 
moderately 9.6% 
strongly 10.6% 
no opinion 9 .9% 




25. Choice of the future of Hong Kong after 1997 
independent 36.6% 
continue British rule 41,0% 
Sovereignty in PRC 12.2% 
no opinion 10.2% 
C. Father's attitudes 
26.工 love China very much 
strongly agree 13,3% 
moderately 16.1% 
slightly 26.9% 
slightly disagree 14.0% 
moderately 5,4% 
strongly 7.0% 
don't know 17.3% 
21• No merit is found in Chinese socialism 
strongly agree 10.2% 
moderately 11.6% 
slightly 16.8% 
slightly disagree 31.4% 
moderately 9.1% 
strongly 6,9% 
don't know 14.1% 
28. The communist government manages China very well 
strongly agree 1.8% 
moderately 3.2% 
slightly 8.4% 
slightly disagree 20.5% 
moderately 26.2% 
strongly 28.5% 
don't know 11,5% 
29. If nationalist government is to rule China, it -jill do a 
better job than the commimist government 
strongly agree 3.3% 
moderately 4.1% 
slightly 20.3% 
slightly disagree 20.8% 
moderately 10.9% 
strongly 9.8% 
don't know 30.8% 
f - k 
30. Most of the officials in the communist government are net 
corrupted 
strongly agree 2.9% 
moderately 4.2% 
slightly 6.2% 
slightly disagree 12.5% 
moderately 21.0% 
strongly 41.9% 
don't know 11.4% 
31. I am willing to contribute my strength to China 
strongly agree 7.9% 
raoderately 9.1% 
slightly 23.5% 
slightly disagree 11.2% 
moderately 6.2% 
strongly 9.0% 
don't know 33.2% 
32. I am loyal to the communist party 
strongly agree 2,9% 
moderately 3.6% 
slightly S.0% 
slightly disagree 11.7% 
moderately 12.9% 
strongly 39,0% 
don't know 21.9% 
33. On weighing the past performance of the communist government, 
its merits outnumber demerits 
strongly agree 3.7% 
moderately 6.9% 
slightly 14.8% 
slightly disagree 20.2% 
moderately 14.4% 
strongly 15.9% 
don't know 24.2% 
34. Be patient, and the communist government's management of 
China will get to improve 
strongly agree 3.1% 
moderately 4.5% 
slightly 17.2% 
slightly disagree 16.7% 
moderately 14,3% 
strongly 15.0% 
don't know 29,0% 
35. The leadership of the communist government neglects the 
interest of the Hong Kong people when drafting the basic law 
strongly agree 14.7% 
moderately 13.7% 
slightly 18.1% 
slightly disagree 12.7% 
moderately 4.9% 
strongly ,4.4% 
don't know 31.5% 
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36. Level of trust towards the communist government in general 
strongly trust 2.4% 
moderately 8.1% 
slightly 17.8% 
slightly distrust 20.1% 
moderately 16.6% 
strongly 17.2% 
don't know 17.9% 




don't know 18.0% 
D. Mother's attitudes 
38. Most of the officials in the communist government are not 
corrupted 
strongly agree 2.0% 
moderately 2.9% 
slightly 7.2% 
slightly disagree 13.5% 
moderately 19.3% 
strongly 38.8% 
don't know 16.3% 
39. I love China very much 
strongly agree 10.4% 
moderately 11.1% 
slightly 22.7% 
slightly disagree 12.6% 
moderately 7.9% 
strongly 10.0% 
don't know 25.3% 
40. The communist government manages China very well 
strongly agree .7% 
moderately 1.3% 
slightly 5.8% 
slightly disagree 16.2% 
moderately 25.9% 
strongly 33.6% 
don't know 16.5% 
41. I am loyal to the communist party 
strongly agree 2.0% 
moderately 1.9% 
slightly 6.5% 
slightly disagree 10.4% 
moderately 14.7% 
strongly 38.4% 
don't know 26.1% 
f - k 
42. The leadership of the communist government neglects the 
interest of the Hong Kong people when drafting the basic law 
strongly agree 12.1% 
moderately 11.7% 
slightly 16.7% 
slightly disagree 12.1% 
moderately 6.7% 
strongly 5.5% 
don't know 35.2% 
43. If nationalist government is to rule China, it will do a 
better job than the communist government 
strongly agree 3.7% 
moderately 5.6% 
slightly 18.0% 
slightly disagree 15.4% 
moderately 8.5% 
strongly 8.3% 
don't know 40.4% 
44. No merit is found in Chinese socialism 
strongly agree 9.2% 
moderately 9.3% 
slightly 17.1% 
slightly disagree 26.0% 
moderately 8.8% 
strongly 5.5% 
don't know 24.1% 
45. On weighing the past performance of the communist government, 
its merits outnumber demerits 
strongly agree 3.7% 
moderately 5.6% 
slightly 15.2% 
slightly disagree 16.0% 
moderately 15.4% 
strongly 14.8% 
don't know 29.3% 
46. I am willing to contribute my strength to China 
strongly agree 4.9% 
moderately 7.1% 
slightly 19.8% 
slightly disagree 8.7% 
moderately 8.2% 
strongly 11.4% 
don't know 39.9% 
47. Be patient, and the communist government‘s management of 
China will get to improve 
strongly agree 2.1% 
moderately 2.8% 
slightly 12.6% 
slightly disagree 17.0% 
moderately 11.5% 
strongly 17.8% 
don't know 36.1% 
f - k 
48• Level of trust towards the communist government in general 
strongly trust 1.0% 
moderately 4.1% 
slightly 15.2% 
slightly distrust 21.6% 
moderately 18.9% 
strongly 19.9% 
don't know 19.3% 




don't know 18,5% 
50. Choice of the future of Hong Kong 
Father Mother 
independent 19*7% 18.1% 
continuous British rule 32.6% 37.1% 
sovereignty by PRC 17.9% 10.6% 
no opinion 8.7% 10.4% 
don't know 21.1% 23.9% 
51. Source of knowing parents‘ attitudes 
Father Mother 
discussion with parents 45.5% 45.6% 
by overhearing 36.4% 31.4% 
by wild guess 18.1% 23.0% 
E. Parent-adolescent relationship 
52. Disciplinary method of parents 
Father Mother 
very strict 8.6% 6.9% 
moderately strict 19.7% 17.2% 
slightly strict 48.6% 46.6% 
slightly lenient 17.7% 24.1% 
moderately lenient 3.4% 3.2% 
very lenient 2.2% 2.1% 
53. Opinion expression freedom on social affairs 
never 3.0% 
usually no 8.5% 
sometimes no 9.8% 
sometimes yes 22.9% 
usually yes 37.2% 
every time yes 18.7% 
54. Acceptance of opinions by parents 
never .8% 
usually no 4.7% 
sometimes no 13.1% 
sometimes yes 40.0% 
usually yes 38.3% 
every time yes 3,1% 
f - k 
55. Closeness with parents 
Father Mother 
very close 12.7% 25,5% 
moderately close 22.8% 34.8% 
slightly close 34.0% 27.3% 
slightly distant 20.6% 8.1% 
moderately distant 5.4% 2.2% 
very distant 4.4% 2.1% 
56. Parents‘ care for adolescents 
Father Mother 
very much 1.7% 4.2% 
moderately much 2.8% 4.4% 
slightly much 9.6% 18.3% 
appropriate 68.7% 65*1% 
slightly little 11.8% 5.4% 
moderately little 2.9% 1.1% 
very little 2.5% 1.4% 
57. Emotional dependency on parents 
Father Mother 
very dependent 3.1%� 6，5% 
moderately dependent 3.5% 12.1% 
slightly dependent 27.8% 36.8% 
slightly independent 35.0% 24.2% 
moderately independent 15.8% 10.7% 
very independent 14.8% 9,7% 
58. Discussion with parents on China affairs 
Father Mother 
always 6.9% 4.4% 
sometimes 36.7% 30,3% 
seldom 38.2% 43.7% 
never 18.1% 21.7% 
59. Discussion with parents on prominent issues concerning the 
PRC government 
Father Mother 
always 7.5% 3.7% 
sometimes 32.7% 25.2% 
seldom 41.1% 44.1% 
never 18.7% 27,0% 
60. Opinion expression freedom when discussing with parents on 
China affairs 
Father Mother 
never 7.4% 8.5% 
usually no 8.7% 8.3% 
sometimes no 11.4% 8.6% 
sometimes yes 26.2% 26.6% 
usually yes 34.0% 33.8% 
every time yes 12.3% 14.2% 
f - k 
61. Parents‘ acceptance of adolescent‘s opinions 
Father Mother 
never 2.6% 2.1% 
usually no 8.2% 7.7% 
sometimes no 25.9% 17.7% 
sometimes yes 42.(5% 47.5% 
usually yes 18.5% 22.6% 
every time yes 2.1% 2.5% 





63. Parents' discussion with friends on China affairs 
Father Mother 
never 11,3% 20,5% 
seldom 33.8% 42,3% 
sometimes 43.0% 31.-3% 
always 11.9% 5.9% 
64. Interest of parents on China affairs 
Father Mother 
very interested 11.0% 4.9% 
moderately interested 28.6% 18.2% 
slightly interested 38.9% 38.4% 
slightly uninterested 14.1% 23.4% 
moderately uninterested 3.9% 7.7% 
very uninterested 3.4% 7.4% 
65. Parents‘ attention towards China affairs (through mass media) 
Father Mother 
always 54.2% 29,6% 
sometimes 35.4% 42.7% 
seldom 8.5% 22.2% 
never 1.8% 5.5% 
F. Influence of the school 






67. Stand of teachers (including teachers and principal) on China 
affairs 
very subjective 8.5 
quite subjective 19.9 
quite objective 59.7 
very objective 11.9 
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72• Agreement with opinions of socialisation agents on China 
affairs 
a. Father 
strongly agree 5.8% 
moderately agree 16.8% 
slightly agree 48.5% 
slightly disagree 17.6% 
moderately disagree 6.2% 
strongly disagree 5.0% 
b. Mother 
strongly agree 3,7% 
moderately agree 13.2% 
slightly agree 49.5% 
slightly disagree 20.1% 
moderately disagree 6.9% 
strongly disagree 6.6% 
c. Peers 
strongly agree 1.3% 
moderately agree 8.1% 
slightly agree 54,1% 
slightly disagree 22.6% 
moderately disagree 5,8% 
strongly disagree 3.0% 
d. Teachers 
strongly agree 5.7% 
moderately agree 27.8% 
slightly agree 49.7% 
slightly disagree 10.2% 
moderately disagree 2.9% 
strongly disagree 3.7% 
e. Mass Media 
strongly agree 12.0% 
moderately agree 32.9% 
slightly agree 40.2% 
slightly disagree 9.1% 
moderately disagree 2.0% 
strongly disagree 3.7% 
G. Knowledge on the PRC and the ROC government 
Right Wrong 
73. President of the PRC 
- Y a n g Shang Kun 30.3% 69.7% 
74. Party secretary of the PRC 
- J i a n g Ze Min 47.3% 52.7% 
75. Establishment year of the PRC 
- 1 9 4 9 41.2% 58.8% 
76. Director of Xinhua Nevjs Agency, H.K. 
一 Zhou Nan 45.1% 54.9% 
77. President of the ROC 
一�Lee� Deng� Fei� 54.5%� 45.5%�
78. National Day of the ROC 
-October 10 56.9% 43.1% 
79. Legislature of the PRC 
一 National People‘s Congress 13.1% 85.9% 
f - k 
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94.� Place� of� birth� of� parents�
Father� Mother�
China� 76.5%� 62,0%�
Hong� Kong� .3%� .3%�




large� firm,� high� grade� 2.8%� .6%�
large� firm,� low� medium� grade� 7.3%� 3.8%�government,� high� grade� 1.2%� .5%�
government；�low� to� mediuiu� grade� 5.7%� 3.3%�
owner,� small� to� medium� firm� 17,7%� 6.3%�
employee,� small� to� medium� firm� 26.2%� 7.9%�factory,� foreman 5.7% 2,4% 
factory,� worker� 17.8%� 15.6%�teacher,� primary� to�
secondary� school� .7%� 1.0%�hawker� 1.9%� 1.6%�farmer/� fisherman� 2.1%� 2.8%�housewife� 0.0%� 45.0%�retired� 5,2%� 1.3%�no� occupation� 1.6%� 5.2%�non-profitable� organization,�
nigh� grade� 0,0%� .6%�non—profitable� organization�
low� to� medium� grade� .2%� 1,2%�
others� 1.0%� .2%�
96. Education level of parents 
Father Mother 
no 10.9% 15.2% 
primary 36.0% 42.5% 
secondary, junior 24.7% 21.2% 
secondary, senior 18.3% 14.5% 
tertiary, professional 3.9% 3.2% 
tertiary, university 5.8% 5.8% 
graduate school .4% .3% 
97. Total family income Range 1 000 - 300 000 
Mean 12 302.0 
98. Type of house living in 
public housing 44.0% 
private 40.2% 
private, rent 11.5% 
hostel 2.7% 
squatter hut 1.7% 
99. Subjective socio-economic status 
upper .7% 
upper middle 13.7% 
middle 52.6% 
lower middle 29.2% 
lower 3.8% 
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